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Value-Conflict of Environmentalism vs. 
the Growth Ethic 
In the last few generations, humans have produced com-
plex social structures that depend on rapid use of finite 
resources and the technological alterations of natural en-
vironments. This history of our times can largely be 
understood by recognizing that technology and its guiding 
will of economic production has placed man in a position 
to undermine his own existence through environmental de-
struction. Because of this potential, it has become essen-
tial to recognize that the community of man must, at some 
point, make collective decisions about technological ans-
wers as they effect environmental questions. 
The recent decade of the 1970's was a period in which 
there developed a growing awareness that the natural en-
vironment is not an indestructible resource. Many people 
have come to realize that technological innovation can be 
a mixed blessing. Questions are now being raised as to 
whether or not some of the apparent economies resulting 
from technological enterprise are too costly in terms of 
an environmental life-quality. Other people find themselves 
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bewildered because of a lack of adequate opportunities to 
become sufficiently informed so as to make appropriate 
judgments and influence legislation. Environmental prob-
lems as they exist today are extremely complex. There are 
many positions within the environmental controversy, and 
there exists a wide array of interest groups attempting to 
exert influence in various areas of vested concern. Al-
though it is somewhat of an oversimplification, people can 
be separated into two camps on most environmental issues: 
those who place economic activity and the development of 
technology ahead of preservation of the environment and 
those whose priorities are the opposite. The paradox here 
lies in the fact that a society like ours, so long com-
mitted to growth, consumption, and nature exploitation, 
finds itself in a value conflict over previously accepted 
and unchallenged practices. 
Ehrlich, Holdren, and Holm (1971) speak in a broader 
sense to this paradox by suggesting that: 
. the striking dualism in contemporary sci-
ence and technology--monurnental achievements be-
side astonishing omissions and misdirections--
deserves the most careful scrutiny. If the pres-
ent destructive course is to be altered, we must 
understand not only operational details of past 
and present errors, but also the way in which 
society's institutions, goals, and prejudices 
have interacted with science and technology to 
produce such imperfect results (p. 2). 
From a sociological perspective, the current questions 
and debates over environment vs. economics form a series 
of value conflicts around which the battle lines are, in 
3 
many instances, clearly visible. Conflict may range in 
intensity from mere discontent to physical and violent 
confrontations, but the issue of contention remains sali-
ent: economic growth vs. environmental protection. People 
who align themselves with pro-growth tend to feel that 
there are still ample resources for exploitation, and re-
source shortages can only be solved through the unhindered 
free enterprise system. Many in this group have a vested 
interest in economic expansion regardless of possible en-
vironmental damage. Some pro-growth supporters challenge 
the basic assumptions of environmentalist arguments by 
stating that: (1) growth and production are not in them-
selves related to environmental damage, (2) slow economic 
growth inhibits social problem solving because of less 
generated revenue, and (3) only a growth economy can con-
tinue to produce a socially acceptable standard of living 
(Sullivan and Thompson, 1980). 
On the state ballot of Missouri in the November, 1980, 
election was a proposition concerning the implementation 
of specific guidelines for the storage of nuclear waste. 
This issue, called Proposition II, is a valid example of 
the value conflict of economics vs. environment. The fol-
lowing is an excerpt from a letter drafted by the "No on 
II Committee; Missourians Against the Callaway Shutdown," 
and mailed to Missouri voters: 
A November proposal called Proposition II 
is being billed by its promoters as a 'moderate' 
measure.* But what proposition II's promoters 
don't tell you is that II would force the shut-
down of the Callaway nuclear plant located near 
Fulton. 
The shutdown of Callaway would eliminate a 
supply of electricity vitally needed for our 
homes, offices, factories, and farms. Consider 
these facts: 
- A shutdown of Callaway would cost over 
$900 million. That amounts to an aver-
age of over $500 for each and every Mis-
souri household. 
- The Callaway nuclear energy facility is 
designed to supply over 7 billion kilo-
watt hours of electricity every year. 
- The energy equivalent of over 10 million 
barrels of foreign oil annually. 
- The building of the Callaway plant and 
energy generated from it means thousands 
of jobs for Missouri people and millions 
of dollars to our state's economic vi-
tality. 
We need the Callaway energy plant. What we 
don't need are expensive new laws which cut off 
vitally needed energy and economic growth (Mis-
sourians Against Callaway Shutdown, 1980, n.p.). 
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On the other side of the controversy are those people 
who want to maintain the environment in an undisturbed 
state. For these people, continuous and unquestioned 
growth is seen as dangerous to natural environments. They 
see growth as: (1) using up limited resources, (2) in-
creasing the quantity of pollution, (3) not leading to a 
more equitable distribution of income, and (4) associated 
with the kind of technology that often creates enormous 
problems. They maintain that technology is often used 
*Note: Proposition II was a proposal to have strict 
federal safety rules applied to the storage of nuclear 
waste from any future nuclear plant in Missouri. Callaway 
is now under construction. The proposition failed. 
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before its possible effects are truly understood (Sullivan 
and Thompson, 1980). The pro-environmentalists are willing 
to sacrifice certain economic goals for environmental ones, 
believing that economic and technological benefits cannot 
be enjoyed in a world with a dying ecosystem. This posi-
tion is reflected in Galbraith's statement (as quoted in 
Lilenthal, 1975): 
.•• it is hard to suppose that penultimate 
Western man stalled in the ultimate traffic jam 
and slowly succumbing to carbon monoxide, will 
be especially enchanted to hear from the last 
survivor that in the preceding year the gross 
national product went up by a record amount 
(p. 38). 
Currently, one major focus of value conflict within 
the environmental framework concerns the present and future 
production of nuclear power energy. The extreme divergence 
of these opinions has symbolized the controversy in recent 
years about energy fissioning atoms. As Weaver (1979) sug-
gests: 
The debate has been frequently emotional, some-
times bitter, often confusing. Frightening 
stories about radiation hazards of nuclear ma-
terials vie with worrisome forecasts of energy 
famine, economic troubles and even environ-
mental disaster if nuclear energy is abandoned 
(p. 459). 
The debate over the use of nuclear energy is only 
alive because of the problem of resource depletion in the 
area of energy. During the last 80 years, highly industri-
alized societies like the United States have become in-
creasingly dependent upon the use of finite fossil fuels 
for the production of energy. The present "energy crisis" 
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evolved because heavy demand has pushed these fossil fuels 
closer to exhaustion. For example, geologist M. King 
Hubbert estimates that the world supply of oil and natural 
gas will be significantly depleted within 100 years 
(Ehrlich, 1977). The time frame is even more constricted 
in our society. Given our current levels of energy use, 
it is estimated that America will exhaust virtually all of 
its own oil and natural gas resources within the next 40 
years (Time, 1977). 
The crises in energy has led to a reassessment of al-
ternative sources of fuel production, with nuclear energy 
and coal being given top priority (U.S. News and T•Jorld Re-
port, 1977). According to proponents of nuclear energy, 
the development of the nuclear industry in the United 
States has been different from most other industrial de-
velopment in society. For example, some suggest that it 
is one of the first deliberate attempts to understand and 
control the risks of an emerging large scale technology 
(Ramey, 1970). An early report presented by the National 
Research Council and the National Academy of Sciences in 
1956 stated that: 
The use of atomic energy is perhaps one of the 
few major technological developments of the 
past 50 years in which careful consideration of 
the relationship of a new technology to the 
needs and welfare of human beings has kept pace 
with its development. Almost from the very be-
ginning of the days of the Manhattan Project, 
careful attention has been given to the biologi-
cal and medical aspects of the subject (p. 51). 
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The benefits of nuclear power have been promoted by 
various scientific, industrial, and citizen groups in re-
cent years. Perhaps the argument most often presented by 
proponents of nuclear energy is the economic one. In its 
most basic structure, the economic rationale for nuclear 
energy includes the following abbreviated points, according 
to Ramey (1970): 
1. Nuclear power provides competition to other 
energy sources--competition which benefits 
the consumer by keeping power costs down 
and rates down. 
2. Nuclear power costs do not vary appreciably 
with location--a fact of considerable conse-
quence to regions which are distant from 
fuel sources. 
3. The use of nuclear power will decrease the 
burden on the nation's transportation sys-
tems. 
4. The unit costs of nuclear plants decrease 
more rapidly with increased size than unit 
costs of other types of power plants. This 
characteristic is important since the gen-
eral trend is toward larger and larger elec-
tric power plants. Nuclear energy has 
considerable potential for improved operat-
ing economics. 
5. Nuclear power is produced without releasing 
combustion products into the atmosphere and 
therefore contributes significantly in the 
fight for clear air. 
6. Nuclear plants have an aesthetically attrac-
tive appearance and in many instances provide 
opportunities for recreational activities in 
areas surrounding them. 
7. The use of Nuclear Power will help conserve 
fossil fuels for purposes for which they are 
especially suited--such as raw materials for 
producing chemicals, rubber, and plastics 
(pp. 49-50). 
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Not many years ago prospects for the nuclear industry 
were booming. Nuclear electricity was seen by many as the 
clearest, cheapest, and most convenient form of power. 
Production orders for nuclear plants increased consider-
ably and in just three years (1971 through 1973), 100 new 
reactors were ordered. Optimistic projections foresaw as 
many as 1,500 reactors in the United States by the year 
2000 (Weaver, 1979). 
Then came the oil embargo of 1973-74, followed by 
strong national pressures to conserve electricity and fuel. 
Immediately the price of electricity began to rise sharply 
and the increase in electricity demand slowed with numer-
ous reactor orders cancelled or postponed. Concurrently, 
government policy shifted from unqualified promotion to 
mixed support. Public opinion began to change in some 
sectors as opponents of nuclear energy mounted demonstra-
tions at nuclear reactor sites from Seabrook in New Hamp-
shire to Diablo Canyon in California. They raised concern 
over the hazards of nuclear power which primarily focused 
on two major issues: (1) the safety of the nuclear reac-
tors, and (2) the safe disposal of massive quantities of 
highly dangerous wastes (Dasmann, 1976). 
Against this background stands an important fact: 
Nuclear energy is now producing one-eighth of all electric 
power generated in this country. At present, more than 70 
nuclear power plants in 27 states have received operating 
licenses. More than 90 others are under construction. 
Projections indicate that by 1985, our reliance upon nu-
clear energy will nearly triple, with over 23% of our na-
tion's electricity coming from atomic sources (U.S. News 
and World Report, 1977). 
Atomic power and the energy of nuclear fission has 
been with us since the first atomic bomb was tested in 
July, 1945, and used in August of that year. The follow-
ing is a brief explanation of atomic power taken from No 
Nukes: Everyone's Guide to Nuclear Power (Gyorgy, 1979): 
Atomic power refers to the energy that is re-
leased when atoms of matter are split. In 
1905, Albert Einstein showed mathematically in 
his Theory of Relativity that matter could be 
changed into energy, that it has energy in it. 
The f arnous formula E=Mc2 showed how much energy 
could be released. The energy (e) from uranium 
(for example) would be equal to the mass or 
amount (M) of uranium, multiplied by the square 
(C2) of the speed of light. Atomic power re-
fers to the power of very specific atoms. 
Basically two elements are used: an isotope 
of uranium called uranium -235 and the manmade 
plutonium -239. The atoms of these materials 
are split for three reasons. The first is to 
produce an explosion--an atomic bomb. The 
second is to produce bomb-grade materials in a 
nuclear production reactor. The third use is 
to produce heat, make steam, and generate 
electricity in a commercial nuclear power plant 
(pp. 2 9 - 3 0 ) . 
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A look at the history of nuclear energy in the United 
States shows a compelling post-war atomic development start-
ing with with the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which estab-
lished a "five-man" Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to be 
-
appointed by the president for five-year terms with senate 
approval. All research and development of atomic energy 
was to go through this commission whose specific purpose 
was officially stated as follows~ 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the 
people of the United States that, subject at 
all times to the paramount objective of assur-
ing the corrunon defense and security, the de-
velopment and utilization of atomic energy 
shall, as far as practicable, be directed 
toward improving the public welfare, increasing 
the standard of living, strengthening free 
competition in private enterprise, .and promot-
ing world peace (Dean, 1953, p. 23). 
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The accumulated power of the Atomic Energy Corrunission 
began to manifest itself in the 1960's with increased de-
mand for electricity, and as Seaborg (1971) wrote: 
The years 1963-1967 constituted a crucial pe-
riod of change for nuclear power. Costs came 
down further as nuclear power proponents drew 
up plants for 500-megawatt, and even 1,000 
megawatt power plants. The first sign of a 
real economic breakthrough came in 1964 with 
the selection of nuclear power for the Oyster 
Creek Plant by the Jersey Central Power and 
Light Company. More of the new large compe-
titive nuclear plants were selected as other 
utilities climbed on the nuclear band wagon. 
Roughly half of the new large-sized corruner-
cial power plants ordered in 1966 and 1967 
were nuclear (p. 28). 
The 1960's also marked a time when the United States 
Government and the American society in general had to con-
tend with various social movements against the political 
and economic structure. The first stirrings of public 
opposition to nuclear energy were outweighed by other 
social issues. But a growing environmental awareness at 
the end of the decade, together with the widespread growth 
of atomic plants, created the atmosphere for increased 
public opposition toward nuclear energy in the following 
decade of the 1970's (Gyorgy, 1979). 
11 
In the decade of 1960, energy use more than doubled 
in the United States. Advertising and lifestyles encour-
aged heavy electrical use. According to Lapp (1971) , in 
1969 alone, utilities spent $323.8 million on sales and 
advertising, and $41 million on research and development. 
Consumption patterns seemed to be set in an upward motion. 
Although in 1969, there were only 16 "nukes" licensed to 
operate in America, 54 were under construction and 35 more 
had been ordered (Gyorgy, 1979). 
As the number of nuclear plants increased from 16 to 
nearly 80, with many more planned and already under con-
struction, public opposition began to spread. With this 
increased opposition there came increased solar-related 
experiments and other alternative energy sources as the 
decade progressed (Gyorgy, 1979). 
On January 1, 1970, the National Environmental Policy 
Act went into effect requiring the AEC to prepare an en-
vironmental impact statement for new nuclear plants being 
licensed. By the early 1970's, citizen opposition to 
nuclear energy was becoming more aggressive and had the 
effect of slowing down the AEC's licensing process. Ac-
cording to the AEC, the average time for issuing construc-
tion permits had risen from 10 months in 1967 to more than 
20 months in 1971. These delays were credited to the Na-
tional Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) , the 1970 
Water Quality Improvement Act, and to citizen intervening 
groups (Lewis, 1972). 
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In July, 1971, the U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington, 
D.C., decided in favor of the National Environmental Protec-
tion Agency and some local citizen groups against the AEC 
in the Calvert Cliffs case. This landmark decision in-
formed the AEC that it did not have the right to license 
nuclear projects without NEPA consideration of "radiologi-
cal factors~" The court decision stated that: 
. • • the very purpose of NEPA was to tell fed-
eral agencies that environmental protection is 
as much a part of their responsibility as is 
protection and promotion of the industries they 
regulate. Whether or not the specter of a na-
tional power crisis is as real as the Commission 
apparently believes, it must not be used to cre-
ate a blackout of environmental considerations 
(Lewis, 1972, p. 284). 
Although this did not prevent any nuclear plants from being 
built, it meant that 63 pending license applications were 
now subject to environmental review. 
The decade of the 1970's also witnessed a signifi-
cant number of "dissident" scientists publically opposing 
the use of nuclear energy. Individual scientists like Drs. 
John Gofman, Arthur Tamplin, Ernest Sternglass, and Thomas 
Mancuso, carried on independent research concerning radia-
tion standards and public health; research that exposed 
serious credibility gaps in AEC statements about radiation 
limits. On the anniversary of the atomic bombing of 
Hiroshima, the following declaration was signed by more 
than 2,000 biologists, chemists, engineers, and other sci-
entists and presented to the congress and President of the 
United States: 
... the country must recognize that it now ap-
pears imprudent to move forward with a rapidly 
expanding nuclear power plant construction program. 
The risks of doing so are altogether too great. 
We, therefore, urge a drastic reduction in new nu-
clear power plant construction starts before ma-
jor progress is achieved in the required research 
and in resolving present controversies about 
safety, waste disposal, and plutonium safeguards. 
For similar reasons, we urge the nation to suspend 
its program of exporting nuclear plants to other 
countries pending resolution of the national se-
curity questions associated with the rise by these 
countries of the by-product plutonium from United 
States nuclear reactors (Union of Concerned Sci-
entists, 1978, p. 337). 
In 1973, the Friends of the Earth environmentalist 
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group forced the AEC, under federal law, to release docu-
ments showing a "cover-up" of a 1964 reactor safety study 
which concluded that in a moderate to severe nuclear acci-
dent (one facility) 45,000 people could die, 100,000 could 
be injured, with property damage of $17 billion or more 
(Nader and Abbotts, 1977). By the late 1970's, the early 
critics of the 1960's were being joined by more small groups 
of intervenors and by organizations like the Task Force on 
Nuclear Pollution, Friends of the Earth, and others. As 
people learned more about nuclear power, a new activist 
movement against it began to emerge, especially as legal 
action against plants failed to stop their construction. 
Citizen groups based on public education and civil disobedi-
ence in the form of nonviolent direct action began to 
spread throughout the nation. As the nuclear energy con-
flict became more exposed, its present use and future con-
sideration became a volatile political issue, encompassing 
the environmental and economic questions referred to earlier. 
Issue of Public Acceptance of 
Nuclear Power 
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The politics of nuclear energy in the 1970's produced 
a growing relationship between nuclear policy and public 
participation. Individuals and groups increased their de-
mands for more input into policy making at both national, 
state, and local levels, and in some cases these demands 
were reflected in legislation. One excellent example of 
national legislation that encourages public participation 
is the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970 (referred 
to earlier), which contains authority for citizen lawsuits. 
One interesting and vital area that reflects this relation-
ship between public and policy is the state initiative to 
submit the nuclear issue to direct popular vote. In 1976, 
for example, seven states voted on an initiative to re-
strict the building of nuclear plants within their juris-
dictional limits~-california, in the June primary election; 
and Arizona, Colorado, Montana, Ohio, Oregon, and Washing-
ton, at the time of the November election (Wenner and 
Wenner, 1978). 
Because each of these initiatives was a part of the 
same national campaign to limit nuclear energy, all six 
state ballots contained nearly the same major provisions 
that mandated that legislatures concern themselves with 
(1) the safety and security systems associated with the 
plant; {2) the waste disposal problem; and (3) the elimi-
nation {or waiver) of the federally imposed $560 million 
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insurance limit for nuclear accidents. Table I lists the 
provisions, ranks the states according to how difficult 
(restrictive the question presented on the ballot was), 
and the percentage of the state populations voting for the 
nuclear moratorium. 
The Wenner study of the 1976 initiative ballots found 
the following independent variable categories to support 
their own research hypothesis, as well as other hypotheses 
derived from earlier research: 
Demographic Characteristics: being Democratic, fe-
male, white, young (under 35), better educated, and urban 
are associated with skepticism concerning nuclear power in 
these six states. These variables are also found in other 
nuclear power and public opinion research; for example, 
Dunlap and Allen (1976). According to Wenner and Wenner 
(1978) , ecological/environmental concern has been consid-
ered a middle-class phenomenon; a concern of people who 
have the income, political clout, and leisure time to de-
velop an ecological consciousness. However, wealthy people 
tend to favor nuclear power, whereas less affluent people 
tend to be more uncertain. Education is associated with 
skepticism toward nuclear power; affluence with acceptance 
of it (divergent variables). (There is also indication 
that less affluent, blue collar workers tend to favor nu-
clear energy for economic reasons in various local areas.)* 
*This study does not include operationalized variables 
concerning perceived risks by the citizens in the six 
states of nuclear accidents. 
TABLE I 
STATE NUCLEAR MORATORIUM MEASURES 
Legislative Safety Waste Liability 
Approval Shown Disposal Limits 
--
Oregon 2/1 x x Abolish 
Montana Majority x x Abolish 
Washington 2/1 "certain conditions" 
Arizona Majority x x Abolish 
Ohio Majority x 0 No Limit. 


























Economic Variables; Moritorium 
Non-Supporters 
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People who were concerned about such issues as unem-
ployment, electricity rates, property taxes, and who lived 
in heavy industrial (energy intensive) areas were more 
likely to vote against the moritorium in all six states. 
Economic Variables; Moritorium 
Supporters 
Persons with negative attitudes toward growth and 
its possible effects of increased pollution, increased con-
gestion, and heterogeneity in local populations, tended to 
be in favor of the moritorium in all six states. 
Wenner and Wenner (1978) conclude from their study of 
1976 nuclear moritorium initiatives in six states that 
demographic characteristics such as sex, race, age, rural, 
or urban are less important in determining nuclear energy 
attitudes in the public than are certain situational vari-
ables, such as cost of electricity, need for increased 
energy use in local areas based on the type of economy 
and educational status of community residents. This re-
sult was supported in all six states. This study also 
supports other research, suggesting that during this time 
frame (1976), the majority of Americans were willing to 
accept nuclear power as a significant factor in future 
energy plans for the United States (Wenner and Wenner, 
1978). 
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In the spring of 1979, a national opinion survey, 
conducted by the Gallup Opinion Index, found that more 
Americans favored "caution" in the construction of nu-
clear power plants, although a solid majority continued 
to believe that it was important to develop nuclear power 
as a national energy resource. This survey was taken 
less than a month after the March 28, 1979, nuclear plant 
accident at Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania. 
The Three Mile Island situation helped to explain the 
sharp changes in public attitudes toward nuclear energy 
as compared to a 1976 Gallup survey (i.e., the percentage 
of Americans who favor a cutback in nuclear plant opera-
tions until stricter safety regulations can be developed 
increased from 40% in 1976 to 66% in 1979). This "go-
slow" approach was generated in public attitudes reflected 
in the following Gallup (1979) findings: 
- Three in 10 (4 in 10 in the East) were 'ex-
tremely' (12%) or 'quite' (16%) worried about 
their own and/or their family's safety in the 
irrunediate aftermath of the reactor incident. 
- As many as 4 persons in 10 (41%) felt the 
situation was, in general, not handled as well 
as possible, reflecting the confusing early 
reports regarding the seriousness of the 
situation. 
- Three in every four in the survey (75%) think 
a situation such as the Three Mile Island plant 
accident is likely to happen again. 
- While most Americans continue to attach con-
siderable importance to the development of nu-
clear power, as many as 6 in 10 (62%) say they 
would object to having a nuclear plant con-
structed near their home (within a radius of 
five miles). This proportion represents a sharp 
increase since the 1976 survey, when only 45% 
said they would have a similar objection. 
- American people are not ready to reject the 
use of nuclear power for future energy needs. 
Only one American in four (25%) favors shutting 
down all nuclear plants at this time. In addi-
tion, 63% feel that it is either 'extremely' or 
'somewhat' important to have more nuclear power 
plants to meet the future energy needs of the 
nation ( 197 6 was 71%) (pp. 1-14) . 
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Tables II and III are percentage responses broken down 
into demographic variable categories which reflect two of 
the questions asked on the Gallup survey. These two ques-
tions are included here because of their general applica-
bility to national nuclear issues. (Material from the 
Gallup Poll was both quoted and paraphrased, with selected 
result categories included.) 
The volatile and complex nature of the nuclear energy 
issue is reflected in the following Gallup findings con-
cerning economic vs. safety factors. The significant find-
ing is that the American people as a whole place economic 
factors ahead of safety considerations. Some response per-
centages are: 
- By a vote of 50 to 41%, the public indicates 
it would not be willing to pay higher prices for 
electricity in order to reduce the nation's de-
pendency on nuclear power. 
- In addition, the public, by a 56 to 31% ratio, 
expresses the belief that the presence of nu-
clear plants is less of a risk to the nation than 
the energy shortage that almost certainly would 
result if these plants were permanently shut down 
(Gallup Opinion Index, 1979, p. 7). 
Tables IV and V show the questions and significant findings. 
TABLE II 
IMPORTANCE OF NUCLEAR PLANTS 
Question: "In order to meet the future needs of the nation, how impor-
tant do you feel it is to have more nuclear power plants--
extremely important, somewhat important, not too important, 
or not at all important?" 
Extremely Somewhat Not too Not at all No 
Important Important Important Important Opinion 
National 30% 33% 13% 17% 7% 
Sex 
---r:1ale 40 31 10 16 5 
Female 21 35 17 17 10 
Race 
--white 31 33 13 16 7 
Non-White 24 31 17 20 8 
Education 
College 37 35 10 16 2 
High School 28 34 16 16 2 
Grade School 23 25 13 22 17 
Region 
East 27 33 16 19 5 
Midwest 29 39 12 15 5 
South 32 29 13 17 9 






--i:rotal under 30 25 
18-24 years 24 
25-29 years 26 
30-49 years 34 
50 & older 29 
Income 














TABLE II (Continued) 
































































Clerical & Sales 34 
Manual Workers 30 
Non-Labor Force 26 
City Size 










Source: Gallup Opinion Index 
TABLE II (Continued) 











































NUCLEAR SAFETY REGULATIONS 
Question: "Do you feel that nuclear power plants 
operating today are safe enough with the 
present safety regulations, or do you feel 
that their operations should be cut back 
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According to Otway, Maurer, and Thomas (1978), many 
technologists and scientists have been surprised at the 
growing strength of public opposition to nuclear power, 
especially in view of seemingly persuasive technical argu-
ments promoting its use. The application of an attitude 
model to the issue of public attitudes toward nuclear 
power, however, found a relatively minor role of technical 
and environmental concerns is determining public attitude 





RESPONSE TO QUESTION REGARDING WILL-
INGNESS TO PAY HIGHER PRICES TO 
REDUCE NUCLEAR DEPENDENCY 




College Background 43 50 
High School 40 51 
Grade School 39 47 
East 43 49 
Midwest 35 54 
South 45 47 
West 43 48 
Source: GalluE OE inion Index (1979) I p. 8. 
TABLE V 
No 
RESPONSE TO QUESTION REGARDING WHETHER 
NUCLEAR PLANTS OR ENERGY SHORTAGES 
PRESENT THE GREATER RISK 
Nuclear Energy 
Plants Shortage No 
National 31% 56% 
Men 27 63 
Women 34 51 
College Background 31 62 
High School 30 58 
Grade School 32 40 
East 36 54 
Midwest 25 60 
South 29 57 
West 35 54 

























debate may be the focal point of concerns about many so-
cial issues, and that it is not merely concerned with 
costs and benefits in the usual sense. The authors con-
tend that if there is a central issue in the nuclear 
energy controversy, that issue is personal and political 
power, and public input in the control of that power. For 
example, for the "pro nuclear energy" group, it was eco-
nomic and technical benefits which accounted for most of 
their positive attitudes. For the "against nuclear energy" 
group it was risk factors, specifically the anxiety factor 
of psychological risk which was most important (i.e., us-
ing nuclear power will expose one to risks without one's 
consent, and once exposed to these risks, one has no con-
trol over them). Otway et al. interpret these findings 
as an illustration of the complex nature of public atti-
tudes toward the use of nuclear power, suggesting that 
many people perceive risks and benefits "independently," 
rather than as together in a single level. For example, 
the belief that nuclear power use might produce sociopolit-
ical risks (terrorism) without necessarily producing en-
vironmental risks (air and water pollution). The 
significant finding that those against nuclear energy tend 
to place emphasis on psychological and sociopolitical fac-
tors indicates that: 
Part of the opposition to nuclear energy stems 
from concerns which go beyond technologies to 
the social and political institutions they 
imply. These concerns include the centraliza-
tion of scarce and vital resources (such as 
energy) , their control by ever-larger and 
impersonal bureaucracies, and the growing 
dependence on specialized knowledge of tech-
nocratic elites • • • and presents an oppor-
tunity for political confrontation at the 
local level (Otway et al., 1978, p. 109). 
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There is a growing feeling that there is a gap between 
anonymous "expert" decisions made at the national level 
and the more immediate concerns of local groups of people. 
More people want more power over decisions that have a 
psychological and physical (economic, environmental) im-
pact on them. Nuclear power may not be just another prob-
lem of technology, or environment, or energy economics. 
It has a psychological impact unique to our time. As 
Hohenemser and Kasperson (1977) assess: 
Throughout its 30-year history, nuclear power 
has inspired some of the major hopes and fears 
of mankind. While it is difficult to describe 
this or anecedate, to ignore the social his-
tory of nuclear power is to misunderstand its 
present predicament (p. 26). 
The preceding sections of this chapter have presented 
an overview of the nuclear energy conflict in the United 
States. No attempt was made to cover every aspect of the 
issue; however, the most salient areas were treated to pro-
vide adequate background knowledge for understanding the 
focal problem of the dissertation. 
Statement of the Problem 
Recent research has recognized that social movements 
often confront several dilemmas in attempting to mobilize 
the many strategies and tactics that are necessary for 
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success. The strategic and tactical problems faced by the 
anti-nuclear movement in the United Sta·tes have largely 
been emphasized in the research as four major elements: 
(1) the single-issue vs. multiple issue focus of the move-
ment, (2) the definition of nonviolence, (3) the intent 
of the civil disobedience practice by the protester, and 
(4) the use of affinity groups and a consensus style of 
decision-making (Barkan, 1979). These four dilemma areas 
play a significant role in the public image maintenance 
considerations of the movement. Any social movement must 
effectively confront and solve the problem of public rela-
tions in order to generate and maintain a legitimate base. 
Decisions by movement organizations or groups concerning 
specific strategies and tactics must incorporate the need 
for a consistent, positive public image. As Wilson (1973, 
p. 226) states: "Many social movements are often remem-
bered more for their tactics than for their objectives." 
Tactics contribute significantly to the establishment of 
the identity of a social movement because tactics may be 
all that is visible in the movement. Many social move-
ments are not much more than tactical organizations, hav-
ing little substance beyond their efforts to bring a 
cause to the attention of society or coerce some sphere 
of authority to induce change. In this paper the author 
will examine the issue of movement identity maintenance 
within the American anti-nuclear movement. Identity main-
tenance as an issue contains two basic areas of concern: 
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(1) external public relations and (2) internal membership 
identity. Both forms of identity maintenance are closely 
linked to the basic movement ideology of nonviolent direct 
action. Both are also closely linked to the structure of 
the movement organization. Nonviolent direct action as an 
ideology is generally more palatable to the public than is 
overt violence and property destruction. The anti-nuclear 
organizers as a group have wanted to avoid the tactical-
image mistakes of early social movements, and nonviolence 
has been their principal method of accomplishing this. 
The structure of the movement has primarily evolved as a 
symbolic link to this nonviolent ideology. Consensus de-
cision making and the use of affinity groups have projected 
a certain desired image to the public and also have served 
as integrating factors concerning movement membership. By 
maximizing individual participation, the movement's struc-
ture has produced a positive morale and minimized poten-
tial feelings of disenchantment with group decisions. The 
avoidance of group factionalism can also be an important 
property in promoting a positive public image. 
The problem of external image maintenance is basi-
cally handled by and modified through the ideology and 
structure of the anti-nuclear movement. In terms of an-
alysis, this represents an effective theoretical combi-
nation of the resource mobilization perspective (Oberschall, 
1973; McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Jenkins and Perrow, 1977) 
and the traditional social-psychological approach on the 
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collective behavior aspects of social movements (Smelser, 
1962). By theoretically combining these two perspectives, 
a greater understanding is generated concerning the move-
ment dilemmas of: (1) effective use of internal resources 
to promote a cause, (2) the need to project a positive 
public image, and (3) the need to produce and maintain the 
psychological affinity of the membership to the movement. 
Identity maintenance in the anti-nuclear movement will 
therefore be focused within this paper on the following: 
nonviolent direct action, use of the mass media (rhetoric 
and overt action), consensus decision making, and affinity 
groups (structure of the movement) . 
The above makes use of both resource mobilization and 
social-psychological processes. Both external identity 
maintenance (psychological affinity of members to the move-
ment) are generated and maintained by the ideology and 
structure of the movement. The Sunbelt Alliance Anti-
Nuclear Organization, which was based in Tulsa, Oklahoma, 
will be used as the case study focus for the dissertation. 
Although the Sunbelt Alliance is no longer in existence, 
their organization as it did exist provides an excellent 
example of an anti-nuclear alliance for the purpose of ;. _ 
this qualitative analysis.. This group, with its successes 
and failures, existed recently enough to be used as a vi-
able data base for generalizations concerning the movement 
against nuclear energy. 
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Methodology and Theoretical Framework 
The research methodology employed in this study is a 
combination of semistructured interviews, observation, 
and document study. The semistructured interview, often 
referred to as the focused interview (Phillips, 1976), 
makes use of topic areas and general hypothesis selected 
in advance of the interview. The questions used in the 
interview, however, are not worded in advance. The inter-
view subjects have been involved in a particular situation 
or process, and the researcher has provisionally analyzed 
this process in advance. This type of analysis allows the 
researcher to construct a tentative hypothesis from which 
an interview guide can be developed. The actual interview 
is focused on the subjective experiences and ideas of the 
subject within the framework of the questions asked (Merton, 
Fiske, and Kendall, 1956). This type of interview proce-
dure allows for maximum flexibility in terms of the ques-
tions asked. The researcher can probe for more specific 
answers and subjective meanings from the respondent. 
The second type of methodology used here is nonpartic-
ipant overt observation. With this method, the researcher 
does not participate in group activities, and the group 
participants are all aware of the nature of the research. 
Because much information can be gained from organized 
group meetings, it is believed that observation of the 
group members in a natural setting such as meetings, will 
be beneficial in data collection. 
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The third methodology used here is document study, 
in which information will be taken from various written 
materials concerning the ideology and strategy of the 
organization. Many nonpersonal materials are written con-
tinuously by organizations such as official statements of 
purposes and goals, memos from leaders to members, and 
strategy statements. These materials will be a major 
source of data collection. Document study has the signif-
icant advantage of neutralizing possible reactivity of the 
subjects that can develop from overt observation and in-
terviewing. Validity is increased by the fact that docu-
ments and written materials are usually forms of 
communication that are produced for specific organizational 
purposes, and are not affected by researcher input. 
The theoretical framework around which the data 
gathering and its substitutive interpretation is based, 
rests on the assumption that human behavior is created out 
of a balance of both social sources and individual creative 
components. The element of impression management reflects 
this assumption and is central to the theoretical focus 
of this research. Interaction and role-taking, central to 
the theory of symbolic interaction, allows the process of 
impression management to develop and continue. The collec-
tive production of specific appearance and images by groups 
within the anti-nuclear movement are formed by the creation 
of certain symbolic patterns of behavior and. 1anguage sys-
tems. This cooperative action comes about through a cormnon 
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definition of situations and a shared consensus of mean-
ings. Both leaders and members in the movement identify 
the need to project a particular image when interacting 
with forces and gr0ups outside the movement. This defined 
need has become a significant factor within the tactical 
framework of the movement and is reflected in the move-
ment's ideological statements. Rhetoric as a strategy for 
forming public opinion, planned use of the mass media, and 
passive civil disobedience as a confrontation tactic, all 
reflect a movement concern for dramaturgical construction 
of appearance and image. 
The social-psychology of the movement is also mani-
fested in the vocabulary of motives of participation ex-
pressed by individual members. This·area of focus 
represents a shift of emphasis from the collective identity 
maintenance of the group as social definition to personal 
identity-maintenance of members as definition of self. 
This personal identity is openly reflected in individual 
statements of rationale for joining the anit-nuclear move-
ment, and by careful examination of individual member's 
values, lifestyles, and personal histories of social move-
ment participation. This area of analysis is concerned 
primarily with the kind of self-identity that the movement 
gives to some of its members, and the appear of the move-
ment related to susceptibility of individual members. 
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Possible Contributions 
The dynamics of social conflict and social change are 
embedded within the collective behavior of social move-
ments. These movements represent groups of people acting 
in what they believe are their best interests to change 
power relations in a given society. Social movements pro-
vide one of the few opportunities in a mass society for 
generic social imput into the bureaucratic power base. 
Bureaucracies will continue to attempt executed dominance 
over the lives of individuals, with the internal needs of 
bureaucratic structures, such as growth and expanded use 
of resources, often conflicting with the very people they 
are to serve. The anti-nuclear movement symbolizes a 
dialetic of increasing bureaucratic control. In just the 
last few years sociologists have recognized the fact that 
public acceptance of nuclear energy is problematic and 
many have sensed the research challenge in the opportunity 
to analyze the dynamics of the anti-nuclear movement and 
to study the characteristics of the nuclear contriversy 
as a social process. The sociological face of the nuclear 
energy issue is pointed to by Duncan (1978): 
There is a steady evolution in which problems 
are initially defined as scientific and techni-
cal, later as economic, and still later (as we 
are now beginning to see) as intrinsically 
social and political (p. 19). 
Whatever the anti-nuclear movement's future, it will allow 
sociologists to test several hypotheses of both the 
-------
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traditional and emergent perspectives on social power, 
collective behavior, and social movements. It is hoped 
that this thesis will add to the motivation for such study. 
More significantly, in concentrating on the social-
psychology of this particular movement, using a specific 
group as a case study, the author hopes to contribute to 
the perspective of the sociology of public relations and 
identity-maintenance. A great amount of research and 
theory construction has been formulated on the macro-
sociological concept of the structural causes of social 
movements. For example, Smelser (1962) sees any form of 
collective behavior as a rational, utilitarian response to 
some form of structural strain. Ash (1972), in a similar 
view, uses the Marxist concepts of power and class cleav-
age as causal agents. For Ash, the connection of ideology 
and attitudes to system produced inequality and power dif-
ferences is not far removed from Smelser's notion of struc-
tural strain. Both authors emphasize conditions in the 
social structure as focal points for the study of social 
movements. Without denying the value of this approach, 
the author has chosen to concentrate on the internal or-
ganizational elements of the movement; how the members 
see themselves, what tactics must be used to foster and 
maintain a favorable (at best, tolerable) public image. 
This shift of emphasis toward the social psychology of the 
movement can be viewed as an extension of the theories of 
Oberschall (1973) and Toch (1965). Oberschall contends 
that true understanding of social movements can only be 
reached with an analysis of collective protests within a 
sustained organizational base containing a continuity of 
leadership. The members of the movement, as well as the 
success of the movement, are both affected by collective 
goals and organizational strategy forces. He believes 
that group structures can best be analyzed by looking at 
how various resources are allocated and managed in their 
relation to group goals. 
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For Toch (1965), a person's susceptibility to join a 
social movement can be linked to his individual search for 
meaning, and a desire to be involved in a form of change 
that will produce that meaning. Therefore, a psychologi-
cal bond exists between a movement's ability to sell it-
self and the individual's willingness to buy. This, 
according to Toch (p. 17), is the "crux of the social psy-
chology of social movements." 
The most significant appeals of a social movement are 
contained in its ideology, which defines the movement and 
its goals. Because this ideology is by definition counter 
to general social opinion, tactical decisions must be made 
concerning public relations procedures. The anti-nuclear 
movement has at this point opted for a passive resistance 
policy hoping to cultivate increased public sympathy for 
their cause. It is the author's hope that this thesis 
will contribute to the increased sociological understanding 
of the problems and realities of protest group mobilization 
and image maintenance. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF SELECTED LITERATURE 
Environmentalism 
There exists in the scholarly and professional lit-
erature an extensive amount of publications concerning 
environmentalism as a public issue. The word "environ-
mentalism" now refers to a widespread social movement 
dedicated to the ecological protection of the environment. 
In the last 10 years this movement has succeeded in pro-
ducing increased public concern with resource consumption 
and polluting activity and has prompted passage of environ-
mental legislation and the establishment of agencies at 
various levels of government (Albrecht, 1976). The litera-
ture focus is an eclectic representation of environmental 
issues examined by a variety of sociological interests, 
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theories, and methods. The central concern of the au-
thor's research, specifically the anti-nuclear movement, 
is not abundantly represented in the literature. As 
Duncan (1978) states: 
Several sociologists in the late 1940's and 
1950's forecast that atomic energy would pro-
duce economic abundance. . . • But no so-
ciologist foresaw how technical and social 
processes of nuclear power development would 
compromise its public acceptance and give 
rise to an antinuclear movement, currently 
led by the environmentalists (p. 1) . 
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Presently, the relationships between nuclear energy 
and society have not been examined by social scientists 
nearly as much as the opportunity has allowed. Often 
times the anti-nuclear movement is analyzed within the 
general environmental movement framework, or is researched 
as a general public issue using mass opinion collecting 
techniques. The social-psychological dynamics of the 
movement have been given comparatively limited treatment 
in scholarly studies. Because of its relationship to the 
anti-nuclear movement, the author will present a brief 
overview of the significant research concerning the gen-
eral environmental movement. This will be followed by a 
review of the definitive literature and research of the 
anti-nuclear movement in the United States. 
Social scientists have focused on the origins of the 
environmentalist movement, with some choosing to emphasize 
the movement's relationship to the earlier "Preservation-
ist Movement" (Harry, 1974), and others like Schnaiberg 
(1973) choosing to stress the process of political mobili-
zation evolving from the Civil Rights and anti-war na-
tional movements. A general analysis of topic areas 
includes studies dealing with the 'significance of the 
public's increased recreatianal contact with nature, grow-
ing affluence allowing more Americans to concern them-
selves with aesthetic matters, and publications projecting 
future ecological problems (Albrecht and Mauss, 1975; 
Gale, 1972; Harry, 1974; Schnaiberg, 1973). Some early 
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attempts to measure public attitudes toward specific en-
vironmental problems such as air pollution (DeGroot, 1967), 
were followed by studies of attitudes toward environmental 
problems in general (Murch, 1971). Most of these studies 
simply document levels of public environmental concern 
(Albrecht and Mauss, 1975), but studies of the correlates 
of environmental attitudes have increased significantly. 
An array of empirical studies have examined the mem-
bership of the environmental organizations, reflecting 
socioeconomic status and other traditional demographic 
variables (Mitchell and Davis, 1978; Sills, 1975). Atten-
tion has also been centered on the individual reasons for 
affiliation and participation (Faich and Gale, 1971), level 
of organizational commitment (Bartell and St. George, 
1974), and attitudes toward environmental problems and 
solutions (Stallings, 1973). 
Much of the previous research concerning the sources 
of environmental commitment has focused on the variables 
of education, age, income and occupational status, politi-
cal ideology, and residence as predictors of individual 
and group concern with environmental quality. High educa-
tion, youth, liberalism, urbanism, and affluence have been 
associated with environmental orientation (Van Liere and 
Dunlap, 1979). The correlations, however, are generally 
modest, from 0.1 to 0.4, and multivariate analyses examin-
ing the relative and cumulative effects of these variables 
are rare (Dunlap and Catton, 1979). Consequently, 
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understanding of the sociological reasons for environ-
mental concern tends to be inconsistent and often contra-
dictory. For example, Malkis and Grasmick (1977) found 
that the socioeconomic factors of education, income, and 
occupational status are not as crucial as age in account-
ing for variation in support of environmentalist ideology. 
Age also remained constant as the significant predictor 
across the two hypotheses of "occupation-centered-alienation 
from technology" (p. 25). 
Value-conflict between environmentalism and pro-growth 
groups has also been the subject of some sociological in-
terest. For example, Morrison (1973) suggests that the 
orientation of the environmental movement has changed from 
one of consensus to one of conflict, with the conflict be-
coming more formal, thus requiring more legal and politi-
cal sophistication. He polarizes this conflict around: 
(1) the environmentalists, both voluntary and institution-
alized, characterized as mainly white individuals with high 
educational, economic, and prestige levels not directly as-
sociated with organizations threatened by environmental 
reforms, and (2) the "growthists," generally the rest of 
society, the most vocal being industrialists, land devel-
opers and poor and middle-class consumers who will have to 
bear the cost of environmental reform. Along these same 
lines, the conflict theme is reflected with Albrecht (1972), 
who contends that members of environmentalist groups tend 
to: (1) challenge the growth ethic, (2) view only the 
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aesthetic aspect of the wilderness, and (3) develop plans 
for social movements that are comprehensive. Counter-
groups, however, support the (1) growth of free enter-
prise, (2) utilitarian uses of the wilderness, and (3) 
issue specific plans for social action. The concept of 
Smelser's {1962) generalized belief in collective behavior 
processes is used to analyze conflict within the environ-
mental movement (Stallings, 1973). The data shows a sig-
nificant degree of heterogeneity among movement members 
concerning environmental problems and proposed solutions. 
Stallings suggests that because of the value conflict 
within the movement, some collective action by environ-
mental organizations results from the emergent internal 
processes and structures rather than value consensus among 
movement participants. 
Review of Anti-Nuclear Movement 
Literature 
The majority of attention in the literature is given 
over to the origin of the anti-nuclear movement and the 
various episodes of confrontation. Different observers 
find various origins for the anti-nuclear movement. The 
intervention of the United Auto Workers (UAW) in the 1956 
decision to build a breeder reactor near Monroe, Michigan, 
is cited by Strauss (1962) as the earliest indication that 
the development of atomic energy would be fought. As re-
cently as 1974, however, Ebbin and Kasper (1974) couid 
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find little or no evidence of a widebased communication 
network between various people in different areas of the 
country. Mazur and Leahy (1976) have described the close 
association of nuclear opposition to the general environ-
mental movement of the late 1960's, noting that Ralph 
Nader emerged as the most prominent national movement 
spokesman in the early 1970's. These authors also con-
tend that the anti-nuclear movement is closely tied to 
other national issues such as the oil shortage and there-
fore will always be subjected to oscillation of public 
interest. Other writers such as Weinburg (1970), Grossman 
(1976) and Hohenemser, Kasperson, and Kates (1977) take is-
sue with Mazur and Leahy, proclaiming persistent increases 
in the nuclear opposition movement resulting in public-
wide acceptance of the movement's goals. Authors such as 
Doff (1970) and Nemzek (1975), among others, however, see 
the struggle for movement credibility among the public as 
an ongoing battle whose outcome cannot be predicted. Re-
lated to the issue of credibility, Thompson and MacTavish 
(1976) contend that the public's general distrust of the 
Atomic Energy Commission and energy decision-makers has 
allowed increased toleration for the movement. 
Dozens of protests have taken place throughout the 
United States in opposition to the construction and opera-
tion of nuclear power plants (Hill, 1977; Hines, 1977; 
Mohr, 1978). These demonstrations have been analyzed by 
some social scientists as an extension of the political 
activism of the 1960's and early 1970's (Alpern, 1978). 
Many observers are reminded of the early days of the 
Vietnam peace movement (Scheiner, 1977), and others be-
lieve that the movement reflects enough opposition to 
nuclear power to support protests on the scale of the 
civil rights and antiwar demonstrations (Carter, 1979), 
although very little research and analysis has been done 
concerning the sociological aspects of the movement 
(Duncan, 1978). One notable exception to this absence 
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is Barkan (1979), who looks at the tactical and organiza-
tional problems of the movement using a resource mobiliza-
tion theoretical framework, which has formed the basis for 
earlier research on social movements such as Oberschall 
(1973) and Jenkins and Perrow (1977). Also significant 
in this area is· the work of McCarthy and Zald (1977) , 
emphasizing the variety and sources of movement resources, 
the relation of movements to the media, and the interac-
tion among movement organizations. This approach tends 
to de-emphasize the social psychology of movement involve-
ment allowing for increased focus on structural theories 
of social processes. Barkan stresses the value conflict 
within the anti-nuclear movement over such tactical mat-
ters as the definition of nonviolence and the use of 
affinity groups as a type of collective decision making. 
Barkan concludes that, because of tactical conflicts 
within the movement, the use of forums outside the movement 
for influencing public opinion have met with both success 
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and failure. A somewhat different appraisal is found 
with Carter (1979), who views the anti-nuclear movement 
as initially developing locally and regionally, as first 
one then another nuclear power plant project sparked con-
troversy. This localism, however, has now spread as op-
position to nuclear energy is becoming less fragmented. 
Individuals and groups in different geographical areas 
are forming an effective communications network, that ac-
cording to Carter, is increasing the political power of 
the movement. There exists additional points of view 
concerning the negation of internal movement conflict. 
For example, Gyorgy (1979) maintains that movement process 
of consensus decision making among members has maximized 
morale and minimized feelings of disenchantment with group 
decisions. It has also been argued that the consensus 
process has functioned to maintain organizational equili-
brium by reducing hostility and possible factionalism (Was-
serman, 1977a,b). The internal conflict theme of Barkan. 
is further expanded, however, in the literature focusing 
on the issues of individuality vs. collectivity; confron-
tation vs. building a base; single issue vs. multi-issue 
approach (Jezer, 1977). Others such as Harrington (1979) 
have also analyzed the need for widening the anti-nuclear 
movement to include the demands for radical change of the 
American corporate structure. 
A few sociologists have given attention to internal 
weaknesses of social movements like the anti-nuclear 
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movement, in terms of neglect of "grassroots" organization 
as a factor in speeding the decline of the movement. For 
example, Obserschall (1973) suggests that the partial 
success of some movements has shifted activists to the 
environmental movement; however, any movement that is 
loosely structured and organized, and relies more on tele-
vision and media personalities than local organization, 
will fail to remain viable. An opposing perspective is 
presented by Marx and Burkart (1977), who contend that 
successful modern social movements emerge by processes of 
symbolic interpretation of socially constructed grievances 
that can be "marketed" through the mass media, and this 
identity formation through the media transcends the 
ideology of the primary group within the organization. 
This "marketing" aspect can be seen in the anti-nuclear 
movement with its extreme concern for the tactic of non-
violence, which has served to gain favorable attention 
from the national and local media (Irwin and Faison, 1978). 
The question of the citizen's role in making decisions 
in a highly technological society has been included in 
some of the anti-nuclear movement literature. There are 
those who believe that decisions about technology and its 
use should be made by technical experts, those most likely 
to understand the complexities and details of the technol-
ogy. For example Ray (1973) states that social decisions 
are valid on any citizen level, but scientific decisions 
like those involving nuclear energy must be based on the 
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opinion of experts. There are others, however, who argue 
that questions of the use of technology are social ques-
tions, not merely technical, and therefore should be kept 
out of sole hands of experts (Ray, 1973). 
The factors of social class and other sociological-
demographic variables as determining agents of support for 
the anti-nuclear movement have usually been seen in the 
literature as part of the general environmental movement. 
For example, Buttel and Flinn (1976, 1978) examine the tra-
ditional variables of social class and political ideology 
using standard methodological techniques. Also, Kronus 
(1977) discusses behavior mobilization of selected volun-
tary associations to determine their degree of success in 
being recruited into the environmental quality movement. 
More specially oriented toward the anti-nuclear movement 
is the work of Mazur and Leahy (1978), based on interviews 
with movement leaders and analyses of movement publications. 
Leaders of the anti-nuclear movement tend to be older, 
middle-class or higher, liberal, well-educated, and have a 
history of political activism. Members are generally re-
cruited into the movement through prior occupational or 
avocational interests and organizations, and through the 
personal influence of friends and acquaintances. Opposi-
tion to nuclear energy coming from the movement is usually 
expressed in ideological forms, and the social process of 
recruitment acts to preserve this ideological orientation. 
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A number of publications concerning the issue of nu-
clear energy and the character of the movement against it 
have been produced by individuals and groups outside of 
the social sciences. The best example of this type of 
literature is Gyorgy (1979), a well-documented analysis 
and presentation of nuclear energy from a problems per-
spective. Her book, No Nukes: Evervone's Guide to Nu-
clear Energy, is an example of the literary extension of 
the anti-nuclear movement. Numerous other publications 
deal with the problems of nuclear power, citizen action, 
and viable alternatives (Berger, 1976; Hayes, 1976; Nader 
and Abbotts, 1977; Gofman and Tamplin, 1971; Morgan, 1977; 
Lovins, 1977). 
CHAPTER III 
THE GENERAL PROBLEM, NATIONAL ANTI-
NUCLEAR MOVEMENT: EVOLUTION 
OF CONCERN 
Inseparable from the growth of the national nuclear 
energy program has been the movement to stop it. The move-
ment against nuclear power as an energy source has taken 
many forms and adopted numerous tactics, all with various 
degrees of success or failure. Citizen intervention in 
nuclear power issues can be explained, in part, as a nat-
ural culmination of a more generalized national concern 
with environmental degradation. Nuclear power plants re-
quire sites near bodies of water since large supplies of 
water are necessary for physical operation of the plants. 
The plants are then often in competition for a limited en-
vironmental resource with other uses or values, either 
recreational or esthetic. But the opposition of nuclear 
power is also based upon fear among the population of nu-
clear accidents, of radiation exposure, and fear of long-
range unknowns; in other words, fear of commitment to a 
technology imperfectly understood. This fear of technol-
ogical error has a clear historical foundation. Many 
adult Americans were first made aware of nuclear power as 
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a wartime force for destruction through the bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and subsequent threats of nuclear 
war in our more recent history. The image of the "mush-
room shaped cloud" remains clear and frightening in the 
minds of many people. Also, the development of nuclear 
power has been marked by several nuclear "incidents," 
many fairly recently, which have served to promote stri-
dent opposition and expressions of concern. As some pub-
lie opinion polls reveal, many people associate "nuclear" 
with violence and anxiety (and with words such as fear, 
danger, destruction, radiation, death, and burns). A 1972 
national survey pointed out that 60% of adults associated 
the word "nuclear" with violence/anxiety, 83% of adults 
and 90% of youth associated the word "atomic" with 
violence/anxiety. The same study also indicated that: 
• . . opposition is based primarily on concern 
about the safety of a nuclear power plant, 
only secondarily on environmental considera-
tions. Concern about safety is expressed in 
general terms, or regarding possible release 
of radioactive substances, less often in re-
gard to possible explosion. (However, as 
brought out in further questioning, concern 
about possible explosion is about equal to 
concern about radioactive substances) (Electric 
Companies' Public Information Program, 1972, 
pp. 15-17). 
Looked at in this context, it is not surprising that a 
technology recognized in the public mind as having 
evolved from war use, has not won full acceptance in so-
ciety for its peaceful uses. Active intervenors, in par-
ticular, are substantially concerned enough about the 
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dangers of nuclear power technology to donate a great deal 
of personal time and resources to local and translocal ef-
forts to stop it (Ebbin and Kasper, 1974). 
Different observers find various origins for the 
anti-nuclear movement in the United States. During the 
last five years dozens of protests have taken place na-
tionally and internationally in opposition to the construc-
tion and operation of nuclear power plants. According to 
Alpern (1978) and Scheiner (1977), the American anti-
nuclear demonstrations symbolize a new era of political 
activism with processes and characteristics similar to the 
antiwar movement of the 1960's. To conclude from this, 
however, that the movement is recent is to be misinformed. 
Perhaps the earliest indication that the development of 
atomic power would be a source of international conflict 
was the intervention of the United Auto Workers (UAW) in 
the 1956 decision to build the breeder reactor near Monroe, 
Michigan. According to Strauss (1962), the case was under 
litigation until the Supreme Court, in 1961, ruled against 
the UAW, and the construction of the Fermi-fast breeder 
reactor was ultimately granted. The Supreme Court, with 
dissenting Justices Black and Douglas, held that the 
Atomic Power Commission (APC) had proceeded properly in 
issuing the construction permit, while delaying the find-
ings that operation of the plant would allow for accept-
able protection of public health and safety. The safety 
issues were not resolved before a construction permit was 
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issued. The dissenting justices, for example, expressed 
their concern that public safety considerations after 
plant construction has begun are not likely to compromise 
the invested momentum of the project. The initial inter-
vention by the labor union was viewed at the time as an 
isolated incident. From a historical perspective, however, 
this early conflict was the beginning of what was to be-
come a continual evolution of concern of plant sitings, 
nuclear safety issues, and the impact of nuclear plants on 
the environment. 
The number and intensity of active public interven-
tions was also fed by the internal debate in the AEC 
(Gillette, 1972) which did not anticipate the localized 
interventions of nuclear licensing processes as having 
any implication on the national scene. Nelkin (1971) 
lists eight nuclear power plant controversies that devel-
oped between 1958 and 1971, in which the issues tended to 
be defined in terms of local interests such as the thermal 
pollution of bodies of water. Although there is no evi-
dence that such controversies were the actions of a co-
hesive anti-nuclear movement containing a sophisticated 
informational network between or among various citizen 
group intervenors in different parts of the country 
(Ebbin and Kasper, 1974), these conflicts did form the 
ideational base for close association of nuclear opposi-
tion with the environmental movement of the late 1960's, 
which itensified with the so-called energy crises (Mazur 
and Leahy, 1978). Mazur and Leahy observe that anti-
nuclear leaders used the oil shortage to argue for con-
servation and more acceptable sources such as solar 
energy as opposed to nuclear. 
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Weinberg (1970) noted that public opposition to nu-
clear energy was first expressed by Lilenthal (1975) by · 
posing serious questions about the structure and operation 
of the nuclear establishment. One of his main arguments 
was against the irresponsibility of building large-scale 
nuclear reactors without first solving the problem of 
radioactive waste disposal. Lilenthal maintained, ac-
cording to Weinberg (p. 46) that "The future of atomic 
energy as a major reliance for civilian electricity is in 
grave doubt, and that the risks may limit or even elimi-
nate a nationwide atomic energy program." Lehoc (1974) 
writes that, as early as 1959, a citizens' group named 
the "Massachusetts Lower Cape Committee on Radioactive 
Waste Disposal" pressured the AEC to discontinue dumping 
radioactive wastes in the Atlantic near Cape Code 12 
miles from Boston, and the following year prevented the 
building of a nuclear waste reprocessing center on Cape 
Cod. In 1962, citizens won a victory against consoli-
dated Edison of New York, preventing the building of a 
nuclear reactor at Ravenswood, Queens, in the middle of 
one of the most densely populated cities in the world 
(Curtis and Hogan, 1969). Two years later in 1964, res-
idents near Bodega Head, California prevented Pacific Gas 
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and Electric from excavating for a reactor site which lay 
directly above a geological fault (Caldwell, Hayes, and 
MacWhirter, 1976). Early opposition was also expressed 
in the form of a referendum in Eugene, Oregon in 1967 to 
prevent a nuclear plant project on Oregon's coast, and a 
successful fight against "Project Ketch" in rural Pennsyl-
vania, which was to use a 24 kiloton bomb to create a deep 
storage cavern for natural gas (Lewis, 1972). Barkan sum-
marizes the early opposition by suggesting that in the 
1960's and early 1970's, opposition to atomic plants cen-
tered mostly in established environmental organizations 
and local citizen groups who used the traditional channels 
of regulatory agencies and the courts. These attempts at 
legal intervention failed to significantly reduce the li-
censing and construction of nuclear power plants, even 
though the examples referred to above did have some impact. 
Barkan also maintains that the interventionist strategy 
tended to be confined to hearing rooms and court rooms 
largely removed from public attention and thereby limiting 
the possible contagion of movement support. 
By the early 1970's, there were numerous local energy 
groups in the United States, and legal intervention in the 
AEC's regulatory proceedings became more widespread as a 
movement tactic. Intervention organizers were able to 
force numerous new safety requirements upon the nuclear 
industry and collected important information on the nuclear 
issue to disseminate to the media. These activities bought 
needed time to allow the general public to consider the 
implications of nuclear construction. Lengthy interven-
tions against the Calvert Cliffs (Maryland) , Vermont 
Yankee, Indian Point (New York), and Midland (Michigan) 
reactors led to a series of legal challenges and prece-
dents that laid the basis for future debate. 
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As mentioned earlier, however, the interventions had 
their costs. They were expensive, complex, and technical, 
and basically incomprehensible to the average citizen. 
Because the events usually took place in Washington, D.C., 
they were far removed from the public eye, and therefore 
had greater difficulty in raising needed funds for legal 
fees. Members of the intervention groups tended also to 
be mainly middle-class, highly educated professional 
people, which further served to separate the thrust of the 
movement from the public mainstream (Gyorgy, 1979). 
Beginning in the early 1970's, opponents of nuclear 
power had become impatient with the legal intervention 
process. As the struggle escalated, more citizens from 
around the country began to coordinate their efforts, and 
a national movement began to grow, helped along by a small 
but dedicated group of citizen activitists. The point of 
controversy seemed to begin in earnest in 1969-1970 when 
several anti-nuclear articles and books raised serious 
questions about the effects of nuclear power plants. They 
illustrated the growing concern among some scientists and 
members of the public about the implications of the national 
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commitment to nuclear power and about the growing number 
of nuclear plants that were being built around the coun-
try. During this same period, the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969 was being debated in congress and en-
vironmental concerns were becoming more politically feas-
ible. This led to a confluence of issues, the boundaries 
of which included quality.control in construction, en-
vironmental impacts, radiation exposure and its cumulative 
effects, and the possibility of nuclear plant accidents. 
These were intertwined with a rapidly growing public de-
mand for electrical energy (Ebbin and Kasper, 1974). The 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 became law on 
January 1, 1970. The stated purpose of the Act was: 
• • . to declare a national policy which will 
encourage productive and enjoyable harmony be-
tween man and his environment; to promte ef-
forts which will prevent or eliminate damage 
to the environment and biosphere and stimulate 
the health and welfare of man; to enrich the 
understanding of the e·cological systems and 
natural resources important to the nation; and 
to establish a Council on Environmental Quality 
(Ebbin and Kasper, 1974, p. 27). 
In addition to the new law, pressure brought by inter-
vention groups acted to force the AEC to open to the public 
their previously closed meetings. Groups such as the Un-
ion of Concerned Scientists (Cambridge, Massachusetts), 
Businessmen for the Public Interest (Chicago, Illinois), 
and Ralph Nader all had an impact on the AEC change of 
attitude toward public intervenor groups. According to 
Ebbin and Kasper (1974), while it would be incorrect to 
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characterize the active intervenor groups as representa-
tive of the general public will, it would be equally incor-
rect to dismiss their contentions as self-serving or as 
anti-technology in general. They were, for the most part, 
"intelligent and upstanding members of their communities 
who are concerned or, perhaps, afraid of nuclear power" 
(Ebbin and Kasper, 1974, p. 9). 
The interpretation of the motivation of citizen group 
intervenors might best be understood as related primarily 
to feelings of powerlessness before the decision making 
processes of the federal government. As Ebbin and Kasper 
(1974) conclude: 
Though intervention is expensive and labori-
ous, frustration with the inability to stem 
an apparent tide of technological determina-
tion, fear of nuclear technology, and anger 
with the trade-off of diminishing natural re-
sources for economic growth compels these 
citizens to make their voices heard. The 
physical ecology is a major issue, but the 
human ecology, the intangibles of quality of 
life, the realization that having more may 
mean enjoying less, and headlines about 
technology-related problems, as well as daily 
articles in the press about corruption in high 
places, also contribute to their concern. 
Perhaps, only perhaps, the basic issue amounts 
to considerably more than merely interventions 
in local nuclear power reactor siting cases. 
Perhaps it is really a crisis of governance 
(p. 32). 
By the early 1970's, nuclear reactor orders had reached 
the level of over 30 annually, nationwide. In the midst of 
this rapid expansion, consumer advocate Ralph Nader became 
involved in the forefront of the anti-nuclear movement. 
Nader's "Public Interest Research Groups" convened the first 
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national anti-nuclear conference called "Critical Mass," 
held in Washington, D.C. in 1974. Public education cam-
paigns, state-level lobbying, and subsequent national con-
ferences, all became a significant thrust of Nader's 
student-based organization against nuclear energy. 
The nuclear issue served to split apart the nation's 
oldest and most influential environmental group, the Sierra 
Club. David Brower had resigned as president of the Sierra 
Club because it had refused to take a specific stand 
against atomic energy. Later he formed the Friends of the 
Earth organization which has taken a strong anti-nuclear 
position and has helped develop a worldwide network of 
ecology activists. 
Another group with considerable influence was the Na-
tional Intervenors, a coalition formed in the early 1970's 
to act as a disseminator for legislative information con-
cerning the nuclear energy issue. According to the National 
Intervenor's newsletter of September, 1974, more than 130 
separate groups comprised the organization. By 1974, the 
legal intervention process was clearly being rejected by 
more and more activists. The tolerance for the autonomy of 
the AEC in nuclear energy matters was wearing thin. Many 
anti-nuclear activists were now ready to take their case 
directly to the public rather than relying on government 
and industry "experts" in judicial proceedings. The use 
of the citizen initiative (anti-nuclear referenda), a leg-
islative process legal in 17 states, became a new tactic 
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of confrontation. According to Barkan (1979), these 
referenda had mixed results. For example, a 1974 anti-
nuclear ballot issue in western Massachusetts won 48% of 
the vote; referenda in many other states in 1976 lost by 
two to one margins. Some of the most significant attempts 
at citizen initiatives during this time are as follows: 
in 1972, citizens of southern California placed a clean 
environment act initiative on the state ballot. The bill 
which included a five year moratorium on atomic construc-
tion was defeated by a two to one majority. This defeat 
was thought by some supporters to be the partial result of 
the word "moratorium," which may have had "negative conno-
tations" in the public mind because of the Vietnam War. 
Other reasons for the defeat were probably due to the lack 
of time for the public education about the bill, plus the 
large amounts of money used by the nuclear industry to pro-
mote its defeat (Gyorgy, 1979). 
As mentioned above, in 1974, nuclear opponents in 
Western Massachusetts fared considerably better. Voters 
in three Connecticut Valley counties projected a 48% sup-
port of a referendum against the building of twin reactors 
at Montague. In addition, nearly 33% of the voters reg-
istered their willingness to dismantle operating reactors 
at Rowe, Massachusetts, and Vernon, Vermont. Because this 
was the first ever initiative in the United States on re-
actors already in operation, even the supporters of the 
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referendum had predicted only a 10% showing at best at 
such an early stage of opposition (Gyorgy, 1979). 
In the spring of 1976, another nuclear initiative 
went onto the ballot in California, calling for a series 
of health and environmental restrictions on reactor spe-
cifications. This proposal was defeated by the public by 
two to one. The following fall, similar resolutions were 
on ballots in Arizona, Oregon, Washington, Montana, 
Colorado, and Ohio. All six initiatives were defeated, 
losing in Oregon by 56% to 42%, in Montana by 60% to 40%, 
and by two to one margins in the remaining four states. A 
major factor in the outcome of these six initiatives was 
the large amount of money poured into the campaigns by the 
nuclear industry. New Age (1976) made the following com-
ment: 
The industry poured in from ten to one hun-
dred times as much money as the proponents 
had to spend. In all cases they portrayed 
the proposed reforms as being a blanket ban 
on nuclear construction, and went to great 
expense to convince the electorate that the 
bills would cost them jobs and money (p. 8). 
Nuclear opponents were also forced to realize that other 
reasons for defeat existed beyond being outspent. For ex-
ample, an article in Mother Jones (1977) by Gofman, pointed 
to the wording of the initiatives and to economic factors 
as causes of rejection. Gofman criticized the propositions 
for being unclear and contradictory, focusing on health and 
safety reforms which were often difficult to understand. 
He suggested that many times people voted against the 
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initiative falsely, thinking they were voting against nu-
clear power, and that a clear "yes" or "no" choice on 
atomic energy would have been better wording on the nu-
clear questions. At the same time, he said, the nuclear 
industry was successful in convincing the majority of the 
public that stopping nuclear power would cost jobs, black-
outs, and increased electric bills. Gofman went on to 
state: 
With a combination of facts, half-truths and 
outright lies, industry effectively hammered 
out a case aimed at the average voter's eco-
nomic self-interest (p. 15). 
Some of Gofman's criticisms were proven correct by the 
Construction Work in Progress (CWIP) vote in Missouri. 
Missouri voters, unlike the anti-nuclear initiatives in 
other states, were opposing nuclear construction by a two 
to one margin. The Missouri Initiative opposed the CWIP, 
a billing procedure by which utilities charge consumers for 
nuclear construction projects while they are being built. 
The voters banned the CWIP from Missouri, with the result-
ing cancellation of at least one reactor. This economic 
issue of cost was clearly argued and promoted by the nu-
clear opponents and managed to catch on elsewhere. In New 
Hampshire, for example, CWIP rates were used to build the 
Seabrook plant and became a conflicting political issue in 
the 1978 gubernatorial race (Gyorgy, 1979). 
The referenda process had some measurable results, 
but .·overall had been slow and expensive, and had no effect 
on reactors already near completion. Nuclear opponents 
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realized that new tactics of confrontation must be tried, 
and the politics of direct action developed as the next 
stage of the movement. 
The first significant protest action against atomic 
power plants was the 1974 toppling on Washington's birth-
day of a nuclear plant weather observation tower by Samuel 
Lovejoy, a Massachusetts farmer. Lovejoy said he wanted 
"to twist some heads around here. I wanted people to think, 
'that guy's willing to go to jail--these nuclear plants 
must be heavier than I thought'" (Kifner, 1974, p. 33). 
His arrest and subsequent trial received considerable cov-
erage in the local and national press and helped make 
nuclear power a major topic of debate in western Massachu-
setts (Wasserman, 1977a). Lovejoy presented the follow-· 
ing statement in which he took full responsibility for 
his action: 
In the long-established tradition of challeng-
ing the constitutionality of particular events, 
I readily admit full responsibility for sabo-
taging that outrageous symbol of the future 
nuclear power plant. . . . Positive action is 
the only option left open to us. . • . It is 
my firm conviction that if a jury of 12 im-
partial scientists was empanelled, and follow-
ing normal legal procedure they were given all 
pertinent data and arguments: then this jury 
would never give a unanimous vote for deploy-
ment of nuclear reactors amongst the civilian 
population. Rather, I believe they would call 
for the complete shutdown of all the commer-
cially operated nuclear plants. • • • Through 
positive action and a sense of moral outrage, 
I seek to test my convictions (Gyorgy, 1979, 
p. 402). 
Lovejoy went on trial in September, 1974, on charges of 
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malicious destruction of private property and was ac-
quitted because of a faulty indictment. Protests in other 
parts of the country were slow in coming, however, as 
during the next year opposition to nuclear plants remained 
restructed to referenda and intervention attempts as dis-
cussed above. 
In February of 1975, some 30,000 farmers, students, 
and environmentalists marched onto the site of a proposed 
nuclear plant in Whyl, West Germany, and stayed there in 
varying numbers for nine months, forcing the cancellation 
of the construction (Hines, 1977). This action inspired 
nuclear opponents throughout the world. It appeared to 
many that by force of numbers, nonviolent direct action 
might succeed against nuclear power where intervention and 
referenda had failed. 
The first American occupation occurred in August, 1976, 
at the Seabrook plant site on the New Hampshire seacoast. 
During the previous eight years, Seabrook residents had op-
posed the plant before regulatory agencies and in a town 
meeting vote. Spurred by the failure of these methods 
and the success at Whyl, the Clamshell Alliance was formed. 
On August 1, 600 people protested at the Seabrook plant 
site, with 18 arrested for unlawful trespassing. In May, 
1977, more than 1,400 people from the New England region .... 
and other states were arrested for occupying the Seabrook 
construction site. Their act of civil protest received 
significant nationwide media coverage and served to 
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transform Seabrook into a national symbol of opposition 
to nuclear power plants (Wasserman, 1977a; Kifner, 1974). 
The Clamshell Alliance spawned the formation of other 
anti-nuclear groups in various other states. Occupations 
were also being planned at Diablo Canyon, California; and 
at Trojan in Oregon, where America's largest reactor was 
already in operation. The forming of groups such as the 
Abalone Alliance in California and the Crabshell Alliance 
in Washington state, led to the reality of half of the 
nation's 65 atomic power plants becoming targets of organ-
ized opposition by June of 1978 (Kuhn, 1978). A number of 
demonstrations have taken place at numerous plant sites, 
including more than a dozen occupations in such states as 
California, Oregon, Colorado, Pennsylvania, and South 
Carolina. Arrests at these sites have ranged from 14 to 
500 (Soloman, 1977; Baechler, 1978; Hurst, 1978; Scheiner, 
1978; Wallace, 1978). Using the Clamshell Alliance and 
its Seabrook occupations as a model, these other organiza-
tions have employed nonviolent civil disobedience as the 
primary tactic of protest and adopted a consensus style of 
decision making involving the use of affinity groups. 
Later chapters of this paper will provide a discussion of 
these methods in detail. 
June 25, 1978 saw the largest anti-nuclear plant rally 
yet in the United States. More than 18,000 people engaged 
in a rally sponsored by the Clamshell Alliance in which in-
formation booths and exhibits on nuclear power, conservation, 
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and alternative energy sources were used to educate the 
public towards opposition of nuclear energy. The action 
at the site was followed by the occupation of the nuclear 
regulatory commission on June 28, 1978. After a three 
day action in which 50 of 250 protesters were arrested, 
the Commission decided to suspend construction at the site. 
Previously, on April 29, 1978, 5,000 people organized 
by the Rocky Flats action group, the American Friends 
Service Committee, Mobilization for Survival and others 
gathered at the Rocky Flats construction site 16 miles 
northwest of Denver, Colorado, to focus on occupational 
dangers, pollution, and the potentially dangerous trans-
porting of plutonium. As a partial result of the growing 
"negativism" of the nuclear resistance movement, the demon-
strators at Rocky Flats attempted to focus on "positive" 
alternatives. For example, workshops at a nearby Denver 
college emphasized possible alternatives to nuclear energy 
that would also promote job security. Perhaps the most 
dramatic of the Rocky Flats demonstration occurred when 
12 members of the American Friends Service Committee and 
Southerners Mobilizing for Survival drove a flat bed truck 
to Denver loaded with empty barrels labeled "plutonium." 
The truck followed the exact route for the federal govern-
rnent' s proposed delivery of plutonium from the Savannah 
River nuclear plant in South Carolina to the Rocky Flats 
site. The group held press conferences in Atlanta, Nash-
ville, Memphis, Wichita, and other cities to inform the 
pubiic that 18 states would be involved as part of the 
transportation route (Szita, 1978). 
On Monday, October 29, 1979, the 50th anniversary 
of the Great Stock Market crash, the Manhattan Project 
Committee promoted a mass demonstration in front of the 
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New York Stock Exchange on Wall Street for the purpose of 
raising public consciousness concerning America's corpor-
ate power structive and its relationship to nuclear energy. 
Representatives of the Manhattan Project stated the follow-
ing in a pamphlet entitled, "Take it to Wall Street": 
The Wall Street action, part of the Manhattan 
Project, is a direct action campaign aimed at 
raising public consciousness about the way 
corporations and the financial community con-
trol people's lives. The campaign's goals are 
to show the countless abuses forced upon the 
American people--disproportionately 
and minority people--by the same institutions 
and the same system that pushes nuclear poses 
and weapons: To focus on nukes as just one 
symptom of an economic and energy system based 
upon corporate profit and the expense of human 
need; and to open discussion on the alternative 
directions for our society that we might choose 
to take. The organization saw a possible al-
ternative direction in some of the following: 
'(1) Stop financing the nuclear industry; shut 
down all nukes; zero nuclear weapons, (2) full 
employment, health care and housing through a 
peace-time economy, (3) public ownership and 
democratic control of energy industries; safe 
renewable energy; affordable heat and trans-
portation; no winter shut-offs, and (4) stop 
nuclear exports and exploitation of native Amer-
icans, Black South Africans and other people 
(Manhattan Project, 1979, p. 2). 
The Manhattan Project Committee aimed at promoting 
their understanding of the need for stopping nuclear energy 
investments and increasing the funding of human needs. It 
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is their belief that a challenge to nuclear power requires 
an assault upon the basic corporate priorities that form 
the basis of the entire American economy. Because the nu-
clear industry is funded by large multi-national corpora-
tions, the prevention of nuclear power must start with the 
prevention of uncontrolled corporate power. The contem-
porary protest movement against nuclear power has con-
fronted the single-issue vs. multiple-issue dilemma, but 
the majority of nuclear opponents have opted for the single 
issue focus of limiting nuclear plant construction. The 
Manhattan Project Corrnnittee was the first American organi-
zation to actively campaign for a multi-issue approach for 
the movement. Their intent is echoed by Harrington (1979) , 
who emphasizes that the anti-nuclear movement must adopt a 
more widebased approach than the one it traditionally has 
promoted. The basic proposition, says Harrington (p. 280), 
is not simply to "end nuclear energy for all the obvious 
reasons. It must be: end nuclear energy through a full 
employment program that will produce an alternate technol-
ogy of human scale." Harrington concludes that such a 
focus points in the direction of two basic considerations: 
It allows the anti-nuclear movement to reach 
out to unions, much as groups like Environmen-
talists for full Employment have begun to do. 
And it focuses on the fact that the movement 
will be radical or else it will fail--that is, 
that a resolution of the current nuclear 
crises requires a defeat of the corporate 
power that has dominated American energy policy 
from the beginning (p. 280). 
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Regional Overview 
The following section is a regional overview of anti-
nuclear organizations based on one representative group 
from various geographical areas of the United States: 
New England Region: Upstate People 
for Safe Energy Technology (UPSET) , 
New York 
Since 1973, citizens in northern New York state have 
been fighting the construction of a 765,000 volt power-
line, the largest powerline ever planned for the north-
east. UPSET maintains that the huge powerline is a 
"backdoor" method for the future construction of central-
ized nuclear power plants, for which the line will serve 
as a transmission facility. Originally, the movement 
against the line focused on court battles against the 
Power Authority of the State of New York (PASNY). UPSET 
formed in 1974, obtaining intervenor rights in the Public 
Service Cormnission hearings concerning the construction 
of the line. Along with this intervenor status, exten-
sive effort went into public education about the rela-
tionship of powerlines to nuclear plants. The education 
campaign involved door-to-door canvassing, petitioning, 
letter writing, floats in parades, field days, and infor-
mation booths at county fairs. UPSET turned more active 
in the fall of 1976, when over 500 people walked six miles, 
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from Ft. Covington to Bombay at the northern end of the 
proposed line, to express their opposition. In December 
of 1976, three farm women led by the Iroquois woman Jane 
Standing Still, went to jail for blocking construction of 
the line. Since 1976, over 40 people have been arrested 
for sitting on bull dozers, for sitting in elm trees, and 
for parking tractors in front of PASNY machinery. In 
both March and August of 1977, 1,000 people walked various 
lengths of the proposed line route to express their con-
tinuing opposition to the power line. The UPSET organiza-
tion is opposed to the 765 KV power lines for the following 
reasons (partial list) : 
1. Adverse impact on agriculture: loss of 
land, soil compaction, interference with 
drainage, destruction of houses and barns, 
lowering of land value and erosion of the 
tax base. 
2. Visual and psychological pollution (four 
towers per mile; each tower about 175 ft. 
tall; each tower base taking of 1/4 acre 
of land). 
3. Adverse health and safety effects: cardio-
vascular stress on humans and animals 
caused by the powerful electric field; 
production of nitric oxide; constant psy-
chological nuisance of audible noise, vis-
ible light, and radio-TV interference; 
creation of a magnetic field which may 
interfere with migration of birds, flight 
patterns of bees; possible effects on glo-
bal weather patterns. 
4. Eventually the line will serve large gener-
ating stations in upstate New York, and ac-
cording to planning maps, those will be 
nuclear power plants. We are opposed to 
nuclear power plants because they represent 
a physical menace to present and future 
generations, and the construction of nuclear 
generating stations discourage energy con-
servation and decentralized energy systems, 
both of which we consider essential to our 
survival. 
5. We are opposed to the construction of the 
765 KV line because of its connection with 
the James Bay Hydroelectric Project. That 
project which will flood 63,000 square 
miles of Cree and Inuit Indian Lands in 
Canada, will eventually provide the power 
to be shipped to New York City along the 
proposed line. We do not wish to be respons-
ible for this disruption of, and safety 
threat to, the lives of Native North Ameri-
can people. 
6. There will be no economic or social benefit 
to the north country, save a very few short-
term jobs. 
7. There may be a growth in unemployment and 
welfare roles as landowners are deprived of 
traditional means of livelihood. 
8. Those who truly stand to gain from the con-
struction of powerlines are investors in 
nearly $200 million worth of tax-free bonds 
which will finance the project. 
9. The powerline will further entrench waste-
ful energy policies by encouraging further 
subversion of the democratic process, and 
discouraging development of alternative en-
ergy sources (Gyorgy, 1979, pp. 408-411). 
Mid-Atlantic: Environmental Coali-
tion Nuclear Power (ECNP) 
One of the most active anti-nuclear groups in the 
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United States has been the Environmental coalition on Nu-
clear Power (ECNP) , an organization of individuals in 
Pennsylvania and neighboring states interested in the im-
pact of nuclear power problems on society, the economy, 
and the environment. This organization has influenced 
public opposition that defeated the following projects: 
1. The AEC Plowshare Project Ketch (1967-1968), 
a plan to explode over 1,000 nuclear bombs 
underground in central Pennsylvania. 
2. A proposal to locate the demonstration 
breeder reactor in northeastern Pennsyl-
vania, now referred to as the Clinch River 
Breeder Reactor. 
3. Energy packs (1975), the national test case 
for nuclear energy centers. 
4. Leasing of state-owned game lands for ura-
nium prospective (1974). 
5. Commercial low-level radioactive waste dis-
posed site proposed by Chem-Nuclear (1976). 
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In litigation and intervention ECNP member groups have 
obtained the following: 
1. Cancellation of two Newbold Island Reac-
tors (NJ) on the Delaware River in 1973, 
which reversed the AEC urban siting policy. 
2. Delayed for five years the construction at 
Hope Creek, the alternative site for Newbold 
Island. 
3. Establishment of AEC policy of requiring cool-
ing towers on inland water bodies (1974 Peach 
Bottom case) • 
4. Requirement of additional iodine hold-up sys-
tems (1973, Three Mile Island Unit 1). 
5. Forced the NRC to vacate the radon number 
(74.5 curies) from the standard S-3 table, 
summary of the Environmental Effects of the 
Nuclear Fuel Cycle, and to admit under oath 
that the total number of curies attributable 
to Randon-222 will amount to billions of cur-
ies (premature deaths) per annual fuel require-
ment per reactor. This is still in litigation 
on grounds of NEPA and other violations. 
6. Caused cancellation of Fulton MTGRl and II in 
1975 in consequence of intervention delay. 
7. Forced cancellation of Summit I and II, Dela-
ware (1977). 
8. Appeal Board Decision remanding Three Mile 
Island II to the Appeal Board for reconsid-
eration of the aircraft crash probability 
and the risk assessment issue (Gyorgy, 1979, 
p. 415). 
Southeast Region: Catfish Alliance 
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The Catfish Alliance began in the fall of 1977 and is 
composed of individuals and groups from eight separate 
southern states: Alabama, South Carolina, Louisiana, 
Tennessee, Florida, North Carolina, Georgia, and Mississi-
ppi. The alliance was formed for the purpose of establish-
ing a decentralized coordinating communications network 
for the southern region. In September, 1977, the group met 
for the first time at Monte Sono State Park, Huntsville, 
Alabama, and issued the following declaration of purpose: 
We the citizens of the Southern States stand 
in alliance to: 
A. Oppose the development of nuclear power; 
B. Make known to our fellow citizens the com-
plete facts regarding nuclear power and 
solar energy and the great potential in 
energy conservation, to reassert our in-
herent democratic right to decide and di-
rect our lives and the future of our 
communities; 
C. Take responsibility for our regional energy 
development to tap our inexhaustible source 
of solar energy and develop a decentralized 
solar economic base of permanent job oppor-
tunities to benefit our people rather than 
those who exploit us for profit; 
D. Bring to the forefront of our consciousness 
to live in harmony with our Earth as good 
stewards. To further this purpose we found 
the Catfish Alliance and commit our lives, 
fortunes, and sacred honors (Gyorgy, 1979, 
p. 415). 
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Ohio River Region: Paddlewheel Alliance 
Early in 1977, citizens from the Ohio Valley region 
walked from Louisville to Washington, D.C., to request a 
nuclear moritorium in the Ohio valley and to prouest 
against the Seabrook, New Hampshire, nuclear site. The 
major concern of these people was the proposal by the 
Public Service Company of Indiana to build a twin reactor 
nuclear plant at Marble Hill, Indiana, eight miles from 
Cincinnati, Ohio, and 28 miles from the Louisville, 
Kentucky, water system intake pipes. Paddlewheel Alli-
ance is a direct action organization that grew out of the 
March to Washington in 1977. They maintain that because 
legal tactics have failed, they are attempting to build a 
dramatic popular opposition to Marble Hill and the power 
plant proliferation in the Ohio River region. A partial 
organizational statement of the Paddlewheel Alliance is: 
We are walking from Louisville to Washington to 
symbolize the frustration and anxiety citizens 
across the nation and experiencing each time a 
nuclear reactor is proposed for their area of 
the country. In our area the citizens face the 
possibility of 100 to 200 power plants located 
on the Ohio River, of which 20% are projected 
to be nuclear. 
The continued lack of representation within the 
bureaucracies and the lack of due process of 
law within the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
hearings offers the public no redress of griev-
ance. It is for this reason that citizens of 
New Hampshire and others across the country 
have determined that civil disobedience is the 
only remaining alternative (Gy0rgy, 1979, 
pp. 424-425). 
Midwest Region: Great Plains 
Federation 
In April, 1976, construction began on the Callaway 
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County nuclear plant near Fulton, Missouri. Early opposi-
tion in the form of attempted legal intervention had 
failed. In November, 1976, people from Kansas City, 
Columbia, Fulton, and St. Louis linked up for a 38 mile, 
three-day march, from Columbia to the Callaway plant site. 
The climax of the march brought together several groups 
already formed, including Missourians for Safe Energy, 
Kansas City People's Energy Project, and People for Dis-
armament and Social Justice of St. Louis. These groups, 
together with others, formed the Great Plans Federation/ 
Missourians for SAFE Energy/Sunflower Alliance. On April 
30 to May 1, 1977, the Federation conducted a Safe Energy 
Fair about three miles from the Callaway reactor site. 
The fair included solar displays, music, food, camping, 
and nuclear protest. Education, outreach work, film show-
ings, public meetings, and newsletter production continue 
to be the activity of this organization dedicated to stop-
ping nuclear power in the midwest region. The Great Plains 
Federation Statement of Purpose was adopted on September 11, 
1977. It reads as follows: 
We are united in active non-violent opposition 
to the development and maintenance of nuclear 
power plants anywhere. 'Non-violence' should 
be understood as a respected non-destructive 
and fair attitude toward our fellow humans. 
Alliance members and other individuals 1and 
groups use a wide variety of methods such as, 
education, legislative, court and regulatory 
action, referendum, petitioning, demonstra-
tions, and other forms of public protest in 
their efforts towards this common goal. We 
support and welcome all efforts towards these 
ends. 
We support and encourage conservation of our 
natural resources--which means doing better, 
not doing without--and widespread conversion 
to safe, clean, and renewable energy sources 
such as solar and wind power. These sources 
are best used in a decentralized manner under 
local control. Nuclear power poses an unne-
cessary threat to our health, safety, and the 
quality of our society. Our concern for all 
life requires us to take action (Gyorgy, 1979, 
pp. 436-437). 
Rocky Mountain/Southwest Region: 
Cactus Alliance 
On October 1, 1977, citizens from the states of 
Colorado, New Mexico, and Nevada formed a regional anti-
nuclear alliance to work against all aspects of nuclear 
energy and nuclear weapons. The organization describes 
its purpose as: 
A coalition of citizens dedicated to the bet-
terment of life through the advancement of the 
ideals and values of respect for life and 
health, and of sensitivity to the earth and 
its systems. These bring us into opposition 
with: 
A). The high cost and risks, especially health 
risks, of nuclear energy, 
B). The introduction of radioactive wastes into 
the environment, and 
C) The production, proliferation, and use of 
nuclear weapons. We actively support the 
alternatives of strict conservation prac-
tices, the reduction of technology to meet 
74 
human needs, and the full development of 
alternative energy sources along with de-
centralization of energy systems. To this 
end we pledge to further our goals by 
means of education, communication, direct 
action, and community organizing. Recogni-
zing the importance of cooperative regional 
action, we of the western intermountain 
states are working together (Gyorgy, 1979, 
pp . 4 4 4- 4 4 5 ) . 
Pacific Northwest/West Coast Re-
gion: Trojan Decommissioning 
Alliance 
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During the summer of 1977, the Trojan Decommissioning 
Alliance (TDA) formed in Portland, Oregon, as a statewide 
coalition in opposition to the Trojan nuclear power plant, 
the largest operating plant in the United States. The 
Trojan plant has been the site of three nonviolent actions 
promoted by the TDA. The last demonstration occurred in 
the summer of 1978, when 200 people were arrested during 
a four-day blockade of plant entrances. After the arrests 
the TDA issued the following statement: 
'We are taking action in self-defense, in de-
fense of the people of the Northwest, and for 
children and grandchildren who are already 
burdened by the nuclear wastes generated by 
Trojan and other nuclear reactors' (Gyorgy, 
1979, p. 451). 
Six months later the plant was shut down following the dia-
covery that its control building did not meet earthquake 
standards. The Trojan Decommissioning Alliance has issued 
a Declaration of Nuclear Resistance which, in part, de-
manded: 
A) ...• an immediate and permanent halt to 
the construction and operation of nuclear 
power plants; 
B). (that) a supply of energy is a natural 
right and should in all cases be controlled 
by the people. Private monopoly must give 
way to public control; 
C). (that) in concern with public ownership, 
power supply should be decentralized, so 
that environmental damage is further mini-
mized and so that control can revert to 
the local community and the individual; 
D). Any job lost through cancellation of nu-
clear construction or operation (must) be 
immediately compensated for in the natural 
energy field (Gyorgy, 1979, p. 452). 
Type of Movements 
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Types of social movements vary considerably, and re-
searchers in this field have generated various ways of 
categorizing them. One relatively simple approach is 
that suggested by Aberle (1967), in which he begins by 
determining whether it is the "social structure" or the 
"individual" that the social movement attempts to change 
or resist changes in, and then whether the change that 
movement members envision is a partial or total one. 
Aberle divides social movements along the two dimensions 
of: the locus of change sought, and the amount of change 
sought. Cross-classification on these two dimensions gen-
erated four possible types of social movements. Perry and 
Pugh (1978) summarize Aberle's typology: 
Transformation movements aim at the total 
change of a social structure, and they gener-
ally envision a cataclysmic upheaval as a 
precondition for the occurrence of such an all-
embracing change. • . . Refomative movements 
aim at only the partial change of a social 
structure. They do not anticipate cataclysmic 
violence and are more circumspect in their 
goals. . . • Redemptive movements aim at the 
total change of the individual since they ex-
plain social problems by blaming personal weak-
nesses among those involved. • . . Alternative 
movements seek only limited changes in individ-
uals (pp. 226-227). 
Ash (1972) developed a five-part typology of social 
movements. First is the "class-conscious revolution-
ary movement," whose objective is to take control of the 
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state and its social control forces by the use of nonlegi-
timate (from the state's point of view) strategies and 
tactics (p. 6). A second type are the "class-conscious 
movements without a program of immediate revolution (p. 7). 
These movements are likely to function within the struc-
ture of the target society. They may desire to change the 
class system, but choose strategies such as promoting 
political candidates for election rather than attempting 
revolution to gain state control. The "reform" movement 
is the third type in Ash's scheme (p. 7). This movement 
uses legitimate activities and does not attempt to change 
either the class system or the control of the means of 
production. The fourth type is the "counter-
revolutionary" movement which attempts to reestablish a 
prior class of economic structure (p. 7). Finally, the 
"coup d'etat" is a movement which seeks to replace one set 
of political rulers with another, without making any sig-
nificant change in the current class structure of society. 
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Turner (1969) was one of the first American sociolo-
gists to conclude that goals and tactics of many recent 
social movements were linked to individual feelings. 
Feelings of alienation were previously considered per-
sonal rather than social problems by most scholars. 
Turner's thesis is that the protest movements of the 
1960's were symbolic or expressive rather than ameliora-
tive. He contends that we can no longer ignore the typo-
logy of the expressive movement and must give it equal 
status to the more traditional categories of revolution-
ary, regressive, and reformist movements. 
One of the best known and most influential typolo-
gies of social movements is that of Blumer (1951). Using 
tactics as his frame of reference, he distinguishes be-
tween: (1) the general social movement, (2) the specific 
social movement, and (3) the expressive social movement. 
The general social movement lacks specific goals and a 
coordinated program. These movements develop gradually 
out of "cultural drifts" and slow changes in social values. 
Specific social movements evolve out of general movements 
and may be of a reform or revolutionary nature. Reform 
movements accept the basic social order in which they 
exist and seek to change only some part of it. Both re-
form and specific movements contain well-defined goals, a 
definite leadership and organization, and a highly devel-
oped "we consciousness" sustained through an ideology. 
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A revolutionary movement, in contrast, has the function of 
introducing a new set of values to replace the dominant 
ones. 
Expressive social movements, rather than attempting 
to change society, act as release mechanisms for various 
kinds of expressive behavior. Religious movements, for 
example, provide for a release of tension without a thrust 
for social change. Expressive movements tend to be in-
wardly directed, having more concern with the values of 
their own members than the objective conditions of the 
outside society (Blumer, 1951). 
The anti-nuclear movement in the United States may be 
classified as basically a specific-reform social move-
ment. It has worked for limited change by influencing 
public opinion through an appeal to moral and ecological 
values. From the beginning the movement established the 
well-defined objective of preventing the increase of 
nuclear power as an energy resource. The tactics for this 
prevention were also collectively defined within the 
movement, although at times some internal conflict has 
been generated over strategy and tactics. The anti-
nuclear movement has made use of established institutions, 
especially the media, to develop a public opinion favor-
able to its aims. Through the media the movement has 
sought to establi.sh a public issue concerning the nega-
tive aspects of nuclear energy. Using a discussion 
process in order to persuade an "inert" population, the 
movement has sought social change and a reaffirmation of 
the ideal ecological values of society. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE SPECIFIC PROBLEM 
Sunbelt Alliance: Origin, Purpose, 
and Structure 
The Sunbelt Alliance was an Oklahoma-based, anti-
nuclear organization formed in June of 1978 in Tulsa, Ok-
lahoma. It was formed in order to stop the proliferation 
of nuclear power through nonviolent direct action. 
Origin 
In May of 1973, the Public Service Company of Okla-
homa (PSO) announced plans to build two nuclear power 
plants (Black Fox 1 and 2) near Inola, Oklahoma, a small 
community about 13 miles east of Tulsa. Plans were also 
projected to convert Camp Gruber, a large public hunting 
area in eastern Oklahoma near the Arkansas border, into a 
large, energy-producing complex. In 1973, the Oklahoma 
Citizens Action for Safe Energy (CASE) was formed as a re-
sult of a study of nuclear power by a small group of Okla-
homa citizens. In the fall of 1975, CASE informed the 
AEC of its intention to intervene in the legally required 
public hearings concerning the proposed construction of 
Black Fox. The AEC tried unsuccessfully to persuade CASE 
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not to intervene in the public hearings. CASE secured 
the services of attorneys and expert witnesses for use in 
the hearings and succeeded in building a strong argument 
against the proposed nuclear power plants. 
In 1974, the Oklahoma Corporation Conunission refused 
to grant PSO's requested rate increase for electricity 
consumers in Oklahoma, forcing the utility to delay their 
Black Fox plants for one year. The following years, CASE 
sponsored numerous workshops promoting alternatives to 
nuclear energy, and on May 3, 1978, "Sun Day" to promte 
solar energy in Oklahoma. 
In June of 1978, the Sunbelt Alliance formed, as a 
response to the limited success that CASE had achieved in 
preventing the ongoing construction of Black Fox. Sun-
belt began to actively campaign against the projected 
1984 completion of Black Fox 1. In the beginning, Sunbelt 
was based only in Tulsa, Oklahoma, but rapidly spread to 
other Oklahoma communities. On March 13, 1982, one of the 
founders of the Sunbelt Alliance related the followinq ac-
count of the group's beginning to the author: 
I was in Tulsa walking through Riverside Park 
when I noticed some people handing out anti-
nuke literature, which, after reading, I thought 
sounded very biased and exaggerated. I decided 
to check it out further and went to the public 
library. After reading some sources, I found 
to my satisfaction that the claims against 
nuclear energy were valid, maybe even under-
stated. I decided to organize a Sunbelt group 
in Stillwater with the help of the Tulsa organi-
zation. I went to 'Hill House' in Tulsa and 
trained under the guidance of a man from the 
Clamshell Alliance who was in Oklahoma to or-
ganize the movement. We advertised for our 
first meeting, called 'Nuclear Power in Okla-
homa,' and a representative from CASE and 
Clamshell spoke before a large audience on 
campus. From this we received about 40 in-
terested supporters and the Sunbelt battle 
in Stillwater against Black Fox was on its 
way. 
The Sunbelt Alliance was a coalition of people who 
had, as a matter of conscience, strong objections to the 
proliferation of nuclear power and energy in America and 
throughout the world. The collective objections were 
based in each individual's personal recognition that di-
rect action is necessary to prevent the continued growth 
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of a nuclear technology that poses economic, health safety, 
and environmental threats. This collective commitment 
is found in an organizational description statement which 
reads, in part, as follows: 
The Sunbelt Alliance is not the embodiment of 
any ideology, attitude or set of values. Just 
as our objections stem from diverse roots, our 
backgrounds and beliefs cover a wide spectrum 
of political and social perspectives. People 
do not join the Sunbelt Alliance because of a 
common overview of our political world as one 
would join the Democratic Party. People join 
the Sunbelt Alliance because they share a 
resolute opposition to nuclear power. 
This allows the Sunbelt to assume a multitude 
of 'personalities,' of strategies, and of pro-
jects. As a result, we can maintain an assault 
on Nukes from many fronts, and provide persons 
with a structure that will afford them their 
most effective political voice. 
The concept of an 'alliance,' or a group bound 
by commitment instead of perspective, allows a 
great deal of freedom for political expression. 
It is an immutable requirement that all per-
sons within the Sunbelt Alliance conduct such 
expressions non-violently and respectfully. 
But other than this we assume in good faith 
that each affinity group and chapter will mani-
fest its opposition in a responsible manner. 
The Sunbelt Alliance is not an organization 
through which every activity must gain approval 
or endorsement; nor do we wish to be. We do 
not seek to censor, censure or pass judgement 
on each other. The Sunbelt Alliance is a mech-
anism, a vehicle, with which individuals can 
mount a maximum of political influence. It is 
predicated upon a tolerance and respect for our 
colleagues, and an absolute intolerance of nu-
clear power. 
Although, as an alliance, we do not have a 
singular ideology, we do have a singular pur-
pose--to halt the proliferation of nuclear tech-
nology generally, and to permanently halt the 
construction of Black Fox specifically. We feel 
that only the people possess the authority to 
decide the issue of nuclear power and so we take 
the issue to them (Sunbelt Alliance, l979e, 
p. 5) • 
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As the Sunbelt organization grew in membership, sev-
eral different areas of support evolved. The alliance 
consisted of Supporters of Silkwood, Musicians Against 
Black Fox, Tulsa University Students Against Black Fox, 
the Oklahoma City Branch of Sunbelt, and a number of con-
concerned individuals. The fall of 1978 saw a number of 
activities generated by the Sunbelt Alliance, including 
cosponsorship, with the Supporters of Silkwood and CASE, 
of the September 3 Jackson Browne concert, a picnic/rally 
with live music the afternoon of the Browne concert; an 
educational conference on September 16 in Aaronson Audi-
torium at the Tulsa City/County Library; an occupational 
action at Black Fox Station on October 7, 1978, in con-
juction with other occupations that were scheduled around 
the nation. The Stillwater chapter of the Sunbelt 
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Alliance, along with other anti-nuclear organizations, 
joined together to form Oklahomans for Nuclear Safeguards 
(ONS) in November of 1979. The newly formed group at-
tempted to get 65,000 signatures from voters to get the 
question of nuclear safeguards on the November, 1980, 
state ballot. The petition, in part, read: 
1. Nuclear facilities must accept complete 
liability when accidents occur. 
2. The effectiveness of all safety systems 
must be tested under conditions substan-
tially similar to operation. 
3. Radioactive materials must be handled in 
a fully safe and secure manner. 
4. A bond must be posted prior to construc-
tion to provide for the.decommission of 
a spent nuclear facility. 
5. There must be adequate protection from 
theft and terrorism (ONS, 1980, p. 1). 
In the fall of 1979, 52 shipments of spent nuclear 
fuel rods were to be routed through Oklahoma's highways 
from San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station in California 
to the General Electric waste dump facility in Illinois. 
The Sunbelt Alliance and Oklahoman's for Nuclear Safe-
guards held training sessions in Tulsa concerning methods 
to stop the trucks as a protest and the legal implications 
of such a stoppage. On November 17, a "Walk Your Neigh-
borhood Day for ONS" was held in Stillwater, Tulsa, Okla-
homa City and other Oklahoma communities. Representatives 
of Sunbelt canvassed door-to-door gathering signatures in 
support of the petition. Also, signature booths were set 
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up at the Payne County Fair, the Oklahoma State University 
Student Union, and in downtown Stillwater. 
Fund raising events were held beginning in the fall 
of 1979, including a series of local concerts held in 
Stillwater, Tulsa, Norman, and Oklahoma City. Holley 
Near--singer, songwriter, and cultural workers on a United 
States tour "For a Non-Nuclear Future," performed with 
J. T. Thomas at the Brook Theater in Tulsa on November 11, 
1979. The following day, Randy Crouch and the Flying 
Horse Opera, and the Sam Man Band performed at the Boomer 
Theater in Norman. On November 13, Sunbelt held a Silkwood 
Commemoration at Kerr Park in Oklahoma City in conjunction 
with a Silkwood teach-in the following day at Morton Hall 
in Oklahoma City. A candlelight ceremony was part of the 
program that included speakers Holley Near; Mishu Kakuu, 
a Black Hills Alliance spokesperson; Makoda, and Billy 
Davis, who did investigative work on the Karen Silwood case. 
On November 27, several hundred people, many of whom were 
Sunbelt members, demonstrated outside the Oklahoma State 
office building in Oklahoma City, portraying an "angry mob" 
in reaction to requested rate hikes by the Public Serivce 
Commission of Oklahoma for the purpose of raising added 
funds to construct Black Fox 1. 
Beginning on December 1, 1979, Sunbelt published its 
first statewide monthly newsletter containing articles on 
organization activities and anti-nuclear information. 
Also, an all-volunteer staff of Sunbelt members and others, 
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published a special spring issue of "Wellspring" in Still-
water. According to Sunbelt, this local publication was 
devoted to "self-sufficiency, alternatives, and the heal-
ing of the body, mind, and spirit · (Sunbelt Alliance and 
Oklahomans for Nuclear Safeguards, 1979, p. 2). The scope 
of the articles included organic gardening, alternative 
education, crafts, politics, philosophy, poetry, and art 
work. 
On April 26-28, 1980, many Sunbelt Alliance members 
participated in the National Anti-Nuclear March on Washing-
ton, D.C. The three-day schedule of activities included 
a massive march on the Washington, D.C. mall; a "religious 
day," in which Sunbelt members performed the "symbolic 
funeral" with thousands of others; and peaceful protests 
at the Department of Energy, Nuclear Regulatory Conunission, 
the Pentagon, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Sunbelt 
Alliance issued the following statement concerning the 
significance of the March on Washington: 
On April 26-28 people from all over the coun-
try that are concerned and outraged over the 
needless proliferation of nuclear power will 
converge on Washington, D.C., bringing a clear 
and definite message to the federal government. 
STOP NUCLEAR POWER NOW! (Sunbelt Alliance and 
Oklahomans for Nuclear Safeguards, 1979, n.p.). 
Prior to the march, an "information sheet" was drafted 
which read as follows: 
Living in a democracy means that we are all 
part of the crucial struggle concerning which 
energy path to follow. The survival of untold 
future generations and the quality of life that 
will be experienced tomorrow are created by the 
choices made today. Catastrophic accidents, 
genetic mutations, cancer, environmental damages, 
erosion of our civil liberties, and the con-
tinued corporate dominance of our lives is a 
legacy that must not be tolerated. 
By pushing an energy policy that promotes nu-
clear power, the federal government has sold 
out the American people to Big Oil, the nuclea·r 
industry, and the utilities--an interlocking 
group of corporations bound together by the 
desire for high profits that are acquired by 
handcuffing the energy consumer to centralized 
power. Nuclear power's existence depends on 
our tax dollars. It is our right to make the 
choice and our responsibility to make that 
choice known. It is our obligation to make 
sure that choice is carried out. 
With the sun's unlimited energy supply to meet 
our needs, it is inexcusable that a program 
has not been implemented at least as large as 
the program that put a man on the moon. The 
lack of such a program reveals the importance 
the government places on meeting our needs 
compared to the desires of EXXON and other en-
ergy corporations. 
It is imperative that every person aware of the 
dangers becomes involved by voicing their op-
position and conununicating to the American 
people the magnitude of this issue. Your par-
ticipation in the March on Washington is greatly 
needed. Won't you please come to Washington? 
(Sunbelt Allianc~ and Environmental Action. 
Coalition, 1980, n.p.). 
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Prior to April, on March 28, a day of local activities 
was held around Oklahoma, designated as "Three Mile Island 
+ 1 Day 11 in which a series of meetings and rallies were 
held as reminders of the Three Mile Island incident. 
The Sunbelt Alliance, together with the national anti-
nuclear movement, adopted one basic strategy in its ef-
fort to stop nuclear power. That was to create enough pub-
lie pressure so that government and the nuclear industry 
will find it both politically and economically too costly 
to proceed with nuclear energy construction. This basic 
strategy for change was implemented through a variety 
of tactics. One of the most basic is public education, 
which has been promoted through public speeches, public 
meetings and debates, film presentations, writing and 
distributing literature, and appearances on radio and 
television talk shows, to name only some. For example, 
a representative of the Sunbelt Alliance engaged in a 
public nuclear debate with the chairman of Oklahoman's 
for Nuclear Energy on October 29, 1979, in the Student 
Union Ballroom on the Oklahoma State University campus. 
The event was sponsored by the Oklahoma State University 
Environmental Awareness Center, and a large audience was 
present. The writing and distribution of literature has 
also been an organizational tactic of Sunbelt in which 
a variety of anti-nuclear literature has been produced 
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on information sheets and flyers and distributed through-
out Oklahoma. Much of the Sunbelt Alliance literature 
contained similar themes. For example, the economics of 
nuclear power was often presented in the literature as a 
corporate system of energy production and distribution 
that is part of an overall framework of a concentrated 
economic power structure. This power base, it was argued, 
will continue as long as nuclear energy remains profitable 
through large investments and non-competitive monopolies. 
Continued expansion of nuclear power can virtually guaran-
tee high profit margins for some large American Corporations 
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while lessening the public control over energy design de-
cisions. Some specific remarks related to this theme are 
found in the Sunbelt statement on "Jobs and Energy": 
Corporate energy interests, along with 
most industrialists and some agencies of the 
government, are vigorously urging the rapid 
expansion of energy production. The energy 
systems they are promoting are large in scale, 
technologically complex, wasteful, environ-
mentally destructive and dangerous to energy 
industry employees and the public--it is for 
good reason that the public has been led to 
believe that energy expansion has been the 
springboard to economic growth, the 'good life,' 
and jobs. 
Industry has been able to replace human 
labor economically with energy purchased at 
very low rates from an ever-expanding energy 
industry which has been accumulating ever-
increasing profits. The small consumer has 
been picking up the tab: industries tradi-
tionally have paid less than individual con-
sumers for each unit of energy used. In 
addition, by bearing most of the environmental 
and disease costs associated with energy, and 
by permitting substantial government assistance 
to energy companies, the public has actually 
been subsidizing industrial use of cheap en-
ergy to replace human labor. Surely, there 
is a better path to prosperity and jobs. En-
ergy production is not a goal in and of itself. 
Energy should be utilized to serve people, to 
provide the freedom for all people to have 
richer, easier, healthier lives. That a nation 
uses vast amounts of energy does not reveal to 
what extent the energy is actually being put to 
wise, effective use by its people. 
The best approach to energy sufficiency, 
economic prosperity and joos is that which com-
bines increasing energy efficiency with a vari-
ety of diverse and safe energy-supplying 
technologies. This approach is not 'anti-
technology,' as sometimes is alleged by the 
large energy interests. In fact, technological 
innovation will be a key to achieving success 
with this approach--but the technologies in-
volved need to be ones which can be controlled 
by the American people, not ones so elaborate 
and complex that people have to be kept far 
away from them or from decisions concerning 
·them. 
And this is not a 'no-growth' approach, 
or one which advocates a return to drudge 
labor. To the energy industry, 'growth' has 
always meant growth in energy production in 
order to satisfy its own needs, no matter the 
consequences for the rest of society. But to · 
others, 'growth' means a national policy of 
full employment, improved standards of living, 
improved job safety and public health, expanded 
opportunities for leisure activities and the 
development of rewarding relationships with 
other people (Sunbelt Alliance, 1979c, n.p.). 
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Another persistent theme of Sunbelt Alliance educa-
tional literature was alternatives to nuclear energy. 
There is a wide variety of alternative sources of power 
available for use now and in the future, according to 
movement literature. Power potentials of the sun, wind, 
water, and earth can become technologically efficient 
and cost-effective if they are given the proper public 
and private priorities. The anti-nuclear spokespersons 
contend that our energy future does not have to depend 
on choosing one of these technologies, but flexibility 
and multiple use of a combination of systems could meet 
the different needs for power that exist. "Appropriate 
technology" is a term that is often used to explain the 
desirability of alternative energy sources. Anderson 
(1978), in Solar Age magazine, defines appropriate tech-
nology this way: 
Appropriate technology embodies many benef i-
cial features: 
(1) It makes efficient use of energy and other 
resources, and in other ways enhances en-
vironmental quality; 
(2) It is light on capital use and particu-
larly conducive to small business partici-
pation; 
(3) It depends as much as possible on, and 
seeks to dignify, human labor; 
(4) It uses local materials and labor; 
(5) It is simple to install, operate, and 
maintain; 
(6) The technology serves people rather than 
dominates them--it is responsive to human 
needs; 
(7) It emphasizes technologies conducive to 
decentralized control (individual, collec~ 
tive, community) and demaaratic decision-
making; 
(8) It results in durable recyclable systems 
and/or products, and offers low life-cycle 
costs to the user (p. 2). 
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The Sunbelt Alliance argued that solar, wind genera-
tion, biomass conversion, 1.and conservation are all viable 
possibilities for energy use regardless of "propaganda" 
to the contrary. For example, the organization maintained 
that: 
We have been led to believe by the energy compa-
nies that alternative technologies, such as solar 
and wind, are not available at present in a prac-
tical or economical way. According to their fig-
ures, it will be about fifty years before massive, 
centralized alternative technologies will be 
available to meet even a small fraction of our 
energy needs. 
While these centralized technologies are now here 
nearly developed, this argument misses one of the 
main benefits of alternative technologies: they 
are by nature decentralized and adaptable to 
many different conditions and needs. The energy 
companies have everything to lose by people 
being able to take their power into their own 
hands!! 
. . • there has been a campaign on the part of 
the energy industry to mislead the public into 
believing that the bulk of energy waste is 
caused by the average citizen who is too lazy 
to walk, or too pampered to live and work with 
the thermostat at a low setting. The 'lazy 
citizen' theory ignores the reality that waste-
ful energy consumption has been encouraged to 
increase the profits of energy producing compa-
nies. It also does not take into account that 
accurate information on energy matters and al-
ternative methods of energy supply have not 
been available to the consumer (Sunbelt Alliance, 
1979a, n.p.). -
93 
The final theme found in Sunbelt Alliance literature 
focuses on health and safety factors in nuclear energy use. 
The economics of nuclear power are increasingly disastrous 
in terms of health dangers which are viewed as inseparable 
from environmental dangers. Nuclear opponents are ecolo-
gists, concerned with the total ecological system. The 
generally stated reasons why nuclear plants are dangerous 
are: 
1) Radioactive poisons from used nuclear fuel 
can cause cancer, leukemia, birth defects, 
genetic damage, heart disease, premature 
aging, and general poor health. 
2) Every nuclear power plant releases some 
radioactive poisons to the environment. 
3) An accident could release enough radiation 
to kill thousands of people and contaminate 
cities, land, and water for decades. 
4) One of the poisons created--plutonium--is 
the raw material of atomic bombs. Theft of 
plutonium or enriched uranium could lead to 
nuclear disaster or cancer epidemics. 
5) The nuclear fuel cycle from the mining of 
uranium to waste storage endangers its 
workers and communities near nuclear facil-
ities. Workers and their offspring are the 
the ones who bear the brunt of the nuclear 
threat (Gyorgy, 1979, p. 72). 
94 
Because of these health and safety hazards, the Sun-
belt Alliance maintains that many nuclear advocates have 
become doubters. The Alliance states that the issue of 
nuclear safety has been, perhaps, the most debated of all. 
Depending on which experts you listen to, all aspects of 
handling of the highly toxic materials are completely 
safe and under control, or very unsafe and likely to 
poison millions. Coincidentally, many experts who have 
declared nuclear power to be completely safe work for the 
nuclear industry or the utility companies, while some of 
the experts who speak on its dangers have left highly paid 
and prestigious jobs with the nuclear industry. On Febru-
ary 2, 1976, three nuclear engineers at General Electric 
explained their reasons for leaving of their jobs to the 
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy: 
'We resigned because we could no longer justify 
devoting our life energies to the continued 
development and expansion of nuclear fission 
power--a system we believe to be so dangerous 
that it now threatens the very existence of 
life on this planet.' ... Obviously, the 
myth of nuclear reactor 'safety' needs more 
than casual consideration, as does the myth 
that alternative energy sources which are far 
safer and less costly than nuclear power, can 
only be feasible for in the future (Sunbelt 
Alliance, 1979b, n.p.). 
Since the Sunbelt Alliance was formed, 379 charges of 
criminal trespass have been leveled against organization 
members. Many of these charges are the result of various 
forms of nonviolent direct action which the Alliance uses 
as its main form of confrontational policies. Nonviolent 
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direct action can include a variety of tactics as it is 
practiced by both the Sunbelt Alliance and the National 
Anti-nuclear movement. Nonviolent civil disobedience 
and occupation/restoration are two significant forms of 
nonviolent direct action which will be discussed in a 
later section of this research. The following is a brief 
explanation of some of the actions that resulted in legal 
sanctions against Sunbelt members. The activities of the 
Sunbelt Alliance are more than educational literature: 
Oct. 7, 1978:--348 members of the Sunbelt were 
arrested in the first occupation of the Black 
Fox construction site. Twelve minors who 
crossed the fence and occupied the site were 
not charged with violating any issue. No per-
sons were detained. The arrest procedure was 
arranged beforehand and proceeded very smoothly. 
All persons were booked at the site and re-
ceived a citation for trespassing. Those per-
sons were required to either post a $25 bond 
by mail or to appear for arraignment in Rogers 
County on specified dates. Of those arrested, 
132 were found guilty on March 30, 1979, due to 
the prosecution's failure to prove one of the 
essential elements in the case. Bond was re-
turned to them. The remaining persons did not 
contest the charges and forfeited their bonds 
without any trial. 
Oct. 31, 1978:--0n Halloween night, fourteen 
persons stole onto the construction site and 
chained themselves to bulldozers. The 'Hallo-
ween Fourteen,' as they came to be known, were 
arrested and charged with criminal trespass. 
These persons were taken to the Rogers County 
Jail and bond was set at $50 apiece. One per-
son was forced to pay the bond because of work 
obligations. The remaining thirteen went on 
a hunger strike demanding that they be released 
on their own recognizance. After two days, 
their demands were met and all of them were r:re-
leased. . . . These persons have been denied 
a trial by jury in spite of a state law that 
gives them that right. . . • 
January 4, 1979:--Seventeen persons were ar-
rested for occupying an unloading dock at the 
Port of Catoosa. This dock was to be used to 
unload a reactor pressure vessel bound for the 
Wolf Creek Station in Kansas. The blockaders 
were arrested and taken by bus to Rogers County. 
Originally, they were charged with unlawful 
assembly, but charges were later reduced to 
criminal trespass. Although no one but the 
authorities can say for certain, it is common 
opinion that the unlawful assembly charge was 
for the benefit of the press and the authorities 
probably never intended to charge us with any-
thing other than trespass (Sunbelt Alliance, 
1979e, pp. 13-14). -
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CHAPTER V 
APPEARANCE AND MAINTENANCE OF IMAGE: 
STRATEGY AND TACTICS 
Although a social movement is not organized in the ab-
solute sense of the term, it faces structural problems 
that must be addressed if it is to survive. The manner in 
which these problems are confronted usually involves some 
degree of organization in terms of which to meet present 
and future contingencies. The purpose of this chapter is 
to focus on the major structural problem of coordinating 
the activities of the movement in its interaction with 
other social groups and the public in general; that is, 
developing and executing strategy and tactics. This 
structural problem, as well as others not included here, 
is handled through the movement's style of organization. 
As Lang and Lang (1961) suggest, the movement's style of 
organization refers to the general mode of regulating re-
lations within a movement, resolving its conflicts and 
meeting external contingencies (Lang and Lang, 1978). The 
first two elements of this organizational style are related 
to internal problems that a movement must face, and are the 
subject of later chapters. The third element of meeting ex-
ternal contingencies is of importance here and will be 
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discussed within the framework of impression management. 
This is defined by Tedeschi and Riess (1981) as consist-
ing of any behavior by a person that has the purpose of 
controlling or manipulating the attributions and impres-
sions formed of that person by others. 
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Individuals engage in behaviors to promote identities 
that will enhance their ability to influence others. Thus, 
actors may attempt to develop their appearance of trusti-
worthiness, expertise, credibility, and prestige. The 
actor is concerned with the impressions that others form 
of him, and he will take some action (referred to as im-
pression management) to prevent or lessen negative im-
pressions and to enhance positive impressions (Tedeschi, 
and Riess, 1981). 
For the most part, thes.e attempts at influencing the 
reactions of others have been ignored by sociologists and 
social psychologists. However, Burke (1952), Mills (1940), 
and Goffman (1959) have focused on impression management 
processes used by individuals in everyday social interac-
tion. Of these, perhaps the best known is Goffman's 
The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959). Within 
the framework of theatrical performance, Goffman focuses 
on the structure of social interaction that emerges as a 
result of people engaging in interaction presence with 
others. Of particular significance, according to Goffman, 
is the maintenance of a definition of the behavioral sit-
uation by the actor or actors who create and maintain a 
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definition of reality to which others respond. This pers-
pective recognizes that the definition of the situation 
is often part of a projection created and sustained 
through cooperation with others. The term "performance 
team" is applied to the set or group of individuals who 
collaborate to generate a particular definition of social 
reality (Goffman, 1959). Of significant importance in 
promoting this definition is the process of impression man-
agement, or the act of creating a favorable impression. 
Goffman uses the term "dramaturgical circumspection" to 
explain the necessity of the performers to "determine in 
advance how best to stage a show" or image (p. 79). He 
suggests that knowledge of the audience and correct cast-
ing of the parts are contingencies that must be managed 
in some way by the actors. 
Although Goffman's (1959) theoretical framework cen-
ters around face-to-face human interaction, his concept 
of impression management can be applied to group structures 
like social movements. As Klapp (1972) argues: 
•.• movements trying to grow--want publicity; 
but what they really need is not just attention 
to their movements but also dramas of appropri-
ate kinds that will confer new roles on them, 
villian roles on their enemies, and a plot pat-
tern on the action in which followers can be-
lieve and the public at large can perceive 
(p. 368). 
This is the process of creating and maintaining a public 
image that will promote the maximum amount of favorable 
public will toward the movement's specific objective. An 
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outward movement such as the anti-nuclear one, seeks to 
generate support from large public masses, not simply 
individuals. In order to accomplish the goal of mobiliz-
ing mass support, extensive use of mass propaganda through 
education and various pressure tactics are used. To 
understand a social movement it is always necessary to 
refer to the opposition it encounters. By definition a 
social movement always represents some socially unrecog-
nized interest. Opposition to a movement need not only 
be in a direct, active form. It also includes that part 
of the public that potentially can be persuaded to convert 
to the movement's cause. 
The direction of the movement must appear to be a 
solution to a problem that the mass public shares in com-
mon, but may have unfocused sentiments about. The poten-
tial for public conversion in support of a movement 
rests on the ability of the movement to convince the 
public it faces a social problem that needs attention. 
Often, the methods used to gain support are more important 
than the threat of the problem itself in determining 
movement success. In the case of nuclear energy, for 
example, the way the issue is defined by the movement can 
determine the amount of public support. The interaction 
of the movement with its "host society" presents a funda-
mental dilemma for the movement. The dilemma consists 
of trying to maintain an identity and a continuing com-
mitment to principles, while still trying to broaden its 
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support base. In the anti-nuclear movement, demonstra-
tions, debates, and site occupations are necessary if the 
membership morale and belief in the movement's purpose 
is to be maintained. At the same time that galvanizing 
sentiment within the movement is necessary, there also 
must be movement consideration for increasing its circle 
of sympathizers within the public at large. The movement, 
in order to be effective,usually has to make certain prag-
matic compromises in its "image style" to attract as much 
public support as possible. While the movement is working 
to expand its membership and support base, it must also 
contend with cooptation and repression attempts by society. 
Mauss (1975) defines these: 
By 'co-optation,' we mean ameliorative gestures 
in the direction of meeting and neutralizing 
the movement's criticisms, combined with a 
propaganda effort emphasizing those interests 
and values which the society shares with the 
reform movement. By 'repression,' we refer 
to social control techniques ranging from 
police action to ridicule, which can and do 
occur across all the institutions of the society 
(pp. 5 5- 5 6 ) . 
The success of a social movement is determined in 
large measure by its own methods of manipulating and re-
spending to external contingencies. The style of impres-
sion management that the social movement adopts is highly 
correlated to its ability to effectly deal with these 
outside forces. By social movement impression management 
the author is referring to: the movement's ability to 
perceive and in some measure counteract the effects of 
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external social forces in such a way as to promote the 
maximum favorable public response to its existence (defi-
nition the author's). The maintenance of a particular 
public image in relation to the above definition forms 
the basis for the movement's selected strategies and tac-
tics. The need to win external support may be seen as a 
function of these two dimensions. The remainder of this 
section focuses on the specific strategies and tactics of 
the anti-nuclear movement in general and the Sunbelt Alli-
ance in particular, in terms of appearance and image 
functions. 
Appearance and Image: Specific 
Strategy and Tactics 
Nonviolent Civil Disobedience , 
Nonviolent civil disobedience, as promoted and prac-
ticed by the anti-nuclear movement and its affinity groups 
(including the Sunbelt Alliance) , is a combination of the 
desire for direct action and the ideology of nonviolence. 
The politics of direct action to some extent may be 
an outgrowth of the earlier movement frustrations with the 
tactics of legal intervention, discussed earlier. However, 
Gyorgy (1979) contends that there were important ideologi-
cal differences between the early intervenors and the new 
movement activists. Gyorgy, as a member of the Clamshell 
Alliance, explains the differences in terms of background 
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and political orientation of the new members. She writes: 
In the mid to late 70's, as the nuclear 
program spread across the country, people who 
had been politically active in the late 60's 
began to get involved in the nuclear issue. 
The new nuclear opponents found the same 
kinds of coverups, lies, vested corporate in-
terests and inhumanity involved in nuclear 
power as in the war issue. In fact, nuclear 
power seemed in many ways to be 'the Vietnam 
War brought home.' By aiding the nuclear in-
dustry while assuring the public it has nothing 
to fear, the government was supporting an en-
ergy source that could prove as lethal as any 
war. 
. . • one important lesson learned during the 
Vietnam War days was that a citizen's actions--
at all levels--does bring change and the way 
that people act has a lot to do with the kinds 
of change they'll get .... 
Both the anti-war movement and the earlier 
civil rights movement demonstrated the power of 
individual and especially collective civil dis-
obedience. It was this tactic that broke 
through racist barriers in the South and 'raised 
the special cost' of the Vietnam War to the 
point where policymakers had to take notice 
(p. 388). 
Direct action as a tactic of the anti-nuclear is based 
on the belief that nuclear power must be opposed in ways 
beyond educational efforts or legal confrontational tac-
tics. Direct action is aimed at raising the social and 
political costs of pursuing the national nuclear program, 
while also educating the public concerning nuclear energy 
dangers. These actions can range from educational canvas-
sing to rallies, marches, demonstrations, and occupations 
of specific nuclear facility targets. 
Direct action can either be violent or nonviolent in 
nature. The direct action tactics of the anti-nuclear 
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movement have been nonviolent in orientation, both at the 
national and local group levels. As Alpern (1978} has 
pointed out, there has been a surplus of nuclear power 
plants winning very favorable attention in the national 
and local press. According to many anti-nuclear activists, 
the protest and civil disobedience of the Vietnam peace 
movement were necessary tactics for bringing public pres-
sure on the federal government to end the war. However, 
many also feel the violence of the movement often ob-
scured the main goal of ending the war, and they look more 
favorably on the nonviolent direct action of the civil 
rights movement in terms of public sympathy and good 
realization (Alpern, 1978). According to Sharp (1973), 
nonviolent action is a generic term that includes a variety 
of methods of protest, noncooperation, and intervention, 
in all of which the actors behave by doing or refusing to 
do, certain things without using physical violence. There-
fore, Sharp suggests that nonviolence is not passive inac-
tion; not merely the absence of violence but the particular 
philosophy of action that can produce certain consequences: 
When people refuse their cooperation, withhold 
their help, and persist in their disobedience 
and defiance, they are denying their opponent 
the basic human assistance and cooperation 
which any government or hierarchical system 
requires. If they do this in sufficient num-
bers for long enough, that government or hier-
archical system will no longer have power. 
This is the basic political assumption of non--
violent action (p. 64}. 
Pelton (1974} also maintains that nonviolence is action 
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oriented; it is action that does not avoid conflict but 
seeks to confront conflict and resolve it. Pelton main-
tains that inaction can contribute to injustice, and the 
avoidance of injustice is at the philosophical base of 
nonviolence. He states that nonviolence is: 
. . • action based on the refusal to do harm 
and injustice or to allow harm and injustice 
to exist. Nonviolence not only suggests that 
we act in a manner that will not harm anyone 
but that we strive to root out injustice in 
the world. Nonviolence then is action that 
does not do or allow injustice. It might be 
thought that the nonviolent activist believes 
that he knows precisely what constitutes jus-
tice, or thinks that he has cornered the mar-
ket on truth; not so. It is partly because 
the nonviolent activist believes that he can-
not know absolute truth, and that he can act 
only on the basis of what he considers to be 
injustice, that he uses nonviolent means. He 
believes that violence carries an implicit 
judgment on other men that contains a finality 
that no man is fit to impose upon others. 
No one is fit to judge because they are trapped 
by their own subjective reality. Thus, the 
concept of truth in the philosophy of nonvio-
lence is that of relative truth (pp. 14-15). 
Nonviolence is a philosophy of means which rests upon 
certain moral premises, but it is also a very instrumental 
tactic for public relations purposes when used by a move-
ment. As Pelton (1974) discusses in his section on func-
tions of nonviolent protests, such actions can serve the 
purpose of diverting public attention to a focused issue 
or alleged injustice. Nonviolent protests can produce 
subsequent persuasion by arousing curiosity and promoting 
a frame of receptiveness for new information. A protest 
action can also, according to Pelton, draw sympathizers 
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into active participation in the movement, serving the 
purpose of mobilizing people into active conunitments, 
while at the same time, allowing for the least risk of 
of fending the public at large. 
Therefore, although some anti-nuclear protesters view 
nonviolence as a philosophical principal guiding all per-
sonal and political behaviors, many within the movement 
have adopted it as the most rational strategy for the goal-
realization of ending nuclear power. There is a distinc-
tion between conscientious and pragmatic nonviolence 
(Stiehm, 1968). Also, the concern with nonviolence has 
several tactical objectives, according to Barkan (1979): 
1. To present a favorable image to the public 
and elected officials through the news 
media; 
2. To reduce the potential for outbreaks of 
violence, which could not only lead to 
physical injury but also discredit the 
movement and divert attention from the 
nuclear power issue; 
3. To present a contrast to the 'violent tech-
nology' that the protesters claim nuclear 
power represents; 
4. To deflect actions by possible 'agents pro-
vocateurs' of the kind that helped under-
mine the Vietnam peace movement; 
5. To maintain good relations and develop 
lines of communicating with the police and 
National Guard (p. 26). 
The Sunbelt Alliance understands the necessity of hav-
ing a strategy of nonviolent direct action in order to 
best exercise the power of the people to bring about change. 
As the Sunbelt Alliance educational literature states: 
People--you and I--do have the power to bring 
about change, but in speaking of this change 
we must constantly remember that our actions 
effect our goals. If our actions appear di-
visive or impure, our goals will never be ac-
complished, but if our actions are just and 
loving--individually and collectively--then a 
more just, loving and non-nuclear society is 
feasible. For this reasons, the Sunbelt Al-
liance is making a commitment to non-violent 
direct action, morally, spiritually and tacti-
cally, to create a non-nuclear future for 
ourselves and for future generations .... 
Non-violent direct action is, in essence, tak-
ing a cause which affects us all, to the people 
in the most direct and peaceful ways possible. 
We are the people who can and will effect 
change; who can and will--STOP BLACK FOX! 
(Sunbelt Alliance, 1979d, p. 2). 
For the anti-nuclear movement in general arid the 
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Sunbelt Alliance in particular, nonviolent direct action 
has been a means of mobilizing public support for the 
movement by attempting to convince the general society 
that actions taken against a perceived unjust situation 
are valid. For some members of the Sunbelt, nonviolence 
is a total way of life, while for others it is used as a 
means for instigating social change. It is important 
that the anti-nuclear movement involve a diversity of 
membership. As stated by Gyorgy (1979) , some organizers 
have expressed concern that direct action tactics such as 
site occupations are alienating to many working and older 
people. But nonviolent civil disobedience is viewed by a 
growing number of people as necessary and effective, and 
thus far none of the thousands of arrests at nuclear sites 
have involved violence. The movement has taken up direct 
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action on the assumption that civil disobedience is effec-
tive only when it is totally nonviolent. The Sunbelt Al-
liance uses a quote from Ghandi (1954) in its founding 
statement which communicates that nonviolent civil dis-
obedience is: 
the right that belongs to every human being 
and it becomes sacred duty when it springs 
from civility or, which is the same thing, 
love. . . . In those instances where demo-
cratic procedures have been damaged through 
default or design, and where the legal ma-
chinery has been turned towards a travesty 
of justice, civil disobedience may be called 
into play (p. 37) . 
From the perspective of Sunbelt, nonviolent civil dis-
obedience is behavior which illustrates people's commit-
ment to stop nuclear power by showing an informed public's 
dissatisfaction with a technology of environmental harm 
and economic domination, and by contrast, promoting a 
philosophy of concern and empathy for people and the eco-
system. Accordingly, the four main facets of behavior that 
symbolize this concern are: (1) no acts of violence, 
either physical or verbal; (2) behavior that gives secur-
ity forces no reason to feel threatened; (3) total honesty, 
openness, and communication, and (4) steadfast adherence 
to nonviolence even if threatened or assaulted (Sunbelt 
Alliance, 1978a). Stated in different terms, Sunbelt be-
lieved nonviolent civil disobedience to be dependent on 
"reason, imagination, and discipline" (p. 9), reflected in 
these specific guidelines found in their occupation hand-
book: 
1) Our attitude towards officials and others 
who may oppose us should be one of sympa-
thetic understanding of the burdens and 
responsibilities they carry. 
2) No matter what the circumstances or provo-
cation, we should not respond with violence 
to acts directed against us. 
3) We should not call names, make hostile re-
marks or exploit the weaknesses that we 
perceive in others. 
4) When faced with an unexpected provocation, 
we should attempt to make a reasoned, posi-
tive, creative, and sympathetic response. 
We should speak to the best in all people. 
5) We should attempt to interpret as clearly 
as possible to any whom we are in contact 
with--and especially to those who may op-
pose us--the purpose and meaning of our 
actions (p. 9) . 
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Although civil disobedience through the occupations 
of various nuclear plant sites have helped focus national, 
regional, and local attention on nuclear power as an is-
sue, value conflicts over their nature and intent and 
over the meaning of nonviolence have led to some disagree-
ments within the anti-nuclear movement. Many of the anti-
nuclear alliances have not been very specific in their 
goals of site occupations, often merely announcing that 
they are for the purpose of "stopping" or "opposing" 
nuclear power. Some alliances have declared both a sym-
bolic goal of dramatizing opposition to nuclear power as 
well as an obstructionist goal of blockading sites until 
construction is ceased (McQuiston, 1979). 
Many anti-nuclear protesters are committed to civil 
disobedience for purely coercive or obstructionists 
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reasons, and at some of the occupation sites tactical 
arguments have occurred as a result. For example, at the 
May, 1977, Seabrook occupation where over 1,400 were ar-
rested, the Clamshell Alliance had expected everyone to 
be taken into custody immediately upon entering the con-
struction area. When they were surprisingly allowed onto 
the plant's parking lot, they sat down to discuss their 
next plan of action. Many thought they should remain 
where they were, while others wanted to take a more ag-
gressive posture and stop incoming cars containing plant 
personnel and cut through the fence surrounding the site. 
Both of these suggestions were defined as acts of violence 
by those wishing to remain passive (Rosenblith, 1977; 
Hedemann, 1977). A similar tactical conflict over the 
purpose of civil disobedience occurred at the April, 1978, 
occupation of the Rocky Flats Nuclear Plant in Colorado. 
Approximately 150 protesters sat down on the railroad 
tracks inside the plant site. Eventually the group split 
between those who wanted to wait for the trains, and those 
who believed that a 24-hour sitting vigil was enough. 
Thirty-five stayed and were arrested six days later (Kuhn, 
1978). 
The Sunbelt Alliance has used various techniques of 
preparation to attempt to avoid voilence and promote 
strategy cohesiveness during occupations. Nonviolence 
training sessions are required by the Sunbelt organization 
for everyone participating in an occupation/restoration 
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action. The process of occupation/restoration as defined 
by the Sunbelt is based on the belief that: 
We have the right to occupy a nuclear site 
and restore at its natural non-nuclear state 
to prevent the commission of a far greater 
crime--the implications of which we are just 
beginning to discover. In order for an 
occupation/restoration (O/R) to be effective 
and ensure non-violence and solidarity, every 
everyone must attend training sessions and 
be in an affinity group. This is a way for 
the decision-making process to be decentral-
ized and more efficient, enabling everyone to 
take part in the process which determines the 
group's actions. 
It should be remembered that the practice of 
non-violence is not restricted to occupations, 
but extends to all aspects of our organiza-
tion. For if we join together in common 
spirit we can prove, non-violently, that life 
is more important to us than the life threat-
ening technology of nuclear power (Sunbelt Al-
liance, 1978b, n.p.). 
Training sessions for the June 2, 1978, Black Fox 
occupation were usually five to seven hours long and in-
volved 15 and 30 people per session. These sessions were 
designed to accomplish a variety of objectives. A his-
tory of the Sunbelt Alliance and their opposition to Black 
Fox was presented for the purpose of giving the potential 
occupier an increased understanding of the reasons behind 
the organization's structure and its protest tactics. One 
workshop session consisted of training in "creative lis-
tening skills" and quick decision making techniques within 
the organization framework of consensus. Another workshop 
centered around role playing for the purpose of putting 
people in the roles of "authorities, workers, media people, 
and occupiers to gain an understanding of the emotions 
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people experience in stressful situations (Sunbelt Alliance 
and Oklahomans for Nuclear Safeguards, 1979, pp. 9-10). Be-
cause various types of stress may be experienced during 
protest occupations, role-playing allows organization mem-
bers to anticipate how they will react in those situations. 
An important element in the training sessions was the 
knowledge received concerning nonviolent responses to vi-
olence. This knowledge was viewed as essential prepara-
tion for the diffusing of possible spontaneous or organized 
violence directed against occupiers and demonstrators. The 
following is representative of the Sunbelt's strategy on 
responses to violence or threats of violence directed 
against its members, as contained in the Black Fox occu-
pation Handbook: 
When confronted by a potentially violent sib-
uation those prepared to hold their tempers 
while taking initiative, such as peacekeep-
ers, should come forward. Others are protec-
ted by remaining back until the tension is 
resolved. Initiating eye contact and physi-
cal vulnerability with either a lone individ-
ual or a group leader is very important. 
Going forward with open hands and stance, 
smiling slightly and saying, 'Hi, my name is 
, what's yours?' is deceptively --.,.-----simple yet it is the deceptively simple, the 
ordinary, that is exactly the key to resolving 
the violence. By regaining the human en-
counter, by re-establishing the ordinary and 
the personal, you remove the random and anony-
mous elements of senseless violence. 
We are socialized from birth to be hostile, 
suspicious and aggressive. Many people are not 
familiar with non-violence and their encounter 
with you may be their first exposure to a per-
son who will not be provoked to violence. 
Qudet confidence and respect for the other is 
fundamental, even when that person is not 
respectful of us. Be quick to recognize the 
good in the other person without compromise 
to our position. 
There are times when one needs to defend one's 
self physically. This does not mean to re-
taliate, but rather to assume a position of 
least harm to your physical self. All occu-
piers and supporters should know the 'nonvi-
olent defense posture.' It involves clasping 
the hands over the head, elbows drawn in to 
hold the head stable, drawing the knees up 
with the legs tucked under. This forms a 
ball, face down, stomach and genitals covered. 
This position is a last resort in response of 
violence. 
Being in the presence of violence to another, 
particularly to a rrember of your affinity 
group, can be as devastating as being the 
victim. Remain calm. Gently talking to the 
hostile person can sometimes help them regain 
their humanity. It is also possible to inter-
pose yourself between the hostile and the vic-
tim; but recognize the risks involved. This 
gesture of personal sacrifice will often give 
the attacker pause and make them think again. 
Vulnerability, as in the interposing of women 
and children, is often disarming to the at-
tacker, but don't count on it (Sunbelt Alliance, 
1979e, p. 11). · 
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Basically, the Sunbelt group's responses to violence 
were both practical and philosophical. The practical re-
sponses to personal violence included suggestons for: 
--calm 
--quiet confidence and respect for the other 
person 
--eye contact 
--physical vulnerability (openness) 
--taking initiative, offering a greeting 
--genuine humor (not at another's expense) 
--orderly movement, deliverate, unfrantic 
--interposing between attacker and victim 
--nonviolence defense posture (Sunbelt Alliance, 
1979e, p. 11). •. 
The philosophical responses to violence emphasized 
dealing with psychological stress and the cultivation of 
a sense of inner strength, as expressed in the Sunbelt 
Alliance Black Fox Occupation Handbook (1979e): 
The power of nonviolence includes the abil-
ity to witness violence without becoming en-
gulfed in it. The difficulty of violence 
psychologically has less to do with the physi-
cal pain than the confusion, the terror and 
the hurt in realizing that someone else is 
doing that to you. All participants should 
reflect beforehand on those parts of them-
selves and their collective identity which 
cannot be taken by jail, by physical injury, 
or by any external force. In your own mind, 
you are free forever (p. 11). 
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At the close of the Sunbelt training sessions, those 
that decided to participate in the Black Fox occupation 
formed affinity groups which will be discussed in the 
following chapter. 
Maintenance of Movement Image 
Through the Media 
Many environmentalists have been aware for many years 
that effective, public relations is one of their antago-
nists' most powerful weapons. They have often pointed to 
omissions in government press releases, distortions in the 
corporation-inspired feature story, and the scarcity and 
imbalance of media content on issues of the environment 
(Sandman, 1977). The ecology movement, in general, dur-
ing the early 1970's, spent about $500,000 per year in 
media advertising in order to counteract an average of 
about $3 billion in corporate expenditures on the same 
subjects. Many of these environmentalist movement 
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advertisements attached to prevailing lifestyle of the 
nation and spoke of an inevitable conflict between corpo-
rate growth and the ecological health of the earth. They 
described a growing environmental destruction which re-
fleeted itself in individual lives as well as economic 
policies. The social movements of the 1960's had become 
almost totally media based by the 1970's and the ecology 
movement assumed television, for example, could be a po-
tentially useful tool in expanding knowledge about the 
nature of the ecosystem and its needed protection from 
human harm. As Mander (1978) suggests, however, the 
reality of a media oriented society may have changed not 
only the tactics of the ecology movement, but also its 
emphasis. He states that he: 
watched and participated as they changed 
their organizations' commitments from com-
munity organizing, legal reform processes 
or other forms of evolutionary change to 
focus upon television. Educational work was 
sacrificed to public relations work. The 
goal became less to communicate with individ-
uals, governments or communities than to in-
fluence the media. Actions began to be 
chosen less for their educational value or 
political content than for their ability to 
attract television cameras. Dealing directly 
with bureaucracies or corporations was frus-
trating and fruitless. Dealing with communi-
ties was slow. Everyone spoke of immediate 
victory (p. 20). 
Sandman (1977) further stresses the role of the media 
as a format for introducing environmental issues. As a 
public relations expert in environmental communication, he 
emphasizes that an issue needs a media event in order to 
become public knowledge. He advises the environmental-
ists that their goal should be: 
an event that's important enough and public 
enough to justify the story in the minds of 
the reporters. Of course, some events are 
better than others. Try for one that is 
convenient and easy to cover, that has some 
human-interest value and good picture possi-
bilities for broadcasting, and that is con-
sistent with the image your group wants to 
project. Let the media know in advance what 
you are doing, and have a handout ready for 
passers-by and a news release ready for re-
porters who don't show (p. 4). 
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During the last decade, there have been numerous films 
and other audiovisual materials produced by various anti-
nuclear organizations as public information techniques. 
These films present arguments against nuclear power, while 
at the same time, promote specific images of anti-nuclear 
groups for public consumption. According to Smith (1980) , 
the production and distribution of these films often meets 
extreme resistance from the nuclear industry. She quotes 
California film maker Don Widener as stating that: "There 
is an ongoing effort to suppress all anti-nuclear media 
coverage. Anyone trying to produce nuclear films hears 
from the industry" (p. 153). Widener claims he was threat-
ened in the middle of the night by the director of public 
relations at the AEC while he was working on "The Powers 
That Be." Smith states that: 
Today, the nuclear industry is spending more 
and more of its energy and resources on self-
defense. In addition to stepped-up advertis-
ing and public relations programs, the 
industry is attempting to block production or 
airing of films and television shows that de-
pict a less than rosy picture of nuclear power. 
The industry's efforts have gone so far as to 
intimidate and stifle the civil liberties of 
several television and film producers attempt-
ing to document some of the flaws in nuclear 
technology (pp. 153-154). 
117 
Despite the nuclear industry's efforts to discourage 
and suppress anti-nuclear films, the volumn of such films 
has been growing. The following is a representative list 
of such films by titles and producers: 
1. 'The China Syndrome' (1979), full-length film 
from United Artists. 
2. 'Danger, Radioactive Wastes' (1977), NBC-TV; 
from Suffolk for Safe Energy. 
3. 'Energy: The Nuclear Alternative' (1973), 
Citizens Energy Council. 
4. 'The Medical Implications of Nuclear Energy,' 
Earth Energy Media. 
5. 'Radiation and Health,' Green Mountain Post 
Films. 
6. 'Last Slide-Show,' Mobilization for Survival. 
7. 'Nuclear Nightmare Slideshow,' Mobilization 
for Survival. 
8. 'Better Active Today Than Radioactive Tomor-
row,' Green Mountain Post Films. 
9. 'Lovejoy's Nuclear War' (1975), Citizens En-
ergy Council. 
10. 'Nuclear Stew: Arizona Style,' Committee for 
a Non-Nuclear Future (Reader, 1980, p. 132). 
The power of nonviolent direct action as a movement 
tactic depends upon an appeal to the conscience of the pub-
lie. In a mass media society, television must be used as 
a medium for dramatizing and publicizing demands and is-
sues to the American citizen. Television has become a 
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leading force in the arsenal of public relations tactics 
for the anti-nuclear movement, especially during occupa-
tions of nuclear sites. The Sunbelt Alliance referred to 
the "unfortunate reality" of having to rely upon the media 
during the June 2, 1979, occupation of Black Fox in order 
to "convey the spirit and content of our actions" (p. 17). 
The above reference to the "unfortunate reality" was based 
on the belief by the organization that they .had been "vie-
tims of excesses and abuses" by the press and television. 
An entire section of the Black Fox Occupation Handbook is 
devoted to informational tactics on methods to minimize the 
potential for media victimization. The following is a 
statement from Sunbelt concerning appropriate tactics when 
interacting with media representatives: 
A reporter may approach any participant during 
the action. Be friendly and polite above all 
else. You will be giving witness to the integ-
rity of our efforts, so speak calmly but con-
fidently. Avoid using rhetorical language. 
Instead, choose your own words, those which 
come most naturally, and try to convey your 
personal experiences and feelings in simple, 
direct terms. Enunciate the purpose of your 
actions and speak to those substantive issues 
that are most compelling to you. It might be 
of benefit to you to prepare a short statement 
that is a succinct explanation of why you are 
there. Although it would probably be best not 
to memorize a statement, a carefully conceived 
argument will be something that you could rely 
upon if approached by a reporter. People 
planning to participate in the June action 
should take time to write letters to the editor 
of your local newspaper explaining your motives. 
Each area should make contact with the local 
press and convey to them the issues surrounding 
nuclear power. This can be accomplished by ap-
pearing on radio and TV talk shows. Though im-
portant everywhere, it is critical in areas 
where the Sunbelt has not had a local group in 
the past. 
Its important to know the basic facts and fig-
ures about nuclear power. Credibility can 
easily be damaged if it becomes apparent that 
you don't know what you are talking about, or 
if you use incorrect information. • . . Please, 
do not give estimates of how many occupiers 
are expected. 
Remember, no one is obligated to speak to the 
press. If you are uncomfortable speaking to 
them, politely decline. On one level, an occu-
pation is a public event; on another level its 
a very personal experience. A pleasant decline 
will be respected. 
The very structure of the Sunbelt Alliance 
evolves around public relations through media 
exposure. Task forces within the organization 
function as 'an information distribution net-
work, media coordination group, a printing com-
mittee, a fund raising committee, a member 
education program, local outreach, state and 
national outreach, and a printed media commit-
tee for {clip-files, educational materials, 
etc.)' {Sunbelt Alliance, 1979e, pp. 17-18). 
Reliance on the media for public exposure is found 
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throughout the national anti-nuclear movement. The media 
is used by the national movement as an effective way to 
disseminate anti-nuclear information and to promote a 
positive public image for the movement itself. The "media 
task force" within various anti-nuclear organizations is 
an important factor for coordinating media events among 
the various affinity groups. For example, the Coalition 
for a Non-Nuclear World, based in Washington, D.C., 
printed and distributed an information sheet prior to the 
Three Mile Island anniversary day in April, 1980, which 
contained, in part, the following information: 
Dear Local Contacts: 
With the TMI anniversary fast approaching, we 
wanted to let you know about some press efforts 
on behalf of the Coalition, the anti-nuclear 
movement in general, and the pro-nuclear forces. 
The week from March 23-30 will be saturated 
with nuclear-related stories: 
24 -- A tentative press conference with well-
known anti-nuclear spokespeople such as Ralph 
Nader and Henry Kendall. 
25 -- The Atomic Industrial Forum has scheduled 
a major press conference, and encouraged local 
press conferences or briefings around the coun-
try (see the enclosed memo describing their 
efforts). 
26 -- The Coalition for a Non-Nuclear World will 
hold a press conference announcing the April 26-
68 activities (see the enclosed press release). 
27 -- Anti-nuclear groups in Harrisburg will 
hold a briefing. 
28-30 -- Local events in Harrisburg and around 
the country (see tentative listing of local 
events enclosed). 
When you do local press work and hold local ac-
tions, please mention that your group is part 
of the Coalition and that you are planning to 
attend the events here next month. This will 
give the press a sense of unity in the movement, 
and show the grass-roots nature of the April 
actions. 
Will you be holding a press conference to dis-
cuss nuclear issues? If you do not plan to 
hold a press conference or do major press work 
around local events, we encourage you to repro-
duce the Coalition's release and mail it to 
your press contacts. We have left space for 
you to type in a local contact and telephone 
number; or, if you wish, send the release along 
with a letter on your organization's stationary 
(Kehoe, 1980, n.p.). 
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Rhetoric as a Strategy in Forming 
Public Opinion 
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Oberschall (1973, p. 28) has characterized the cen-
tral problem of mobilization for a social movement as one 
of "resource management"--the acquisition and use of 
money, time, talent, energy, and commitment, frequently 
in the face of opposition and repression from a hostile 
society trying to deny the movement such resources. This 
dilemma of determining the most effective allocation of 
limited social movement resources is formed in fact by 
the potential power of the movement in terms of the level 
of internal resources and skills and the degree of social 
threat posed by the movement by disruption or non-
cooperation. The anti-nuclear movement possesses many 
internal resources and skills such as leadership, writing, 
and speaking prowess (Barkan, 1979), much the same as the 
draft resisters during the Vietnam War who were middle 
class and relatively well educated (Baskir and Strauss, 
1978). The numbers of the anti-nuclear movement have not 
been large enough, however, for their protest actions to 
present a great threat of disruption to atomic plants. 
Because the strength of the movement lies in its internal 
resources (education and communicative skills of its mem-
bers), and its weakness has been a lack of power (limited 
numbers) to pose severe physical disruption to nuclear 
energy construction, the movement has focused on its 
public image via the press (Baskir and Strauss, 1978). 
Because of the structural, space, and time limita-
tions of the mass media, information communicated by it 
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is largely descriptive, not analytical. Social movements 
existing in a mass media culture must rely heavily on the 
form of information they want to communicate through the 
media, and less on the content of that information. Once 
a movement has a viable organizational structure, formal 
or informal, with committed members and able leaders, then 
a further critical element in successful mobilization be-
comes the group's appealing ideology or set of beliefs. 
One of the most important functions of an ideology is the 
legitimation of a movement, the explanation of the need 
for the movement or why it exists. Frequently, the impor-
tant elements of an ideology are expressed in the form of 
slogans and symbols, which are designed to succinctly ex-
press the legitimacy of a movement and what it stands for. 
To the extent that they "catch on" and become popular or 
faddish, they provide an important public support to a 
movement, even though their full meanings may not be under-
stood by those who verbalize them. 
Slogans as a form of oversimplified rhetoric are in-
tended to give brief and impressive expression to the 
basic content of the movement's ideology. They are heavily 
relied upon as a strategy of image maintenance by mass 
movements in a mass media society. Descriptive phrases and 
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slogans are more easily communicated and received within 
the framework of a mass media technology. As Mander 
(1978) stresses, because of the technical limits of mass 
media technology: 
. • • superficiality is better television than 
depth; verbal information is easier to convey 
than sensory information, since television can 
deliver words with little information loss; 
short subjects are simpler to transmit than 
multifacted information; the one is easier 
than the many; quantity is easier than quality; 
the bizarre always gets more attention than 
the usual (p. 325). 
Ideologies and slogans also have an important individual 
function for movement members, as well as the aid they give 
to the mobilization process. They help the members feel a 
part of something important, and they provide a sense of 
certainty and meaning for individual members. The Sunbelt 
Alliance reflects the national anti-nuclear movement in 
terms of its use of rhetoric in the form of ideological 
slogans. The following slogans are representative of the 
slogan rhetoric produced by the anti-nuclear movement. 
Many of these slogans can be found within Sunbelt Alliance 
literature: 
"Better Active Today--Than Radioactive Tomorrow!" 
"Demonstrate--Our Future Depends on It." 
"By Joining Hands Across the Nation, We, as a 
People's Movement, Can artd Will Stop the prolif-
eration of Nukes." 
"Peace and No Nukes." 
"Educate, Agitate, and Organize Against Nukes." 
"What do You do in Case of a Nuclear Accident--
Kiss Your Children Good-Bye?" 
"Diablo at Fault." 
"Hold the Baloney! Live Without Trident." 
"Nuclear Pollution Has no Solution." 
"God Bless Our Efforts to Stop Nuclear Power." 
"Nuclear Leaks can Cause Human Freaks." 
"Beware: Nuclear Power Poisons." 
"Plutonium Politics can Mean no Votes for Our 
Children." 
"What do You do With a Used Nuke?" 
"Rock-A-Bye Baby--In the Tree Top--Let's Make Be-
lieve the Fallout Will Stop." 
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The self-defined names of various anti-nuclear organi-
zations also have the function of providing expressive sym-
belie information to outsiders. The majority of or 
organizational names project images that evolve around one 
of three basic meanings: (1) environmental awareness, 
(2) geographical location, or (3) people-centered (grass-
roots) participation. Examples of these themes can be 
seen in the following organizational labels: 
Clamshell Alliance (New Hampshire) 
People's Power Coalition (New York) 
SEA Alliance (SAFE Energy Alternatives (New Jersey) 
Oystershell Alliance (Louisiana) 
Catfish Alliance (Alabama) 
Northern Sun Alliance (Minnesota) 
Great Plains Federation (Missouri) 
Armadillo Coalition (Texas) 
Cactus Alliance (New Mexico) 
Crabshell Alliance (Washington State) 
Sagebrush Alliance (Nevada) 
Abalone Alliance (California) 
Mothers for Peace (California) 
Upstate People for Safe Energy Technology (UPSET) 
(New York) 
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Safe 'n Sound (SAFE Energy on Long Island Sound) 
(New York) 
League Against Nuclear Dangers (LAND) (Wisconsin) 
Citizens Against Nuclear Threat (CANT) (New Mexico) 
Mobilization for Survival (Colorado) 
Nuclear Objectors for a Pure Environment (NOPE) 
(Vermont) 
People's Power Project (Missouri) 
Paddlewheel Alliance (Kentucky-Ohio) 
Citizens for Tomorrow (Wisconsin) 
Sunbelt Alliance (Oklahoma) 
Wilson (1973) posits that many social movements are 
often a::emembered more for their tactics than for their ob-
jectives. For example, Wilson sites student movements such 
as the Free Speech Movement and Students for a Democratic 
Society (SDS), which have achieved much of their notoriety 
through the use of disruptive and violent tactics and not 
through their verbalized goals and objectives, which were 
often poorly formed by the leaders and not understood by 
the public. Tactics contribute significantly to the estab-
lishment of the identity of a social movement because "tac-
tics may be all there is to see" in the movement (p. 226). 
Many social movements are not much more than tactical or-
ganizations, having little substance beyond their efforts 
to bring a cause to the attention of society or coerce 
some agent of authority. Again, for example, the Free 
Speech Movement defined its priorities around tactical ac-
tions such as disruptive demonstrations, instead of "proj-
ects such as building up a loyal following or establishing 
an organization" (p. 227). 
As stated earlier, anti-nuclear organizers as a group 
wanted to avoid the tactical-image mistakes of earlier 
126 
movements. The strategy of appealling to a grass-roots 
public was defined as best accomplished through the tac-
tics of nonviolent civil disobedience and careful image 
maintenance through the mass media. Rhetoric as a 
strategy in forming public opinion is symbolically con-
sistent with the nonviolent values of the movement ideo-
logy. It acts to establish public sympathy in accord 
with the overall strategy of nonviolent direct action. 
Furthermore, the reality of a mass media culture necessi-
tates relying on condensed, symbolic communication to in-
crease public knowledge of the purpose of the movement 
and to generate mass support. Image maintenance of the 
anti-nuclear movement is a function of the moral con-
straints implicit in their ideology and the structure of 
a mass media technology on wich they must depend for dis-
tribution of educational and ideological information. 
Single Issue vs. Multiple Issue 
Social movements throughout American history have 
had to decide on the number of issues to emphasize. For 
example, the Vietnam peace movement was divided by argu-
ments over whether to emphasize only the war issue or 
tie the war to issues of economic imperialism and racism. 
The current protest movement against nuclear energy has 
also contained debates and conflicts over the single is-
sue vs. multiple issue dilemma. Supporters of the single 
issue approach have argued that expanding the movement's 
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focus beyond that of nuclear power plants would become 
a source of alienation among the general public and tar-
get industry officials. Consequently, the anti-nuclear 
movement has generally avoided issues of corporate capi-
talism and socialism (Jezer, 1977). According to Alpern 
(1978), this issue dilemma is underscored by questions 
raised and statements made by nuclear industry representa-
tives concerning the movement's true purpose. As one 
industry spokesperson has asked, "Is it to stop just one 
form of energy, or is it social and political change?" 
(Alpern, 1978, pp. 27). 
Supporters of widening the movement's focus argue 
the necessity of attacking capitalism and promoting so-
cialism if significant social change is to be achieved, 
and assert that only this multiple issue approach would 
appeal to workers and minorities (Hedemann, 1977). One 
socialist, for example, has labeled the political ideo-
logy of the Clamshell Alliance as "incredibly mushy," 
while another has emphasized the need to stress workplace 
conditions in alternative sources of energy (Jezer, 1977, 
p. 17). The rationale of including less related issues 
to the question of nuclear technology has also been a 
source of conflict. For example, during the May, 1977, 
Seabrook occupation, a lesbian feminist affinity group, 
dressed in lavender, arriving at the scene, prompted one 
local organizer to complain that bringing in the gay is-
sue would alienate New Hampshire locals (Drolet, 1977). 
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The internal conflict over whether or not to widen 
the scope of the movement has had the effect of produc-
ing occasional contradictions in rhetoric style and con-
tent. The projection of a desirable public image has 
been accomplished by the use of verbal and written state-
ments designed not to alienate a conservative public. 
This dominant public relations strategy has been a na-
tional outgrowth of the ideology of nonviolent civil 
disobedience. Passive action is symbolically tied to rhet-
oric that is nonabrasive and humanistically oriented. How-
ever, there remains examples of verbal and written 
communication within the movement that is reminiscent of 
verbal attacks on the "establishment," and the intellec-
tual elitism produced by the counter-culture peace move-
ments of the 1960's. This style of rhetoric basically 
confronts the lifestyles and values of the same general 
public that tactics such as nonviolent direct action were 
designed not to antagonize. Although much of this rhet-
oric does not evolve from formal organizations such as 
the Sunbelt Alliance, it does encompass the general 
philosophical boundaries of the movement. For example, 
the following "Parable of the Atomic Fox," written by 
Father Bill Skeehan and published by the Tulsa Free Press, 
deals with the Black Fox nuclear power site by illustrat-
ing a moral attitude: 
Once upon a time, in America's most beauti-
ful city, a baby fox was born. Being the 
first born, he was called Atom. Quietly and 
slyly, he grew into a great black predator, 
hovering over the Eastern skies, waiting 
for his time, his own coming into power, 
waiting to pounce on the unexpecting city, 
laying waste its water and air. A fearless 
band of citizens, little, powerless people, 
organized Citizen's Action for Safe Energy, 
to confront Atom. For years, his mother, 
the local goddess of light, had made power-
ful friends among the city fathers and the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
But the real evil was THE POWER, another, 
deeper, hidden power, lying within this rich, 
lovely city. A power which creates selfish, 
aggressive, political and commerical empires 
--that negative, hopeless, and fear-ridden 
perception of reality that penetrates 'good' 
people, who were chased back into their 
shells, hounded by their own habits of fear 
and by a society that had a vested interested 
in exaggerating it. Why 'fight City Hall,' or 
the ominous NRC?' 
The case was heard, but not really heard, for 
THE POWER was present and mother fox pre-
vailed. She said, 'Let there be light, and 
there was light,' and the light of her eyes 
was Atom, the Black Fox. His lair was built. 
Many years passed. THE POWER remained. Atom, 
the Black Fox, was lord. Yet, imperceptibly, 
the light ebbed and slowly dimmed. Finally, 
only darkness remained (Skeehan, 1978, p. 8). 
A feature story in the Tulsa Free Press, entitled, 
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"Fox Breaks Ground Heads," is another example of rhetoric 
not designed to appeal to a wide public audience. The con-
tent of the story details some violent behavior directed 
toward Sunbelt Alliance members as they were protesting 
groundbreaking ceremonies at Black Fox. The introduction 
part of the article, however, expresses an overt "disdain" 
for the values and lifestyles of mainstream American 
society: 
One would think such a tragic occasion would 
be accompanied by indignant thunder and 
righteously aimed lightning bolts, but that 
was not the case:. As if to prove that we 
are on our own in the reality of our choos-
ing, the sun faithfully illuminated the 
whole scene; relentlessly scorching the par-
ticipants seated in metal folding chairs, 
fanning themselves, and disregarding the 
source of all life on this planet. 
The speakers gathered on the flag-bedecked 
rostrum to congratulate themselves on how 
well they have done in making themselves 
wealthy; in concealing their malevolent in-
tentions from those to whom they are respons-
ible; in launching the largest construction 
project in Oklahoma's history; and providing 
hundreds of working class people with a 
chance to be significantly included in the 
destruction of mankind and the elevation of 
cancer from a chance disease to a national 
way of life. One gets the impression that 
these heartless mannequins would set up con-
cession stands and sell tickets to Judgement 
Day, then again, maybe they already have. 
A small group of people loosely affiliated 
with the Sunbelt Alliance, an organization 
opposing the proliferation of nuclear plants 
in the Southwest, stood conspicuously to one 
side. Dressed in black, symbolic of mourn-
ing, they looked on incredulously as the 
bulldozers scurried to and fro in the distant 
valley; snorting, churning up rodigious 
clouds of top soil mingled with exhaust fumes, 
appearing to be surreal insects greedily con-
suming everything in sight. 
The Catoosa High School band plodded through 
an old Beatles tune while the pubescent cheer-
leading squad pranced and smiled nervously 
through gleaming braces, the sun flushing 
their rouged cheeks. Their proud parents 
probably fear food stains on their uniforms 
more than the incipient cancer epidemic they 
so innocently celebrate. 
The first speaker, a philistine responsible 
for the benediction, tells us that ' ••• the 
power of the Lord can be generated in our 
lives.' He liberally quotes from the Bible 
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that man is above everything on earth, thank-
ing God and Public Service Co. , all in the 
same breath. The bulldozers belch their ap-
proval. One hundred thousand years--plutonium 
is forever and ever, amen (Tulsa Free Press, 
1978, p. 3). 
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CHAPTER VI 
PERSONAL IDENTITY MAINTENANCE AND 
MOVEMENT PARTICIPATION 
Mobilization: Developing and Sustaining 
Member Commitment 
Because social movements are deliberate collective 
enterprises that seek to promote or resist social change, 
they must develop contingencies for their growth and de-
velopment. The focus of this section concerns the prob-
lem of accounting for extreme commitment to the movement 
and the role of the movement's organizational structure 
in this accountability. Once an individual has become a 
member of a social movement, how is commitment developed? 
Answering this question will take up the bulk of this 
chapter. First, however, a brief overview of recruitment 
theories will be presented. 
Among the many attempts to clarify the recruitment 
processes of social movements, various forms of motiva-
tional analysis have been used, as represented in such 
works as Cantril (1941) and Tech (1965). The motivational 
model of analysis has typically focused on the identifica-
tion of the psychological factors which seem to make 
people susceptible to movement appeals and which motivate 
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them individually to sustain group affiliation. Zygmunt 
(1972) suggests that motivational analysis has generally 
taken the form of attempts to establish a "psycho-
functional" connection between the appeals of the social 
movement's ideology and the social-psychological charac-
teristics of potential or actual members. He writes 
that: 
These connections have been conunonly treated 
in terms of some variant of the idea of 
functional complementarity and elaborated in 
various theories of 'conversion susceptibil-
ity' or movement 'attraction.' The dominant 
imagery has been essentially 'psy.cho-economic,' 
depicting a situation of psychological 'sup-
ply and demand.' The 'demand' side of the 
psychological equation would be represented 
by the personality structure, with its needs, 
drives, and other motivational predisposi-
tions, and the 'supply' side, by the movement 
itself, with its promises and opportunities 
for need-gratification, tension-reduction, 
catharsis, predispositional expression, etc. 
(p. 43) • 
Social movements, from this perspective, are viewed 
as potential sources for the restoration of individual psy-
chological equilibrium. Some examples of this type of 
analysis are found in the early work of Cantril (1941) 
and the later writing of Toch (1965) , both representing 
social-psychological focus. Earlier writers, for example, 
Lasswell (1930) and Rinaldo (1921), emphasized deep-
rooted personality factors as motives for political group 
identification. The latest of the above mentioned, Tech 
(1965), is illustrative of more recent social-psychological 
motivational analysis. The key concept in his approach 
is the experiencing of a problem in a thinking, reacting 
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individual. Toch asserts that the gravity of problems 
felt by people can only be understood in the context of 
attitudes, feelings, expectations, and needs of affected 
persons. For problem situations to produce a social 
movement, people must feel the problem, believe some-
thing can be done about it, and want to do something 
about it. All of this must occur within individuals be-
fore a collective action can occur. A person's suscepti-
bility to join a social movement can be linked to his 
or her individual search for meaning and a desire to be 
involved in a form of change that will produce that mean-
ing. Therefore, a psychological bond exists between a 
movement's ability to promote itself and the individual's 
willingness to accept. For Tech, the appeals of the 
movement and the acceptance or rejection of those appeals 
by individuals is the major element in the linkage be-
tween the social and the psychological. Tech suggests 
that most membership into social movements is recruited 
from the "ranks of the desperate." This individual mal-
ady, however, is soon turned into a feeling of mutual 
reciprocity among the members of the movement. The 
mutuality of membership is a collective response to per-
sonally perceived social problems that are too frustrat-
ing to cope with alone, or problems that do not contain 
an individual solution. Tech highlights the personal 
benefits of social movements that stress pervasive con-
spiracy. This type of movement tends to exaggerate the 
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force it is fighting against in order to cement tension 
against it. It has the effect of simplifying the mem-
ber's system of reasoning concerning the focused target. 
Toch does allude to the difference between personal per-
ception and the reality of the movement as a possible mo-
tive for disaffection from the movement {Toch, 1965). 
Toch' s ( 1965.) social-psychological theory can be 
criticized for emphasizing psychological factors at the 
expense of the sociological. He gives little focus to 
the reality of objective social conditions that must be 
identified as needed targets for change. Social movements 
are collective responses to a perceived difference between 
social ideals and social reality. While it is true that 
individual perception of social reality is an important 
factor for motivation to join a social movement, the move-
ment itself, as well as the social condition it is reacting 
to, can influence that perception. His treatment of the 
reasons for continued commitment of members to the move-
ment is very scant. He fails to focus on the role of 
group structure and process in generating and keeping 
membership. 
The concept of alienation is often seen in the liter-
ature as a primary indicator of social movement affilia-
tion and involvement. As Zygrnunt (1972) stresses, however, 
alienation may be manifested in a variety of ways, and 
many "alienated" people do not become involved with or-
ganized movements. He posits that neither alienation from 
a specific social reality, nor attraction to a social 
movement, can be fully understood only in terms of ap-
peals and susceptibilities. Social movements, accord-
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ing to Zygmunt {1972), are not merely vehicles through 
which already existing alienation may be expressed and 
remedied; they are themselves agents of alienation. For 
example, analysis of member recruitment to the sit-in 
movement reflects that individuals with "relatively stable, 
permanent deprivations," people who appear to be predis-
posed to movement affiliation, were "relatively late 
joiners" (Pinard, Kirk, and Von Eschen, 1970, p. 355). 
Evidently, these people had to be convinced that their 
deprivations could be changed through collective action. 
Their personal alienation was only a motive force for 
commitment after the movement itself agitated the feel-
ing. Agitation by the movement must be seen not only as 
drawing on predeveloped feelings of alienation, but also 
as creating and sustaining them by providing more speci-
fic targets (Lang and Lang, 1961). Motivational analysis 
merely treats alienation as a prestructural disposition 
which enhances recruitment susceptibility, not as an emer-
gent process of interaction between individuals and move-
ment structure. There is a frequent disregard of the role 
of movements themselves in generating and intensifying it 
(Zygmunt, 1972). 
Proponents of the motivational approach have used 
these selected dimensions of the recruitment process to 
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explain motives for movement involvement. The methodologi-
cal validity of these analyses is often empirically weak. 
Assumptions about the psychology of human motives are in-
troduced but not tied to specific movement organizations. 
Often times the psychological motives for participation 
and psychological results of actual participation are con-
fusingly entangled (Zygmunt, 1972). 
A more realistic and fruitful analysis of movement 
membership must focus on membership management, with 
special emphasis upon the movement as a structural process 
of fortifying individual cormnitments. Social movements 
can change over time. How do they continue to hold mem-
bers to the goals and tactics of the organization? The 
movement must anchor individual self-identity to the group 
structure. Continued involvement from individual members 
is a variable tied to psychological cormnitment. Not all 
members of social movements are necessarily deeply com-
mitted nor does membership itself necessarily evolve into 
a deep cormnitment. As the length of membership extends, 
many individuals may become more closely associated with 
the movement by the expending of accumulated time and 
energy, receiving increased support from other members, 
and having a continual reinforcement of their needs and 
beliefs (Milgrarn and Tech, 1969). These elements are en-
hanced by the factors of: (1) inside reward contingen-
cies, (2) the instrinsic rewards of various activities, 
and (3) the development of morale (Perry and Pugh, 1978). 
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The understanding of these elements is best achieved 
by focusing on the impact of the organizational pattern 
and structure of the social movement. The relationship 
of organization to individual identity ma~ntenance rep-
resents a symbiosis between psychological process and so-
cial structure. A social movement is therefore faced 
with a dilemma: while it needs organizational projection 
of a positive image to the public, it must also maintain 
member loyalty by sustaining internal identity mainte-
nance. The anti-nuclear movement has addressed this 
dilemma by fusing maximum participant involvement with 
the expressed ideology of the movement. The organization 
of strategies and tactics compliment movement goals, 
public identity maintenance, and internal solidarity. 
Activity in the movement contributes toward solidifying 
self-conception when it gives the individual a signifi-
cant part to play in processes that highlight the move-
ment's goals and when it allows for the feeling of 
individual contribution. 
Personal Identity Maintenance and 
Movement Participation 
Every organized social movement represents some type 
of symbolic and normative structure into which members 
must be incorporated. The success of the movement depends 
upon its ability to draw individuals into the social-
psychological framework of its influence and maintain 
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their loyalty to the group. Mobilization of people for 
action not only involves a collec~ive definition of pur-
pose but also individually altered routines that are ne-
cessary to sustain the movement (Garner, 1977). Every 
movement group who seeks continued allegiance from its 
members must promote the incorporation of individual mem-
bership into individual self-conception. The greater an 
individual's personal identity with a movement, the 
greater his or her commitment to the movement goals is 
likely to be. The specific purposes of the movement's 
formation are often not enough in and of themselves to 
sustain individual loyalty and recruit new members. The 
structure of the organization in terms of the methods 
used to realize its purposes plays a significant role in 
keeping members. The structure of the anti-nuclear move-
ment is a realistic reflection of its purpose. Anti-
nuclear ideology carries with it a philosophical 
orientation toward democratic or "grass-roots" partici-
pation in social decision making. This philosophy of 
equal participation carries over into the structure of 
movement decisions concerning strategy and tactics. The 
individual member is less likely to lose his or her per-
sonal identity in a group situation that allows for 
meaningful personal input concerning group decisions. 
The dichotomy between leadership and membership is more 
difficult to evolve in a group structure that encourages 
egalitarian participation. The structure of the movement 
in the form of consensus-style decision making and af-
finity groups, ideally prevents any individual member 
from being denied access to decision inputs. 
Group Dynamics: A Relationship Be-
tween Process and Structure 
To answer the question of how a movement group can 
generate and maintain a positive self-identification to 
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the movement among the individual members, a theoretical 
explanation is needed to form a base for later empirical 
examples. The generalizations emerging from these theoret-
ical comments will be applicable to the structure and 
process of the Sunbelt Alliance. The concept of group 
dynamics must include an understanding of the concept of 
group. As Lewin (1948) writes: 
The essence of a group is not the similarity 
or dissimilarity of its members, but their 
interdependence. A group can be character-
ized as a 'dynamical whole' containing a sub-
jective or psychological interdependence 
among the individuals who form its member-
ship (p. 54). 
French (1944) points out that, in addition to interdepend-
ence, membership in a group presupposes identification 
with the group. Deutsch (1959) indicates that the inter-
dependence is that of promotive or cooperative interde-
pendence, rather than, for example, competitive 
interdependence. Therefore, a group can be defined as 
being composed of indf.viduals who mutually perceive them-
selves to be cooperatively interdependent in some degree. 
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Thus, group dynamics implies a focus on the internal 
characteristics of groups, that is, on internal structural 
and dynamic properties. One of the significant experi-
mental concepts of group dynamics is that of gro.up cohe-
siveness. It is intuitively clear that cohesiveness re-
fers to the elements which bond the parts of a group to-
gether and serve to negate disruptive influences. These 
elements act on members to remain in the group. Group co-
hesiveness is based on the degree of perceived cooperative 
interdependence among members and to the strength of goals 
about which the members are cooperatively interdependent 
(Zander and Cartwright, 1962). 
Summarizing the large amount of research dealing with 
the concept of group cohesiveness, Collins and Guetzkow; 
Hare, McGrath and Altman, as cited in Deutsch (1968) sug-
gest that: 
We can state that cohesiveness, as measured 
by interpersonal congeniality, the desire to 
remain a member of the group, attitude toward 
the group's functioning, or other similar 
measures, is consistently associated with com-
munication among group members, readiness of 
group members to be influenced by the group, 
consensus among members on attitudes and be-
liefs that relate to group functioning, a 
sense of responsibility toward other group 
members, a feeling of personal ease and se-
curity within the group on the part of group 
members, and so forth. Also, task effective-
ness is in general positively correlated with 
cohesiveness if high accomplishment on the 
task is valued by the group • . • and if the 
task is such that its performance is likely 
to be enhanced by increased group effort 
(p. 46 9) • 
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Various measures of cohesiveness have been employed 
to help generate a common definition of the concept. One 
such measure focuses on the communication process within 
groups as it arises from pressures toward uniformity 
(Back, 1951). Lack of agreement among group members pro-
vides an unstable basis for beliefs and actions which de-
pend on social consensus for their support. This need 
for group consensus generates the need for uniformity. 
According to Festinger (1950), pressures toward uniform-
ity among group members may also arise because uniformity 
is necessary in order that the group may realize some goal. 
Festinger states that greater uniformity in opinion within 
a group may be brought about either be (1) communication, 
directed at changing the positions the individual members 
occupy relative to one another (for example, by attempting 
to influence others to change their opinions or by chang-
ing one's own opinions), or (2) by rejecting or excluding 
individuals with deviating opinions from influential group 
decision making (Festinger, 1950). These two elements 
closely parallel the function and consequences of consensus-
style decision making within the anti-nuclear movement. 
This process of maximizing the feeling of individual par-
ticipation in Sunbelt group decisions will be explored 
later ~n this chapter. 
For the present, it should be noted that consensus 
(as well as the use of affinity groups to be treated later 
also) represents within the Sunbelt group a property which 
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reflects the internal structure and characteristic meth-
ods of working. These forms of group relations also 
determine the extent to which members develop shared per-
spectives concerning organizational problems and goal ex-
pectations. They influence the motivation of individual 
members to perform the activities by producing congru-
ence of attitudes and a sense of cohesiveness. The anti-
nuclear movement stresses the assumption that members are 
decision makers whose individual choices must be chan-
neled in such a way as to allow expression, yet be ori-
ented toward the collective will of the group. Consensus 
style decision making approaches the realization of this 
balance. It recognizes the importance of group decision 
making and participation in motivating people. The 
solidarity that exists among members, in individual terms, 
is the attractiveness that the group has for each member. 
Every group has qualifications for membership. The indi-
vidual knows what makes him or her eligible and he or she 
is aware that membership requires certain kinds of con-
duct, attitudes, and responses to situations important 
to the group as a whole. Most individuals seek to accom-
modate themselves to the demands of the group up to the 
point of consistency with their personal values and norms. 
The greater the interdependence of each member to the 
other, the greater the sense of direction the group can 
maintain in terms of goal realization. Individuals with 
similar points of view, desires, values, and norms tend 
144 
to cluster together and thus social movements are born. 
Life as a viable movement, however, can only be sustained 
if member identification to the movement remains strong. 
The process of individual interaction within the struc-
tural framework of the group is the key element in the 
movement's viability. 
The group dynamics of the anti-nuclear movement has 
emphasized the necessity of compatability between process 
and structure. The linkage between process and structure 
is represented in the formation of superordinate goals 
which are equally compelling for all but which cannot be 
achieved by the efforts and resources of one individual 
alone. In general, cohesiveness is increased by conditions 
which cause group members to develop common perceptions of 
problems, to evolve shared perspectives of themselves and 
their group, and to become consistently and harmoniously 
involved with the strategies and tactics for the realiza-
tion of group goals. The use of the consensus decision 
rule by Sunbelt is a method wherein all individual view-
points are considered until a decision can be reached which 
incorporates the concerns of all members and to which all 
can give their consent. This means that the group looks 
for the "sense of the meeting" which involves the search 
for a proposal which will envelope the concerns of the 
individual group members as well as the needs of the group 
as a whole. The consensus method can only work effectively 
in groups of people who have a feeling of integration with 
each other and an agreement on common values. As Hare 
(1962) points out: 
Members will be satisfied.with the group if it 
has been able to solve the particular task or 
social~emotional problem in which they are 
most interested. However, high productivity 
in the task area is not always associated with 
satisfactory relationships in the social-
emotional area. In authoritarian groups and 
competitive groups, high productivity is often 
gained at the expense of member satisfaction 
(p. 356). 
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Consensus decision making in the Sunbelt Alliance is de-
signed to produce a communication network with maximum feed-
back by individual members. When free communication is 
maximized, each strategy advocated by a member has realis-
tically equal opportunity of being selected by the group, 
resulting in decisions that are often the median of indi-
vidual opinions. The following pages are a discussion of 
how this specifically operates :in the Sunbelt Alliance. 
The Sunbelt Structure of Member 
Participation and Its Impact 
Several scholars have analyzed the impact of the or-
ganizational pattern and structure of social movement 
groups on their ability to reduce factionalism and sustain 
internal loyalty. The anti-nuclear protest alliances have 
largely developed a specific organizational pattern follow-
ing the example of the Clamshell Alliance. To avoid the 
centralized power structure that anti-nuclear protesters 
believe was a significant weakness of the Vietnam anti-war 
movement, the alliances have emphasized democratic decision 
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making and maximum participation by all members. Influ-
enced by Quakerism, the alliances are nonhierarchical 
and decentralized. There are no elected officers or 
other levels of membership, and there is no centralized 
leadership. Rotating "facilitators" take the place of 
permanent chairpersons at meetings, and frequently everyone 
present must have an opportunity to speak before anyone 
can speak a second time (Gamson, 1975). 
Using the meeting process of the Quakers as a model, 
the anti-nuclear alliances reach decisions by the process 
of consensus, not by majority vote. Meetings take no ac-
tion that is riot consented to by every participant. The 
members who do not agree but do not feel strongly enough 
to block consensus may "stand aside" to allow the group 
to reach a decision, regardless of total group consensus 
(Barkan, 1979). The purpose and process of consensus 
decision making as a form of group dynamics was clearly 
expressed by the Sunbelt Alliance in their Black Fox Oc-
cupation Handbook. The organization defines the philosoph-
ical base of this form of activity by initially stating 
that: 
Democracy by consensus is an old and little 
used form of collective decision making. It 
has been carried into the present by the Re-
ligious Society of Friends (Quakers) who 
learned it from the Native Americans in the 
days before the original American Revolution. 
Consensus is a cooperative way for people to 
relate to each other as a group. But not 
every decision can be made in unison. Experi-
ence instructs us that times will arise when 
central decisions are ones that certain per-
sons will not be able, for a variety of reasons, 
find an absolutely unified ground. Mos't often, 
motivated by principles, in rare instances 
motivated by the intent to disrupt, small 
groups of dissenters have occasionally crip-
pled other alliances by blocking consensus. 
For this reason, the Sunbelt Alliance has 
adopted a consensus/two-thirds majority method 
of decision making. We strive first and fore-
most for a consensus within the group, but if 
that is unattainable, a two-thirds majority 
decision will be adopted as policy (Sunbelt 
Alliance, 1979e, p. 7). 
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The anti-nuclear alliances have been forced to make a 
trade-off between the psychological and tactical benefits 
of the consensus process, and the ability to act quickly 
in conflict situations. The Sunbelt Alliance recognized, 
for example, that reaching a true consensus can often be 
a protracted process and that decision making can fail to 
function smoothly. As Kuhn (1978) emphasizes, during times 
of stress or in situations that demand quick action, the 
decision making process of many nuclear protest groups 
has broken down. As an example, Kuhn documents that fol-
lowing the arrests of 280 persons during the April, 1978, 
occupation by the Palmetto Alliance of a nuclear waste 
plant site in South Carolina, 30 representatives of other 
groups making up the Alliance debated the question of 
bail solidarity. One side was proposing to pay up to $25 
bail per individual to avoid adding to the expense of in-
carceration by local residents. A more radical group ar-
gued that no bail money should be paid. Although a 
majority vote would have quickly resolved the conflict, 
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discussion continued for nine hours until consensus fa-
voring the $25 payment was finally reached (Kuhn, 1978). 
During the May, 1977, occupation of the Seabrook, 
New Hampshire nuclear plant site, affinity group deci-
sions were hampered by the failure to reach group con-
sensus. When the occupiers first entered the site, 
decision making broke down in an effort to decide what to 
do next, as affinity group representatives seemed to be 
coming back from coordinating meetings with "orders from 
above." The coordinating conunittee spent most of the day 
discussing such issues as what to name the site, instead 
of what action should be taken next (Hedemann, 1977). In 
other meetings during the following days, confusion over 
the meaning of consensus led to many debates over various 
issues. As one member stated: 
Some felt consensus required agreement by 
everyone, rather than a sensitivity to the 
strength of opinions and a willingness to 
step aside if your opinion was not based on 
a strongly-held principle (Hedemann, 1977, 
p. 14) . 
The Sunbelt Alliance attempted to reduce the possibil-
ity of similar decision making conflicts by opting for a 
combination consensus/two-thirds majority decision making 
format. The organization adopted and distributed a basic 
set of rules for the consensus process evolving from a 
clearly defined group-interaction ideology: 
Consensus requires that everyone con-sent; 
it does not required that everyone agree. 
We are an alliance that formed for a pur-
pose and, in order for us to reach consensus, 
we must inculcate in ourselves a willingness, 
a desire, to reach consensus. As an alliance 
of diverse people with diverse perspectives, 
we seek to cooperate with one another not to 
dominate one another. . • . The fundamental 
responsibility of consensus is to assure 
others of their right to speak and be heard. 
Sunbelt Alliance Rules of Consensus: 
--Be clear about areas of agreement. 
--The situation needing consideration is dis-
cussed. A clear idea of what decision needs 
to be made is formulated. A proposal can 
then be made. (Part of this discussion 
should bring out the present position or 
course of action of the group as it relates 
to the issue at hand.) 
--People present who do not speak are assumed 
to have no strong feeling on the matter. 
--After adequate discussion, it is asked if 
there is any opposition to the proposal 
as stated. 
--If there are no objections, the proposal 
can be formally stated and adopted. 
--Opposition to the proposal will block its 
adoption. 
--If the objections can be satisfied, a sense 
of the meeting can be taken again. If 
there are no further objections, the pro-
posal can be adopted. 
--If an objection cannot be satisfied, and 
no creative alternative solutions can be 
offered which meet no objections, then a 
vote on the proposal is taken. A 2/3 ma-
jority is sufficient to adopt the proposal. 
Since the object is consent, not agreement, 
there are ways to object without blocking 
consensus: 
--Non-support ('I don't see the need for this, 
but I'll go along'). 
--Reservations ('I think this may be a mistake, 
but I can live with it'). 
--Standing aside ('I personally can't do this, 
but I won't block others from doing it'). 
--Withdrawing from the group. 
Because of the fragile nature of this decision 
making process, we all must temper our aspira-
tions for the group with some basic guidelines 
for the consensus process. 
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--Responsibility - Block consensus only for 
serious, principled objections. Help others 
find ways to satisfy your objections. 
--Respect - Accept objections, trust those who 
make them to be acting responsibly. Help 
find ways to satisfy objections. 
--Cooperation - Look for areas of agreement 
and common ground; avoid competitive right/ 
wrong, win/lose thinking. When a stalemate 
occurs, look for creative alternatives, or 
the next most acceptable proposals. Try to 
advance the group synthesis. 
--Creative Conflict - Try to resolve the con-
flict. Don't abandon an objection for 'har-
mony' if it is a real problem that you are 
speaking to. Don't try to trade-off objec-
tions. 
We all have the same purpose: to nonviolently 
stop nuclear power. Seemingly irreconcilable 
differences can be resolved if people speak 
their feelings honestly and genuinely try to 
understand all positions (including their own) 
better (Sunbelt Alliance·, 1978b, pp. 7-B). 
The Sunbelt Alliance was partially successful in 
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guarding against decision making problems during occupation 
situations by developing contingency plans concerning the 
structure of decision making before the actual occupation. 
These plans are developed through a consensus format and 
then distributed to all support people before the occupa-
tion. For example, prior to the October 7, 1978, occupa-
tion of Black Fox, the Alliance distributed the following 
information to interested persons: 
Decision making for the occupation/restoration 
will be as follows: 
The steering committee will divide itself ac-
cording to those who will occupy and those 
who will do support. The occupying steering 
committee will be expanded for the duration 
of the action (beginning on the evening of 
October 6, when all affinity groups should 
be at the staging area) by one spokesperson 
from each affinity group. The support steer-
ing committee will be likewise expanded by a 
spokesperson from the support affinity gro.ups. 
This type of decision making will allow both 
continuity going into the action and an in-
creased democratization for the duration of 
the action (Sunbelt Alliance, 1978b, p. 2). 
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The benefits of consensus as a decision making pro-
cess are both affective and organizational. By maximiz-
ing individual participation, consensus produced positive 
morale and minimized potential feelings of disenchantment 
with group decisions. The individual's sense of personal 
• identity and contribution was enhanced because of the 
opportunity for information input into the collectivity, 
and because the group is defined as an extension of its 
individual contributors, not as an entity that suppresses 
individual significance in favor of structural hierarchy 
or a centralization of power. In terms of organizational 
maintenance, consensus has lessened hostility and group 
factionalism, and has thus served as a type of internal 
control based on the effective balance of individual 
identity maintenance and organization progress through 
group cooperation. When Sunbelt practiced non-consensus 
methods in the later stages of the movement, factionalism 
within the group was the result. This will be focused on 
in a later section of this paper. 
The emphasis of the anti-nuclear alliances on maxi-
mum individual participation is also reflected in the 
decision making structures they have adopted. According 
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to Barkan (1979), to reach "general" strategic decisions, 
each of the local groups that feeds into the larger, re-
gional or statewide alliance chooses a spokesperson to 
represent it in a coordinating committee that makes de-
cisions on this larger level, using the consensus method. 
Decisions reached by the coordinating committee are sub-
ject to approval by all the local groups, and thus a major 
decision may take two weeks or more to complete. 
The Sunbelt Alliance, as a regional organization, con-
tained the local groups in the following cities: Tulsa, 
Oklahoma (Sunbelt Alliance office), Oklahoma City, Okla-
homa (Sunbelt Alliance office), Norman, Oklahoma, Still-
water, Oklahoma, Fayetteville, Arkansas, Tahlequah, 
Oklahoma, and Witchita, Kansas. A significant part of the 
decision making structure during the planning and carrying 
out of specific protest occupations has been the affinity 
group. These groups had the function of the local groups 
referred to above and provided an important way to insure 
maximum participation and group support. The term "af-
finity group" is one the anti-nuclear movement has taken 
from the Spanish Civil War of the late 1930's, where small 
groups were the base of the nationwide anarchist organiza-
tion. Organizing affinity groups is a way of accomplish-
ing goals while allowing for the existence of group process 
through individual dynamics. Usually composed of 10 to 20 
people, they are large enough to be powerful and active, 
yet small enough to provide individuals with a sense of 
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equal participation (Gyorgy, 1979). Affinity groups are 
mostly formed during nonviolent training sessions pre-
ceding nuclear plant site occupations, and usually disband 
following the occupation and its legal consequences. 
These groups are organized on the basis of friendship 
ties, or other sources of individual alliances. The Sun-
belt Alliance organized its affinity groups around "a 
common core interest, such as women's and men's, peace-
keeping, old friends, or people who work together" {Sun-
belt Alliance 1979e, p. 12). 
In order to reach decisions during the planning and 
action of an occupation, every affinity group selects an 
individual to represent it on a coordinating conunittee. 
The decisions made by this committee must be approved by 
all affinity groups using the consensus process. The 
movement defines affinity groups as important beyond the 
short-term aspects of decision making. Gyorgy (1979) sums 
up the significance of affinity groups by suggesting that: 
The methods of organization that have been 
adopted and developed by the anti-nuclear move-
ment in the new direct action alliances do not 
pretend to solve the problems of sexism, domi-
nance and authoritarianism that are such an 
integral part of our society. But they are 
an expression of intent and interest in build-
ing a society where people do not dominate 
and abuse either nature or each other (p. 389). 
The Sunbelt Alliance maintained that affinity groups have 
three basic functions: 
1. They serve as a source of support for their 
members and thereby are a concrete reminder 
of our solidarity. By generating trust, 
they work against the possibility of dis-
ruption by provocateurs. They also pro-
vide emotional support in stressful 
situations. 
2. They are the basic decision-making struc-
ture for the occupation. They allow for 
decentralized tactical decision-making 
through use of consensus, thus evoking 
personal empowerment by giving all par-
ticipants a voice in decisions. In this 
way, representatives(spokes) from each 
affinity group will work together for 
coordination and decision-making. In 
this way, everyone's needs are taken into 
account. 
3. Each affinity group aims for self-
sufficiency on the site, planning its own 
support (for instance, food, medical, 
transportation, legal, and other needs. 
Within the affinity group, individuals 
will need to take or share responsibility 
for certain roles, including those of 
media, medical, peace keeping, spoke and 
perhaps legal personnel (Sunbelt Alliance, 
1979e,p. 12). · 
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Affinity groups are thus intended to produce the same 
affective and organizational benefits that characterized 
the consensus process of decision making. The groups serve 
as an integrating force that reduces the potential of the 
individual losing his or her identity in a collective 
structure. Organizationally, affinity groups provide emo-
tional and tactical support during occupations, where each 
group remains together and is self-sufficient. These 
groups also have produced a high degree of order and disi-
pline during the. occupations, helping to project a non-
violent image. Finally, the affinity group structure is 
a way of identifying potential disrupters of the nonviolent 
ideology of the movement (Kuhn, 1978). 
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The Sunbelt Alliance, as an organization, helped 
prepare its members both physically and psychologically 
for occupation/restoration situations. The organization 
accomplished this through the distribution of printed 
suggestions or "guides" that benefited each member during 
the protest. This type of individual preparation has two 
significant benefits. First, it insures that many poten-
tial problems of food, supplies, and health care will not 
occur during the occupation. Such problems, although per-
sonal in nature, can be a disruptive influence on the 
group process and accomplishments during occupation. 
Second, this form of preparation is a method of more fully 
integrating the individuals into the group structure. It 
provides the individual with a sense of security and readi-
ness, and fosters the idea that each individual is an im-
portant contributor to the success of the protest. Under 
the title of "Be Prepared," the Black Fox Occupation Hand-
book contains several suggested areas of personal readiness 
for individual occupiers. The suggestions are prefaced by 
the following general statement: 
When gathering together.your p~rsonal 
items, you should keep in mind the weight and 
bulk of the materials you bring, as well as 
the situation you are bringing them into. 
Oklahoma in June can be very hot, full of 
vengeful flying insects and very dusty. It 
can also be rainy and cold, especially at 
night. 
Your personal items should all fit into 
(or be lashed onto the outside of) a pack. 
Framed backpacks can carry heavier, bulkier 
loads than frameless ones but they can be 
cumbersome in tight situations (e.g., packed 
into buses) . Frameless packs have a problem 
with being very sweaty as they lie directly 
on the back. You should bring a sleeping 
bag or bedroll--a thin pad beneath would sup-
ply insulation and comfort (Sunbelt Alliance and 
Oklahomans for Nuclear Safeguards, 1979, p. 19). 
The personal items of clothing, toilet items, and 
equipment are suggested as follows: 
Clothing required: 
--one pair of good hiking shoes 
--two pair long, loose pants 
--two loose, long-sleeved shirts 
--two sets underwear 
--two pair wool socks 
--hat with (wide) brim 
--one pair work gloves 
--one jacket 





--one pair shorts or bathing suit 
--windbreaker jacket 
--one pair light shoes or sneakers (not sandals) 
--extra socks/underwear 







--wallet with (optional) I.D. 
--money, including change 
--Occupation Handbook 
--notebook, pen/pencil and stamps 
--large spoon and cup or bowl 




--first aid supplies and personal medications 
--tent and sleeping gear 
--insect repellant 
--gas attack equipment (see 'medical info.') 
Optional: 
--camera and film 
--birth control supplies 
--tobacco supplies 
--reading material 
--road maps of Oklahoma 
Natural fibers breathe best and wool stays 
warm when wet. Clothing should be light, loose 
and comfortable. Avoid expensive equipment and 
expect that anything brought might be lost or 
damaged. Please label all of your belongings 
with name, address, and affinity group. Avoid 
wearing jewelry. Avoid open fires and test 
cooking or candles in the tent, due to the dan-
ger of fires in a crowded area. No firewood is 
available on the site. 
You should bring an absolute minimum of 
1-1/2 gallons of water (only 12 pounds) ; 2-2-1/2 
gallons are recommended (Sunbelt Alliance, 1979e, 
p. 19). 
The Sunbelt Alliance, through its affinity group 
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structure, planned for the responsible operation and corn-
pletion of its proposed occupations. Social actions of 
this type require cooperation and communication between the 
various affinity groups. Each Sunbelt affinity group as-
surned the responsibility of providing for anticipated 
"group" needs. As stated earlier, the small size of the 
affinity groups (10-20 persons) allowed for collective 
task realization, while permitting relatively equal co-
operative input from the individual members. The soli-
darity of the affinity groups as separate units is based 
on the provision of various group needs during the occu-
pation action. As the Alliance stated: 
Each affinity group should bring its own 
shelter. An inexpensive 'tent' can be con-
structed by fastening two ponchos of the same 
type along their edge. . • . Add some mos-
quito netting or a lot of insect repellant 
and you have a good, warm weather tent. 
The affinity group should also bring 
cooking utensils, rope, first aid supplies, 
sewing materials, shovel, trash bags, a re-
pair kit with pliers, heavy tape, safety pins, 
glue, twine, etc. and any other materials they 
feel are necessary .. 
Self sufficiency concerning food is 
urged as the most efficient way of meeting our 
group needs. Each affinity group should come 
with at least four days worth of food ..•• 
It is suggested that all food be non-
perishable and easy to store or pack. Foods 
such as dried fruits, nuts, seeds, peanut but-
ter, dark breads, vegetables, hard cheeses, 
relatively short cooking grains and beans, 
granola, gorp, salami, powdered milk, fresh 
fruit, peas and sprouting containers are good 
items. . . . 
People with special dietary needs should 
come prepared and also refer to the medical 
section of the Handbook. Fasting is not rec-
ommended (Sunbelt Alliance, 1979e, pp. 20-21). 
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The Sunbelt Alliance stressed the importance of indi-
vidual physical and psychological health in order to in-
sure the success of the occupation action. Here again, 
the emphasis is placed on the self-sufficiency of each 
affinity group. A warning of possible problems during 
occupation underscores the need for group and individual 
readiness: 
Due to the situation we will be in--with 
poor or non-existent communication resupply, 
transportation and evacuation systems; expo-
sure to sun and heat and/or rain and cold 
and mosquitos, black flies and poison ivy; 
crowding and noise; very limited food and 
water; possibility of police use of violence 
and/or gas, those occupying must be prepared 
to take care of their own physical and psy-
chological health needs and conduct them-
selves in such a manner as to avoid or 
minimize medical problems wherever possible. 
By and large, those who occupy sites should 
be only those people who are capable of with-
standing the severe physical and psychologi-
cal stresses anticipated with minimal wear 
and who will be able and willing to conduct 
themselves with enough cooperation and self-
discipline in manners of safety, sanitation 
and support of the well-being of the other 
occupiers to help prevent or minimize prob-
lems in these areas ...• (Sunbelt Alliance 
1979e, p. 21). 
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Sunbelt urged people with health conditions that might 
be aggravated by the occupation action to consider a sup-
port role of some kind. This caution acts to reduce the 
possibility of unnecessary strain on other occupiers taking 
valuable time away from their purpose in being there. The 
Alliance recommended that those who should not occupy in-
elude: 
1. people who cannot stand prolonged periods 
of psychological stress. 
2. people with possibly life-endangering medi-
cal conditions such as asthma, heart di-
seases, epilepsy, severe environmental 
allergies, bleeding problems, kidney prob-
lems and pregnancy. 
3. people whose conditions are not life 
threatening but can still be severely 
aggravated by the situation (making them-
selves and others miserable such as sun) 
(Sunbelt Alliance, 1979e, p. 21). 
Finally, as a way of tolerating the various physi-
cal and psychological stresses that can occur during an 
occupation, personal and group conduct was outlined by 
the Alliance by suggesting that everyone: 
1. eat well and get enough sleep both before 
and during the occupation. 
2. wear the correct clothing: cover up from 
sun, rain, insects, and poison ivy and do 
not go barefoot. We cannot spare the 
water needed to treat the problems caused 
by not doing so. 
3. cooperate with safety and sanitation sug-
estions of the medical team. We will also 
try to arrange to have 'quiet areas' desig-
nated at each occupation site for getting 
away from the crowds and noise. 
4. bring a quiet personal activity to withdraw 
into as necessary (e.g., knitting, reading 
material), as well as some activities to 
do as a group (e.g., musical instruments). 
Quiet times are important too (Sunbelt 
Alliance, 1979e, p. 22). 
The medical team at the occupation site was responsible 
160 
for supplying over 69 separate first aid items. Each in-
dividual was also encouraged to carry on his/her person 
small first aid items such as bandaids, gas attack sup-
plies, and insect bite medicine (Sunbelt Alliance and 
Oklahomans for Nuclear Safeguards, 1979). 
CHAPTER VII 
INTERVIEWS: SUNBELT ALLIANCE 
CORE MEMBERSHIP 
The core membership of the Stillwater chapter of Sun-
belt consisted of approximately 10 individuals who were 
significantly involved in the structure and processes of 
the organization from its inception. Although some of 
these initial members have now left the community of 
Stillwater for various places, many are still living in 
the area and were very willing to be interviewed concern-
ing their personal observations of Sunbelt. This section 
represents a combination of input based on personal in-
terviews with many of the core members of the Stillwater 
Sunbelt Alliance. An attempt is made to reflect each 
person's individual conception of the organization concern-
ing structure, strategy, tactics, and goal realization. 
A major focus of the interviews is also the element of 
individual identity maintenance provided by the movement, 
as the members defined it. Because of the political na-
ture of this social movement, the persons interviewed 
are not referred to by exact name. This is done as a 
compliance to the request of some of the individuals, as 
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well as a way of, hopefully, insuring a complete and 
honest response to the questions. 
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At the time of the interviews, the Sunbelt Alliance 
was no longer functioning as an active anti-nuclear or-
ganization anywhere in the state of Oklahoma. As of 
March, 1982, the construction of Black Fox 1 near Inola, 
Oklahoma, was cancelled, thus assuring at least a tempo-
rary victory for the anti-nuclear forces in Oklahoma. 
Every person interviewed was asked to perceive the move-
ment organization at the time of their active membership, 
and not as an after-the-fact involvement. The social net-
work, making up the original core membership of the 
Stillwater Sunbelt group, is still present in the commu-
nity, with most respondents reflecting a sense of soli-
darity with the group as a whole. The following section 
is divided into categories reflecting focused variables 
of interest to this study. A series of open-ended ques-
tions were solicited from every subject interviewed, and 
individual expression of responses was encouraged. Most 
interviews were relatively lengthy, with average inter-
view time being approximately 1-1/2 hours. One interview 
lasted 45 minutes, while two others lasted over three 
hours. These interviews were conducted in Stillwater, 
Oklahoma on March 12-13, 1982. 
Purpose for Joining the Movement 
Most respondents indicated that their major purpose 
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for joining was a personal fear and dislike for nuclear 
power as an energy source in American society in general 
and Oklahoma in particular. For example some specific 
responses given were: 
I felt this was a way of expressing a long-time 
criticism of nukes. 
I saw it as an opportunity to help promote en-
vironmental salvation. I could not consciously 
stand by and allow Black Fox to be built. 
I wanted to do something about Black Fox, and 
saw my chance and went for it. The mess we 
have brought upon ourselves has got to be 
stopped, and I figured why not help stop it. 
I couldn't pass up a chance to actively try 
and prevent something that I was strongly 
opposed to. How many chances do we get like 
that--not many. 
I hate nuclear power and everything it stands 
for; that's all the reason I needed. I am 
not very reflective about these sorts of 
things. Something is either right or wrong 
and Black Fox is very wrong. 
Perhaps the single most striking feature of the respond-
ents regarding the reason for movement participation is 
their belief that society will face an ultimate "eco-
catastrophe" unless immediate and successful efforts are 
made to halt the construction of nuclear power facilities. 
As reformists they were generally knowledgeable about the 
potential dangers of nuclear energy and felt a strong 
need to influence public decision making about these 
dangers. 
As individuals, many of the respondents seemed com-
mitted to model their personal behavior after their ideals, 
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and try to convince others to do likewise. Such processes 
tend to occur in ideological primary groups where shared 
beliefs are linked to the establishment of personal and 
collective identity. The respondents all seemed to have 
a strong desire to "do good," or positive, as they defined 
it; to give of their time and resources to the common ob-
jective of t.he group; and to respond to a personal sense 
of dissatisfaction with the proposed construction of Black 
Fox. Participants were bonded together by a conunon set 
of beliefs that differentiated them from nonparticipants 
based on personal assessments of a target (Black Fox) 
responsible for their anxiety. Stated differently, these 
individuals appear to have adopted an environmentalist 
definition of the problem--that society faces a severe 
crisis and that a grass-roots organization is the best 
way of coping with it in the inunediate sense. 
There is a great deal of literature on the personal 
and psychological reasons behind decisions to affiliate 
with social movements, but there is very little agreement 
among scholars about these motivations (Cantril, 1941; 
Heberle, 1951; Lang and Lang, 1961; Toch, 1965). Some 
theorists have claimed that joiners possess extreme psy-
chological traits such as fanaticism or obsession found 
in the "authoritarian personality" or in the "true-
believer" (Adorno, 1950; Hoffer, 1951). There may be 
some psychologically extreme people involved in social 
movements, but such people are also found in other group 
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structures within society. Furthermore, if individuals 
do feel needs for affiliation or identity, these are 
likely to be as much social as psychological products. 
As Snow and Zurcher (1980) suggest, the extramovement 
social network may play a significant part in movement 
recruitment as well as "structural proximity, availability, 
and affective interaction with movement members" (Snow 
and Zurcher, 1980, p. 787). They posit that: 
However reasonable the underlying assumption 
that some people are more susceptible than 
others to movement participation, that view 
deflects attention from the fact that re-
cruitment cannot occur without prior contact 
with a recruitment agent. . • • This brings 
about the question of: what determines 
which potential participants are most likely 
to come into contact with and be recruited 
into one movement rather than another? (p. 789). 
The strength of qualitative research is that it re-
duces the reliance on esoteric theoretical constructs and 
relies more on the respondent's self-defined reasons and 
motives. A sufficient explanation of motivation for join-
ing a social movement can be found in an expression of the 
individual's focus and intensity of interests. If a per-
son's economic, political, moral, or other interests are 
threatened, or if he defines them as threatened, then no 
other special theory is needed. Social movement joiners 
are activists just like anyone else in these respect. 
Oberschall (1973) states the matter as follows: 
No one is in a position to disregard where 
his next meal is coming from and whether he 
is going to have a roof over his head. Lead-
ers and active participants in social movements 
are no different from other people: they 
fear punishment; they are vulnerable to so-
cial and economic pressures; they seek sup-
port and economic security; some can be 
co-opted; others corrupted (pp. 159-160). 
In summary, as Mauss (1975) writes: 
(1) a person becomes, and continues to be, an 
active member of a social movement out of cer-
tain interests that are usually quite plausi-
bly inferred and easily understood from (a) 
his or her position in the social structure, 
and/or (b) his or her special interests of 
an economic, social, political, occupational, 
moral or psychological kind; (2) a person's 
participation in and enthusiasm for a social 
movement can be expected to use or fall in 
accordance with his own calculus of the risks 
vs. the rewards he is likely to encounter in-
side and outside the movement, taking into 
account the variety and hierarchy of his in-
terests (p. 51). 
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There is some indication that a few of the core mem-
bers joined Sunbelt for more than environmental concerns. 
One core member, for example, stated that he saw the 
movement as an effective way to release some "personal 
energy" and as a way of expressing ''frustration with the 
whole capitalist industrial system." He maintained that 
the oil industry was too large and entrenched to effec-
tively attack environmentally. He saw the nuclear energy 
industry as a tangible alternative for the focusing of 
his personal concerns over increased industrial control 
of the environment for profit. 
Personal Identity Maintenance Received 
From the Movement 
As a group, the core members of Sunbelt expressed 
167 
generally positive feelings about their experience in the 
movement. The intensity of this feeling varied from per-
son to person, with some individuals expressing disatis-
faction with "infiltration" and changes in ideology and 
tactics in the later phases of the movement. The follow-
ing is a representative description of various respondents 
concerning the issue of personal identity maintenance and 
degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the 
movement. 
Interview One 
The first interview involved a young man in his early 
twenties who is majoring in horticulture at Oklahoma State 
University, living in a small apartment off-campus. He 
expressed a lot of positive feeling about the Sunbelt 
group, describing it as "very people oriented" and as an 
"educational and democratic experience." He said the group 
was well organized against the possibility of personal 
"ego trips." He used the example of the rotating role of 
meeting facilitator to support his point. At every Sun-
belt meeting, a different person was designated by the 
group as facilitator or controller of who could speak and 
when. This served the purpose of promoting order and 
clarity while reducing the possibility of arguments and 
speaking out of turn. Every person was allowed to finish 
his or her statement without being interrupted. The re-
volving facilitator role also fostered a sense of 
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leadership diversity among the members. He further main-
tained that the structure of the movement evoked within 
him a "sense of the right method, especially with consen-
sus style decision making." He further indicated that 
the group was deeply concerned with presenting a partic-
ular image to the public. He maintained that they did 
not "want to present themselves as sloppy, hippy radicals, 
but as intelligent persons with a community service mis-
sion." They had to work hard to promote the image of 
"not being radical freaks." In some instances, their 
image promotion paid dividends. In the early spring of 
1980, a series of courthouse meetings were held in Perry, 
Oklahoma, regarding the proposed construction of a chem-
ical waste dump on Blackberry Creek. Members of the 
Sunbelt Alliance were present to voice opposition to the 
proposal and were received positively by most of the 
local citizens attending the hearings. As the respondent 
claimed, "The locals were glad to see Sunbelt there." 
The major method employed by Sunbelt to promote a posi-
tive public image was the use of carefully prepared pub-
lic statements containing some factual substance about 
the dangers of nuclear power and well planned rallies 
and takeovers. 
In late October of 1979, a "mock funeral" was staged 
by the Stillwater and Tulsa Sunbelt chapters at the head-
quarters of the Public Service of Oklahoma in Tulsa. A 
casket was carried around the entrance to the building 
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followed by Sunbelt members symbolically dressed as the 
"grim reaper of death." They demanded, but were refused, 
an audience with the president of Public Serivce of Okla-
homa. The "mock funeral" was described as a "creative 
theatrical statement that symbolized all who have died, 
are dying, and will die from the use of nuclear energy." 
The Tulsa media was present at the demonstration and pie-
tures and interviews were freely given. This type of 
symbolism was necessary, according to the respondent, in 
order to focus dramatic attention on the urgency of com-
bating nuclear energy in Oklahoma. 
In responding to the question of personal identity 
maintenance gained from movement participation, this re-
spondent indicated that he felt the Sunbelt movement was 
like a "social experiment that was one of the most effec-
tive group activities to ever happen in Oklahoma." The 
movement gave him some identity that he didn't have be-
fore because of its focus on a common issue with others 
who felt the same way. He described the group as: 
. like a family with the first Black Fox 
occupation (October 7, 1978); the most beauti-
ful experience because of a strong sense of 
solidarity. The movement contained part of 
the activism of the anti-war movement but 
with a distinct spiritual component of the 
Woodstock generation; it was in the beginning 
a 'beautiful people movement'; a moral issue 
with the opportunity to put yourself on the 
line. 
Sunbelt received national publicity because of its group 
occupations in a "conservative, reactionary state like 
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Oklahoma." They became representative of the intensity 
against nuclear power construction and were often referred 
to by other national anti-nuclear groups as the "crazy 
Okies." 
As the movement progressed, however, this respondent 
became partially alienated with its direction. The Tulsa 
Sunbelt group began pushing for movement involvement in 
the protest of corporate power as a worldwide issue. 
Following the Iranian hostage incident in early November, 
1979, the Tulsa Sunbelt group wanted to publically criti-
cize the United States' involvement with the "corrupt and 
oppressive" reign of the Shaw of Iran. Many individuals 
in the Stillwater group wanted to remain a single-issue 
movement, focusing exclusively on the proliferation of 
nuclear energy. These people believed that Sunbelt in-
volvement in other political issues would destroy the 
movements' credibility with the public. This was es-
pecially a concern because of widespread public sentiment 
in Oklahoma against the new revolutionary government of 
Iran following the American hostage incident. Following 
a statewide Sunbelt meeting in mid November of 1979, in 
which the "Iranian issue" was debated, the Sunbelt group 
split into factions and faded as a cohesive anti-nuclear 
organization. Overall, this respondent viewed the Sunbelt 
movement as positive individual experience and an effec-
tive social protest. He did, however, regret the attempted 
expansion of the movement into other political issue areas 
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and found it increasingly difficult to identify with the 
movement in its later stages. 
Interview Two 
The second respondent was a young woman in her mid-
twenties who is currently a student at Oklahoma State 
University majoring in a physical science area. She 
joined the Sunbelt organization in Stillwater approxi-
mately two months before the first occupation of Black 
Fox. She does not consider herself as a political radi-
cal, only a "concerned environmentalist." Her general 
impression concerning her personal experiences with Sun-
belt were not as positive as those of the first respond-
ent. Her initial response to the group was one of 
"surprise," because of the intensity of the training ses-
sions. She perceived them as "exaggerating" the prob-
ability of violent confrontations with nerve gas and 
police harassment and felt as if there were attempts by 
some of the members to "unrealistically dramatize" the 
potential threat to the group. She stated that she did 
have a positive feeling about the small group concept and 
its participatory framework. As she became more involved 
in group meetings and activities, she became distressed 
about the gradual evolvement away from consensus decision 
making. She reported that one individual from Tulsa be-
gan to take on leadership responsibilities and that even 
a "suggestion of a leader went against her idea of what 
the group was all about." 
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She questioned the motives of some of the group mem-
bers as to whether they were more interested in self-
enhancement and gratification than in the real issue of 
nuclear power. She was strongly opposed to a multiple-
issue involvement by Sunbelt and believed that the Sunbelt 
name should not be used to "strike out at other issues 
such as the American involvement in Iran." She voiced 
the opinion that the first Black Fox occupation in Oc-
tober, 1978, had a significant positive effect on promot-
ing public awareness concerning the dangers of nuclear 
energy. However, she became disenchanted with the move-
ment on the night before the second Black Fox occupation 
on June 2, 1979. She disliked both the "pep rally" at-
mosphere with a few vocal leaders, and the fact that 
"outsiders and harassers had infiltrated the occupation 
site." She and some others left the occupation site 
and were not arrested with the group on the following day. 
Between the first and second Black Fox occupations, she 
observed a "change in some people" toward a more pro-
nounced leadership role and, as a result, the membership 
became less stable, with many individuals "corning and 
going" in terms of group support. She concluded the 
interview by saying that the purpose of the movement 
had been at least partially compromised by a few individ-
uals who "took it upon themselves to define the purpose 
and activities of the group." She believes that the 
Sunbelt name was "ruined in Stillwater and in Oklahoma" 
because of its attempted involvement with social issues 
not directly related to environmental protection. She 
did acknowledge the Sunbelt contribution to the preven-
tion of the completion of Black Fox as significant, but 
does not feel much personal affinity with the successes 
of the group. 
Interview Three 
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This interview was conducted with a female in her 
late twenties who had been a part-time college student, 
but is presently making her living in handcrafts. She 
labeled herself a "political activist" who considers en-
vironmental problems the most significant issues of our 
time. She had been involved in protests against the 
Vietnam War in its later stages. She joined the anti-
nuclear movement in April, 1979. She perceived the 
Stillwater Sunbelt group as the most active in the state, 
and believed that it was a "positive experience" because 
of the intense group commitment to stop nuclear power in 
Oklahoma. Like the previous respondent, however, she 
became disillusioned with the organization at the time 
of the second Black Fox occupation in June of 1979. 
She related that the primary intent of the group was to 
surround parameter buildings and set up tents during the 
second occupation. The Stillwater group, in cooperation 
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with other Sunbelt chapters, had agreed to this plan prior 
to arriving at the occupation site. After their arrival, 
however, a "small number of individuals decided to cross 
the inner fence in order to get arrested." She and others 
did not agree with the new plan and left the site before 
the actual occupation. She was angry because "three or 
four people" had taken it upon themselves to instigate the 
alternative plan. She remained affiliated with Sunbelt 
until late December of 1979. At this time, the Tulsa 
group had become involved with other political and social 
issues, some of which she was philosophically opposed to. 
She noticed, for example, that various people outside the 
movement changed their reaction to Sunbelt from a positive 
to a negative one following the group's attempt to become 
publically critical of America's involvement in Iran. Even 
though she considers herself to be a political activist, 
she disliked the group's orientation toward multiple is-
sues. She concluded by saying that if she had it to do 
over again, she would have become involved in the more 
"conservative CASE organization which remained committed to 
stopping nuclear energy as its only purpose." 
Interview Four 
This respondent joined Sunbelt six months after its 
inception and remained very active in the organization un-
til its conclusion. She considers herself to be an 
"activist-radical" and assumed the role of a "vocal 
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spokesperson" within Sunbelt. She admitted that she had 
an "ego involvement" with the organization and her leader-
ship role in it, but always tried to temper that by main-
taining a personal commitment to the prevention of Black 
Fox. She praised the consensus style of decision making 
and considered the "democratic experiment" to be a last-
ing, positive influence on her life. The only personal 
dilemma she confronted as a result of her affiliation with 
Sunbelt was the need to separate her anti-nuclear activity 
from her professional life. At the time of her Sunbelt 
membership, she was a state employee and therefore felt it 
necessary to keep her political protest activities sepa-
rated from her work. The more actively involved with the 
organization she became, the more difficult the separation 
became. As Sunbelt's activities became more intense, and 
their media exposure increased, she experienced some 
antagonism from her work associates. She handled these 
conflicts by "never discussing her Sunbelt activity while 
at work." 
She maintained that the structure of the Sunbelt or-
ganization was effective in preventing factionalism within 
the group. She suggested that some individuals believed 
that small groups within Sunbelt should be allowed to pro-
test nonviolently on any issue. She was much more inter-
ested in intense focusing on the single-issue of nuclear 
energy in order to protect the "public image of the group, 
and to insure success in stopping Black Fox." She took at 
least partial credit for the idea of the "mock funeral" 
used as a symbolic protest tactic by Sunbelt. She de-
scribed the creation of the idea as follows: 
We were driving back to Stillwater after the 
first Black Fox occupation, and it was a rainy 
night. I was in the lead car and when I looked 
back I saw a long line of car lights through 
the rain; it occurred to me that it resembled 
a funeral procession. The idea struck me that 
a mock funeral procession would be a great way 
to dramatize the death and destruction of nu-
clear energy. We used it and the idea spread 
to other nuclear groups throughout the United 




This interview was with a young student in his early 
twenties who joined Sunbelt at its inception and was an 
active member until the second Black Fox occupation in 
June of 1979. He stated that he was "not real open about 
his membership in the organization, but he never denied 
his affiliation with the group when asked." He had posi-
tive feelings about consensus decision making and affinity 
groups, although he maintained that some in the movement 
were "intimidated by the peer pressure to conform to the 
group process." He described the first Black Fox occupa-
tion as "fun; like war games with media hype and contin-
gency plans." He also suggested that Sunbelt was exciting 
because it was a type of "dramatic street theater" in 
which the "recognition for the anti-nuke issue was good, 
but a bad image for the group." The author asked him to 
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elaborate and he suggested that the public image of Sun-
belt was constantly having to battle against the more 
"mainstream CASE organization for legitimacy with the 
public," and although Sunbelt was more successful in 
dramatizing the anti-nuclear issue, CASE promoted a more 
positive image in the mind of the public because of their 
leadership and tactical use of public hearings and the 
court system. 
By the time of the second Black Fox occupation, the 
"media hype" had alienated this respondent to the point 
of disaffectment from the group. He stated that he favors 
"political tact," especially in a conservative state like 
Oklahoma, and therefore had little desire for a multiple-
issue focus for Sunbelt. He pointed to the attempted 
group involvement in the Iranian issue in the fall of 1979, 
as a "bad political move," in that the people of Oklahoma 
could "not identify with extremist politics." He refused 
to participate in the second occupation of Black Fox, but 
holds no "really negative feelings" toward the movement. 
He concluded by suggesting that the "ideals of the move-
ment were very worthwhile," even though he could not 
personally accept the direction of the movement in its 
later stages. He maintained that the Sunbelt alliance 
should be given almost complete credit for the prevention 
of Black Fox. 
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Interview Six 
This respondent was one of the original founders of 
the Sunbelt Alliance in Stillwater and remained very ac-
tive in the group until its demise. He labeled himself 
as a student activist during the Vietnam era, and felt 
the nuclear energy issue to be as significant as any 
America has faced since the war in Southeast Asia. After 
contact with the Tulsa Sunbelt group, he decided that his 
presence on the Oklahoma State University campus would be 
a logical link for Sunbelt in Stillwater, and the chapter 
was initiated through a campus meeting called "Nuclear 
Power in Oklahoma." This respondent was "trained" in 
nonviolence and the concept of affinity grouping by a rep-
resentative of Clamshell Alliance who was in Oklahoma to 
help organize an anti-nuclear network in Oklahoma. Sev-
eral meetings were arranged in which members were re~ 
cruited and trained for the first occupation of Black Fox 
in October of 1978. 
Following the first occupation there was a "profound 
sense of accomplishment; it was the largest single act of 
civil disobedience in the history of Oklahoma." After the 
first occupation, the media identified this respondent 
as the leader or president of the Sunbelt Alliance in 
Stillwater. He strongly denied this, saying that "every 
person in the group rose to their own ability." He sug-
gested that he and a few others may have given some 
-----------
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direction to group activities, but that decisions were 
mostly consensus based. This respondent stated his be-
lief in the importance of positive public relations 
balanced with the "clear message" that Sunbelt was willing 
and capable of using any method short of a serious felony 
to prevent the construction of Black Fox. The group tried 
to achieve some measure of personal repose with the authori-
ties in Oklahoma. They interacted with many state and 
local law enforcement personnel on a first-name basis, and 
tried to cultivate a respect among these officials for 
their conduct and purpose. 
A few individuals in the movement, including this re-
spondent, wanted the Public Service of Oklahoma (PSO) to 
view Sunbelt as "more than just hippies having fun." They 
felt it necessary to convey their serious commitment to 
stopping nuclear energy construction. The element of sur-
prise was also missing from Sunbelt tactics, as this re-
spondent describes: 
We needed to make the point that successful 
protest requires personal initiative--having 
to bring an idea for action before group con-
sensus was in a sense telling PSO the plans. 
We believed that creative nonviolence was 
needed to take PSO completely off guard. 
Although this concept represented a "divergence in 
function of Sunbelt," a "gorilla unit" was quickly formed 
in October of 1979. The "Halloween 14, 11 as they were 
called later by the media, without Sunbelt group consen-
sus, invaded Black Fox and were arrested for unlawful 
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trespassing on state property. The actual event was de-
scribed as follows: 
We wore ski masks and dark c lathing and jumped 
from a van with our only enemy a full Hallo-
ween night moon. We walked through several 
pastures filled with ravines and brush and 
finally reached PSO land--after crossing the 
fence, we walked and belly crawled until we 
reached the reactor site. The heavy machines 
were digging even at this late hour. We 
watched under cover until they stopped for a 
break. We darted out of the shadows and all 
14 of us chained ourselves to the earth movers. 
After the "Halloween 14" incident this respondent, by 
his own admission, became more "radicalized." He began 
giving public talks about the dangers of nuclear energy 
and became heavily involved in public relations and educa-
tion work. He was able to convince the "right people" to 
pressure the Oklahoma State University Student Senate to 
allocate funds for inviting to campus a nationally known 
critic of nuclear energy. The Young Americans for Free-
dom chapter at Oklahoma State University were very vocal 
against using student senate funds to sponsor an anti-
nuclear spokesman whose views all students did not agree 
with. There was an "information war" between Sunbelt Al-
liance and pro-nuclear forces in Oklahoma following 
"Halloween 14" and the second Black Fox occupation. 
Sunbelt was able to make enough money to support its 
activities and publications by asking rock bands to give 
benefit concerts in and around Stillwater. This respond-
ent knew many personal contacts in the music business, 
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and together with private contributions was able to help 
generate adequate organizational funding. 
Some Sunbelt members believed that they did not 
have ongoing participation. After the first Black Fox 
occupation, there was nothing to keep them active; two 
or three handled most of the "newspaper debates" between 
Sunbelt and PSO and the production of educational litera-
ture. Each group member had different levels of commit-
ment. For the core activists, site occupation was only 
one phase of an overall confrontation approach. "Court-
room battles" between Sunbelt members arrested after 
occupations and PSO prosecution attorneys. The purpose 
of this was "public exposure" with the opportunity to de-
bate nuclear issues. This respondent referred the author 
to a legal information section in the Black Fox Occupation 
Handbook, June 2, 1979, which reads in part: 
We regard the occupation as a moral impera-
tive; but as long as the state continues to 
support the construction of Black Fox, our 
actions most likely will be viewed as crimi-
nal and will thus bring us into the court-
room area. It is important that you realize 
that the responsibility that you assume when 
you go over the fence does not end once you 
pass out of the gate. Your presence in 
court has the same meaning and effect as 
your presence on the construction site. 
(Sunbelt Alliance, 1979e, p. 13). 
Asked about his feelings toward consensus style of 
decision making, he responded by suggesting that 
Consensus has two possible outcomes, and 
that what is decided by group consensus may 
not always be in the best interest of why 
the group was formed in the first place. 
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He used as an example the "negative result of consensus" 
during the second Black Fox occupation. He stated that: 
PSO wanted us to march to the site trailers, 
receive our tickets for unlawful tresspassing, 
and then go home. When a large group of us 
arrived at the fence, a few of us decided to 
go the opposite direction from what had been 
planned, in order to encircle the buildings. 
One group representing only 10 people, re-
fused to agree with the last minute change of 
plans and so most went unwillingly, like sheep, 
to get their tickets. This was a clear case 
of the majority will not ruling because of 
the restraints of consensus decision making. 
In terms of personal identity received from the move-
ment, this member seemed to view the organization and its 
activities as a positive contribution to his personal 
life. He was "proud" of the national exposure that Still-
water Sunbelt received and felt that he had played a sig-
nif icant role in that. The Stillwater chapter was widely 
known as the "street theater group" because of their 
dramatic symbolism in protest tactics such as "Halloween 
14" and the "mock funeral." At the National NJ.clear Mora-
torium Day held in Washington, D.C. on April 26-28, 1980, 
the Sunbelt Alliance was well represented with eight indi-
viduals from Stillwater alone. The "Okies were popular 
at the rally," and played a very significant role in the 
events, as this following account suggests: 
Nearly 8,000 people were massed in front of 
the Department of Energy with hundreds of 
police looking on. There seemed to be no 
focus or leadership, just a lot of nervous 
people. The Sunbelt group got the coffin 
out of our bus (named the White Fox, with 
Indian paintings on the side) and began to 
stir the crowd up. We were asked to lead the 
march to the Pentagon from the Department of 
Energy. The crowd started singing 'can't 
stop the spirit, its like a mountain,' and 
a huge funeral procession with 8,000 people 
snaked through the streets of Washington, 
led by Sunbelt and our coffin. 
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Some Sunbelt members, including this respondent, were 
also active in other anti-nuclear rallies and occupations 
at various locations throughout the United States. Ac-
cording to this member, the May, 1980, attempted occupa-
tion of the Seabrook, New Hampshire site was the most 
memorable because of the intensity of the protesters and 
the violence of the police. 
His concluding remarks indicated that he felt Sunbelt 
was a positive experience in .that it proved that "a grass-
roots movement could still affect social change." He re-
gretted that the "Halloween 14" episode was a source of 
internal conflict in the group and that multiple-issue 
questions had forced the disaffection of some core members 
from the group. He stated that the media had falsely 
labeled student demonstrations against the deportation of 
Iranian students as instigated by Sunbelt. Although some 
Sunbelt members did take part, it was never sanctioned by 
the organization. Personal identity with the movement and 
a strong sense of accomplishment were overriding themes 
in his concluding remarks. 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
Perhaps no social movement can completely escape the 
internal and external concerns of protest activity. The 
strategic and tactical problems of movement groups evolve 
from their attempts to mobilize needed external resources. 
The solidarity and morals of the individual members must 
also be maintained, making for even more significance in 
the movement's tactical and strategic priorities. No two 
social movements are exactly alike, and the problems they 
encounter take particular forms depending on the specific 
historical and social context in which the movement emerges. 
The degree of opposition the movement encounters and the 
"cultural ethos" of the society in which the movement finds 
itself are both pivotal factors in its structure and pro-
cess. However, the preceding chapters of the problems of 
the anti-nuclear movement illustrate the difficulties fac-
ing many types of social movements. The particular ex-
ternal and internal considerations of the anti-nuclear 
movement are handled through and modified by its focus on 
nonviolence and civil disobedience and by its innovative 




The external contingencies of the anti-nuclear move-
ment have largely focused on the need to create a favor-
able public image in order to win mass support for their 
cause. The technique of "impression management1" as1 de-
fined earlier, is for the express purpose of generating 
and maintaining a public image that will promote a broad 
based support dimension. The movement has selected the 
tactic of nonviolent direct action in order to present a 
positive image to the public and elected officials through 
the news media. This type of direct action is symboli-
cally tied to the carefully selected rhetoric of the move-
ment which has remained, for the most part, a method of 
generating descriptive and symbolic information for public 
consumption. 
Nonviolent direct action is an incorporated philos-
ophy of action that strengthens the ideological character 
of the anti-nuclear movement. The Sunbelt Alliance also 
used nonviolence as a philosophy of means instrumental to 
public relations purposes. The organizational literature 
concerning the use of nonviolent direct confrontation is 
based on the idea that actions affect goals. Their refer-
ence to the "individual and collective purity" brought 
about by the exercise of nonviolence is an attempt to fuse 
moral integrity with tactical behavior. Sunbelt made use 
of specific techniques in hopes of promoting this "purity" 
and to avoid the internal value conflicts among its member-
ship. Nonviolent training sessions, for example, gave the 
186 
group a sense of philosophical and tactical solidarity 
while also preparing them for responses to possible vi-
olence. The majority of core members interviewed defined 
nonviolence as a necessary and natural element of an en-
vironmental movement. The idea here is that the potential 
violence and destruction of nuclear energy can best be 
showcased by a philosophical and behavioral reaffirmation 
of its opposite. Most of the Sunbelt members had no per-
sonal dilemma in coping with a philosophy that they struc-
tured their individual lives around. The latent effect of 
nonviolence in promoting public good will was for many in 
the movement a natural and desirable behavior. The 
"beautiful people" movement, as one member referred to it, 
wasn't just a political statement; it was a statement of 
life values. There were no recorded incidents of initiated 
or reactionary violence among any Sunbelt members at any 
time during the organization's activities. This consist-
ency no doubt played a significant role in Sungelt's suc-
cess at public relations in Oklahoma. Although they had to 
fight many stereotypes and labels from a "conservative" 
public, violence and destructive aggression were not among 
them. 
Image maintenance was also promoted by Sunbelt through 
its effective and consistent use of the media. Some of the 
core members of the organization had a thorough understand-
ing of the value of media use for information dissemination 
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and favorable public exposure. Many respondents consist-
ently referred to "one or two individuals" within the core 
group that made intelligent use of press contacts and pub-
lie relations techniques. Many of Sunbelt's activities 
were specifically designed to generate media interest and 
subsequent public exposure. The "Street Theater" tactics 
of the group making use of such dramatic symbolism as the 
"mock funeral" and the "Halloween 14" occupation, were 
effective because of the media interest in their coverage. 
Like any insurgent organization, Sunbelt had to battle 
against biased and inaccurate media coverage of their ac-
tivities. However, the speaking and writing skills of a 
few core members of Sunbelt gave them an advantage that 
perhaps some other anti-nuclear organization did not pos-
sess. One individual was often referenced by other mem-
bers for his "ability to use the media in a dynamic and 
skillful way." There was criticism by a few of the mem-
bers concerning the compromising of group principles for 
personal media exposure on the part of some core members. 
However, as one individual stated: 
We knew from the beginning that we were fight-
ing a public relations problem. We identified 
the people in the group with the most skill in 
overcoming the problem in hopes of turning the 
media to our favor. There was some animosity 
about one or two getting all the coverage, but 
most realized the value of their talents for 
the good of the group. 
The structure of Sunbelt was based on the need to gen-
erate public exposure through the media. The "media -·-
188 
coordination group" was one of the most active within the 
organization. The Sunbelt reliance on the media for 
image promotion and generation of public awareness to the 
nuclear issue was in line with other alliance groups in 
the movement. By responding to reporters' questions in 
an intelligent and sincere manner; by exhibiting nonvi-
olence in their protests and occupations; and by making ef-
fective use of the media as an informational ally, Sunbelt 
was able to promote its cause. The methods used by Sunbelt 
to produce a certain public image established a "circle of 
consistency" in which they appeared to "practice what they 
verbalized." The media coverage of Sunbelt nonviolent 
direct action served to dramatize the nuclear issue while 
giving a measure of legitimacy to the group behind the 
movement. The integrity of nonviolence was not compromise 
through media exposure. As a result, the issue of nuclear 
energy was promoted because Sunbelt was able to effectively 
promote itself. 
The internal contingency of the movement evolves 
around the need to generate and sustain individual member 
commitment and energy to the organization. The use of af-
finity groups and consensus style decision making are the 
pivotal elements in this process. In the case of Sunbelt, 
both of these forms of group dynamics were viewed favor-
ably by the majority of members. Factionalism within the 
group was not the result of any ideological conflict over 
the acceptance of these elements as ideals. Rather, it 
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was a result of an inconsistency between the ideal struc-
ture and the actual process. Prior to the first Black Fox 
occupation, the group displayed a cohesiveness of purpose 
that seemed to be strengthened by the practice of consensus. 
During the first occupation, the cooperation and unity 
among the various affinity groups was viewed by most mem-
bers as a "beautiful experience." However, their concern 
with the image presented to the public intensified ideologi-
cal conflicts within the Sunbelt group over strategy and 
tactics. The choice of issues and the decision making 
process were the two important sources of tension following 
the first Black Fox occupation. The proponents of the 
multiple-issue approach wanted the alliance to expand its 
protest base from merely reacting to one form of energy 
use to include social and political change. Some of the 
core members pushed for increased group emphasis on the 
elimination of nuclear weapons~. They argued that a real 
relationship existed between environmental concern over 
atomic plant construction and the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. The majority of Sunbelt members, however, viewed 
this as an uneasy relationship, opting for the single en-
vironmental issue of nuclear power in Oklahoma. Their 
feeling was that a broadening of focus would make it more 
difficult for state residents to identify favorably with 
the movement. This argument was particularly intense dur-
ing the later stages of the movement, when such issues as 
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America's involvement in Iran was considered by some group 
members as a legitimate target of protest expression. 
Another source for internal conflict in Sunbelt cen-
tered around the specific goals of their site occupations. 
Some members were committed to the symbolic aim of drama-
tizing opposition to nuclear power through passive, non-
obstructionist tactics. During the second Black Fox 
occupation, for example, many Sunbelt members and sympa-
thizers were satisfied with voluntary compliance to 
ities' demands to leave the site. A second group wanted to 
blockade and occupy the site for a longer period. This 
resulted in a tactical argument at the occupation site 
which factionalized Sunbelt to the point of a permanent 
split of some members from the organization. It was also 
expressed that the "radical faction" had undermined the 
group process of consensus by "taking it upon themselves to 
alter tactics at the last minute." Both the affective and 
structural benefits of consensus participation were seen 
by some members as "co-opted" through the unearned influ-
ence of a few vocal individuals. 
The Sunbelt alliance encountered difficulties in the 
choice of issues, tactics, and organization which trouble 
all social movements and can eventually generate group 
factionalism. Within the Sunbelt group, these dilemmas 
were intensified by the size of the group. The smallness 
of its membership eventually allowed individual personali-
ties to gain control over the structure and ideology of 
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the organization; the same structure that earlier had 
been successful with winning publicity and achieving a 
favorable image. The group's moderate tactics, used to 
promote a positive public image, eventually alienated the 
movement's activists. The structure and process of the 
organization, which, in its beginning, was solidly merged 
through group commitment to an ideology and a goal, became 
separated. The separation occurred because of the group's 
inability to adequately respond simultaneously to external 
and internal contingencies. 
By tying together the two dimensions of external 
image maintenance and internal member identity to the move-
ment, this analysis has provided a more dynamic way of under-
standing the origin and consequences in a particular social 
movement of problems of strategy, tactics, and organization. 
Although many anti-nuclear alliances have practiced evalua-
tion of these difficulties, these dilerrunas may continue as 
the movement grows. There is evidence that the anti-
nuclear movement in the United States may continue to 
spread, especially concerning the issue of nuclear weapons. 
Also, if the construction of nuclear energy plants continue, 
even at a decreased rate, more insurgent groups can be ex-
pected to evolve. As Barkan (1979) notes: 
• . . the dilerrunas of the anti-nuclear movement 
underscore its instrumental nature; if its ef-
forts were primarily irrational expressions of 
distress, there would be little concern over 
proper strategy, tactics and organization (p. 34). 
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As stated in Chapter VI, the sociological analysis 
of social movements in recent years has focused on the 
instrumental-organizational quality of social movement 
activity while deemphasizing the traditional collective be-
havior orientation of social discontent. The members of 
social movements are seen as affected by collective goals 
and organizational control factors rather than merely 
alienation or some form of "irrationality." This approach 
views social movement organizations as having a number of 
strategic tasks which include mobilizing support, appeal-
ing to mass publics, and promoting social change through 
specific targets. The movement's relationship to the larger 
society is analyzed through the framework of rational appeal 
procedures, as opposed to uncoordinated, violent, or defi-
ant gestures. As discussed in Chapter VI, this approach, 
although analytically stronger than more traditional col-
lective behavior theory, is nevertheless beset with a lack 
of unity and a theoretical disregard for the interaction 
between the importance of external support and the need 
for internal solidarity maintenance. There has been rela-
tively little systematic research on the dynamics of this 
interaction process. In order to shed greater theoreti-
cal light in this area, this dissertation has contributed 
to the resource mobilization perspective by theoretically 
reducing the significant variables of concern to the is-
sues of external image maintenance and personal identity 
maintenance of the movement members. This analysis has 
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stressed the constant dilemma of maintaining a balance be-
tween the structure of the movement and the actual process 
by which this structure is or is not carried out. 
Every problem of strategy the movement confronts is 
based on the need to generate and maintain favorable pub-
lic identity, while simultaneously maintaining the personal 
commitment of its members to the organization. This theo-
retical approach represents a social psychological analysis 
in which the dynamics of interaction are viewed both ex-
ternally and internally in relation to the movement struc-
ture and process. The findings on the data collected 
indicate that the Sunbelt Alliance anti-nuclear organiza-
tion experienced a dilemma resulting from the tension be-
tween external and internal contingencies. The promotion 
of cooperative interdependence based on member cohesive-
ness within the group suffered because of the inability of 
the organization to maintain consistent agreement concern-
ing external targets. The structure of the group, which 
in essence, is its goals and ideology, was not consistently 
reflected in its process. Disagreement over external 
priorities eventually reduced internal solidarity, and the 
organization dissolved. 
Some important theoretical implications are suggested 
by the findings of this research. First, in contrast to 
the traditional assumption that social movements are held 
together mainly by the collective alienation of their mem-
bers, these findings indicate that the solidarity and morale 
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of the movement's members must also be maintained by 
constant attention to internal factors generating corrunit-
ment. The "external enemy" is not enough when disagree-
ment within the movement occurs concerning how to respond 
to that enemy. Because social movements are social net-
works constituting microstructures, these variables are of 
equal or greater importance than macro-social factors in 
effecting the goal realization of the movement. 
Secondly, the case of Sunbelt indicates that some suc-
cess in meeting external contingencies can produce internal 
disruption. The accomplishments of the organization in 
terms of media exposure and public image maintenance were 
strong enough, that some members eventually proposed a 
multiple-issue base of protest. This change of direction 
away from the single issue of nuclear energy caused 
ideological factionalism within the organization from which 
it never totally recovered. The basic tension between ex-
ternal and internal contingencies represents the social 
psychological dynamics of protest movements. Social move-
ments are organized, but not in the same way as highly in-
flexible systems. They are in a constant state of flux 
and the group must always be aware of a basic dilemma: 
While it needs organization to promote its basic goals of 
social change, it also must respond to problems of the 
internal process of maintaining member loyalty. The Sun-
belt group allowed the success of meeting its external 
problems to influence its internal consistency. 
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It should be noted that the data of this study is from 
only one group, and the inferences to be made from this 
study are, strictly speaking, to the population of the Sun-
belt Alliance in Oklahoma. More theoretically viable gen-
eralizations are possible with an enlarged data base. 
However, this analysis was conceived and completed as an 
attempt to direct further research into social psychologi-
cal dynamics of protest movements. The organization used 
as the data base is typical in many ways to most anti-
nuclear protest groups. Its size, type of members, and 
organizational structure are all consistent with the char-
acter of other regional groups reflected in the descrip-
tive literature. The absence of hard data and empirically 
based relationships may lend a feeling of inconclusiveness 
to this study. However, the observations made are clearly 
defined and focused. To that end, the goal of this analy-
sis has been a theoretical consideration of the particular 
dynamic tension between the external and internal contin-
gency considerations of reform social movements. This study 
will hopefull stimulate further critical inquiry into the 
nature of this dynamics. Throughout this paper there are 
unanswered questions. The study of social movements has 
never received the theoretical and research attention as 
many other areas of human behavior. Yet, the study of 
social movement dynamics contributes to our understanding 
of the behavior of people in groups and of social conflict 
and change. It is thought that this paper will contri-
bute to that understanding. 
Finally, although the Sunbelt Alliance could no.t 
escape certain problems of structure and process, many 
of its former members view the movement as a resounding 
success. They make a strong case for their position. 
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SUNBELT ALLIANCE BY-LAWS 
I. PROCESS 
All decisions, both at the local and organizational 
level, shall be made by consensus/two-thirds major-
ity rule. Consenus/two-thirds majority rule attempts 
to keep in balance both the ideal the Alliance has of 
bringing all participants into unanimity before doing 
an action or making a decision and the equally impor-
tant imperative of keeping the Alliance effective in 
stopping nuclear power. Whenever a proposal is made, 
therefore, the group should decide a time by which 
a decision should be made. If, by the deadline, the 
group has not reached consensus, a two-thirds majority 
approval shall be sufficient for the group to move 
forward. 
II. CRITERIA FOR APPROVAL AS SUNBELT ALLIANCE ACTIONS 
A. All actions must be done within the context of the 
Sunbelt Alliance commitment to communicative non-
violence. This means specifically: 
1. There will be full cooperation with the ar-
rest procedure. 
2. There will never be any type of property de-
struction. · 
3. There will be adherence to the 10 guidelines 
adhered to for the October 7th occupation/ 
restoration unless decided specifically other-
wise through the due process. 
B. All actions must come within the context of the 
Sunbelt Alliance's purpose of stopping nuclear 
power generally and Black Fox in particular. 
III. STRUCTURE 
A. Local Steering Committees 
1. The purpose of local groups is primarily to 
facilitate local outreach and education as 
well as to coordinate regional wide actions 
such as occupations and blockades. 
2. There should be regularized weekly meetings 
of all local groups, more often if necessary. 
3. Each local Sunbelt Alliance chapter shall 
send two representatives, preferably a male 
and a female, to the regional coordinating 
committee. 
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B. Regional Coordinating Committee 
1. The purpose of the Regional CC is to f acili-
tate both informational sharing/gathering 
between local Sunbelt Alliance groups and to 
facilitate decision making that will effect 
the Alliance as a whole. 
2. The CC will be made up of two representatives 
from each local group. 
3. In order for any proposal to become Sunbelt 
Alliance policy it must be passed by the CC 
as well as by each local group. 
4. If, by the time decisions must be made, a 
local group has not decided or cannot come to 
agreement locally, the group's representatives 
must stand aside in the CC voting. 
5. Committees which are regionally wide in nature 
such as the legal, training, and blockage com-
mittees shall each have one representative on 
the CC and shall have equal standing with the 
local representatives to the CC. 
6. CC meetings shall be held at least every other 
week, more often if necessary. 
7. Meetings should be rotated among the respec-
tive local groups to keep within the spirit of 
decentralization. 
C. All meetings, both local and regional, shall be 
open to all interested in attending. The only ex-
ception to this shall be the press, if and when 
sensitive issues of strategy and tactics are being 
discussed. Any exclusions should be done on a 
case by case basis. 
D. Committees/Taskforces 
1. Committees and Taskforces should be set up as 
deemed necessary by the local groups and the 
CC to effectuate policy and to make specific 
proposals for consideration. 
2. Regional wide committees shall have one rep-
resentative on the CC. 
3. All committees should attempt to keep a bal-
ance between old and young, male and female, 
as well as differing points of view that need 
consideration. 
IV. OFFICES 
A. The main off ice shall continue to remain in 
Tulsa. The center of the struggle is here and 
it is theplace in which the Sunbelt Alliance began 
in June, 1978. It is in Tulsa also that the 
greatest continuity will remain. As the main 
office, it is important that any decisions of 
a regional nature, particularly with regard 
to actions at Black Fox, have adequate Tulsa 
input. 
B. Local off ices shall be set up where and when-
ever the local group deems it necessary to 
further local outreach and to coordinate Sun-
belt Alliance activities at the local level. 
V. MEMBERSHIP 
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A. Any person may join the Sunbelt Alliance if that 
person shares the goals and objectives of the 
Alliance. The goals of the Alliance are to stop 
nuclear power on this planet through the means 
of communicative nonviolent action as well as to 
demonstrate the viability of alternative energet-
ics. The specific objective of the Alliance is 
to unconditionally halt the construction of 
Black Fox. 
B. Local Sunbelt Alliance groups shall be formed 
and have standing on the CC when there are enough 
individuals to form one at any given locale. 
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